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**Language and the Ultimate reality in Sung Neo-Confucianism:
The nature and inevitability of *Ch'i***

Nah, Seoung, Ph.D.

Harvard University, 1993

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Language and the Ultimate Reality in Sung Neo-Confucianism:
The Nature and inevitability of *Ch'i*

A thesis presented

by

Seoung Nah

to

The Department of East Asian Languages and Civilizations
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
in the subject of
East Asian Languages and Civilizations

Harvard University
Cambridge, Massachusetts

November, 1992

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Abstract

Throughout examination of the treatment of the concept of *ch'i* in the history of Chinese thought, beginning with the earliest references to it in *Tso-chuan*, this thesis takes issue with the conventional understanding of Sung Neo-Confucianism as being divided into the Schools of *li*, *ch'i* and mind, in a way which suggests that they are pitted against one another, and also questions the conventional classification of Chu Hsi, along with Ch'eng I, as belonging to the Study of *li*. The primary source of these mischaracterizations is a misunderstanding of the holistic nature ascribed to *ch'i*, which encompasses both *li* and mind in it.

The notion of this holistic nature (which is shown here to derive from *Kuan-tzu*, which describes *ch'i*, "that which cannot be spoken of," as the Ultimate reality) made it possible for Chu Hsi to assert that both nature and the mind, and *li* and *ch'i* form "duality in unity and unity in duality" (*i erh erh, erh erh i*) and that the Ultimate reality is "ineffable but still effable" (*wu-chi erh t'ai-chi*), which required that we take cognizance of a relationship of tension between these two aspects. However, effability or *t'ai-chi* alone came to be emphasized, with the result that the notion of tension that Chu Hsi had posited was not developed.

A second source of misunderstanding with respect to *ch'i* is the application of what might be referred to as an Aristo-

telian notion of substance, which presupposes the bifurcation of mind and matter, to a concept which is essentially holistic and all-embracing. To deal with this issue, this thesis proposes to substitute a definition of *ch'i* based on its function rather than its substance.

As to the nature of Sung Neo-Confucianism, including the thought of Chang Tsai, the Ch'eng Brothers and Chu Hsi, this thesis, against the discontinuous and mutually adverse picture of it which is conventionally depicted, proposes that it was in fact continuous and progressive, which is illustrated in its appropriation of Taoist-Buddhist concepts such as *ch'i*-cultivation and *wu-wo*, no-self, to the Confucian cause, although nominally opposing them in an effort to maintain a Confucian identity.

As to the fundamental nature of Chu Hsi's philosophy, this thesis proposes it be viewed not as a great synthesis but as a great interpretation of Confucian thought.

Acknowledgements

In 1983, I came to Harvard to study Chu Hsi (1130-1200), the main figure in this dissertation. My intent was to probe the question of why interpretations of Chu Hsi, particularly, his idea of principle (*li*), are different among Neo-Confucians? My previous study of the Korean philosopher Chông Ta-san (1762-1836) of the Chosôn Dynasty, and the work of Tai Chen (1723-1777) of the Ch'ing Dynasty had led me to that question.

In the course of study and research for this thesis, the following four professors helped me enormously: Benjamin I. Schwartz, Tu Wei-ming, Richard Niebuhr and Nur Yalman.

Professor Nur Yalman introduced me to "a new way of looking at things," structuralism, which is the underlying methodology of this thesis. Professor Niebuhr enlightened me concerning the variety of interpretations of the religious experience. Among them, I benefited most from Schleiermacher and James' theories of no-self and Whitehead's symbolism in conceptualizing the main issues of this thesis. Professor Tu introduced me to the authentic issues in Chinese philosophy, which helped keep my methodological concerns oriented to those issues. It was Professor Schwartz who guided me, with many insights, in incorporating these ideas into my thesis. I am indebted to him for the rendering of "ineffable but still effable" (*wu-chi erh t'ai-chi*) and for the coinage of "pan-

ch'iism," compressing the holistic and active characteristics of ch'i. Without the help of anyone of these four Professors, it would have never been possible for me to find an exit from the labyrinth of my thoughts about Confucianism. My heartfelt thanks are due to each one of them.

My special thanks goes to the Yen-ching Institute, which provided me with a generous scholarship for the initial three and half years and the last semester of my stay at Harvard. I also want to express my gratitude to Diane and Edward Baker for their moral support through the host family program, which made my life in America meaningful and memorable.

During my stay in Cambridge, I enjoyed the companionship of the members of the "senior club" and their families: Choi Jai-keun, Lee Min-yong, and Bae Kuk-won. I am thankful for their friendship, expressed to me in various forms during my stay, which has been a great morale support. Unfortunately, I am the first one to graduate from. I sincerely wish them a luck with their dissertations, and hope our friendship lasts beyond over days in Cambridge.

I am also deeply indebted to many other friends, whose names I cannot list here fully, for their encouragement. To name a few, Doctors Chung Kyung-wha and Yoo Joon-hai for their sincere concern about my health during the last three years' writing period; Ann Bartholomew and Ron Micheels for their hospitality and concern for my work and my family; and Cathleen McCarthy for her enormous efforts in making my

English comprehensible.

Last but not least, I remember the sacrifices each of my family members made for the sake of my prolonged study abroad: my grandmother, my parents, my wife Gui-woo, my sons Chong-yeol, and Chong-yoon and my siblings, Hyun, Kyung-hee, and Keoun. I remember my grandmother's wrinkled face. And especially, I remember my mother's face, as she looked just before her death from cancer in March of 1986. I am also mindful of the loneliness and hardships my father has had to endure. All that has sustained me amid a lot of difficulties, both at home and in Cambridge, was my will to give meanings to their sacrifices by completing the thesis I came to Harvard to write.

I dedicate this result of my intellectual and emotional struggle to my father and late mother.

To my father,
Kee-hwan Nah,
And to the memory of my mother,
Ok-young Lee Nah (1925-1986)

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Part One: Another Look at *Ch'i*

Chapter One: Untranslatability of the Term *Ch'i*; Ideas about *Ch'i* from the Shang to the T'ang Dynasty

While *ch'i* has been an important term throughout the history of Chinese philosophy, there has never been a consensus about its meaning, except that it has been used to explain various forms of reality. Originally, *ch'i* seems to have referred to psycho-physiological energy, but it was later to refer to matter, spirit, atmosphere, sound, smell, and even used as a verb. In other words, the particular denotations of *ch'i* have varied according to the writer and the era. While there are certainly circumstances in which *ch'i* satisfies the condition for "matter"--this is the case in which *ch'i* has a cosmological meaning--even then, however, *ch'i* resists translation simply as "matter." As "vital force," a rendering of Chang Tsai's concept of *ch'i*, and Mencius's "flood-like *ch'i*" imply, *ch'i* was believed to have within it properties such as "vitality," "psychological energy," "spirit," or "mind."

There are three influences, according to my analysis, which have contributed to the accretion of these complex layers of meaning: syncretism, supernaturalism, and rationalism, or philosophical idea. The influence of syncretism upon the development of the concept of *ch'i* was strongest in the

latter period of the Warring States (475-221 B.C.) up until the Later Han (25-220 A.D.). Its use in describing the human body, and particularly its use in medical terminology, represent examples of syncretism.

Supernaturalism may broadly speaking be divided into Correlative thought and nature worship, centering around clouds and wind respectively. Correlative thought, which can be found in incipient form in works as early as *Tso Chuan*, is conspicuous in *Mo-tzu*, before reaching its culmination in the Han Dynasty. The practice of nature worship is most frequently referred to in *Chuang-tzu*. Supernaturalism, aided by syncretism, contributed to an expansion of the definitions of the function of *ch'i* and its connotations during this period.

Rationalism, the main focus of this chapter, refers to a trend of thought first seen in *Kuan-tzu*. Kuan-tzu, first of all, divides *ch'i* into Tao and Power (*te*), which are tantamount to substance and function. He also distinguishes *ch'i* from *ching* (rarefaction), describing their relationship as that of reality and essence. In other words, Kuan-tzu tries to impute the operation of mental processes, "mind," to *ch'i*, thereby relegating *ch'i* to the status of the ever-moving and coarse. In this sense, the concept of *ching* can be said to provide a definition of *ch'i* which is based on rational speculation. Later two other philosophical approaches were used in defining *ch'i*, resulting in representational and ideational interpretations. All three ideas were incorporated

in constructing the Wei-Chin Taoist metaphysical framework of *wu-yu* (non-being and being), ultimately contributing to the development of the Neo-Confucian concepts of *ch'i* and *li*, initially formulated in the thought of Chang Tsai (1020-1077).

Despite many attempts by those writing in Western languages to translate the term *ch'i*, none have been able to understand and convey the unique associations which it has.¹ It seems that a serious confusion of categories has hampered their efforts. A quick glance at the translations rendered thus far would suggest that the conventional understanding among Western readers that *ch'i* is "matter" is predicated on the Aristotelian concept of substance. An Aristotelian dichotomy, as a result, has shaped the concept of *ch'i* and imposed upon it the wholesale character of "matter," preventing recognition of its singular nature. The consequences of this misinterpretation are particularly unfortunate when it comes to understanding the work of the Neo-Confucians, particularly the writings of Chang Tsai, and his legacy in the thought of Ch'eng Hao (1032-1085), Ch'eng I (1033-1107) and Chu Hsi (1130-1200).

¹. *Ch'i* has been translated in various ways such as "ether" (Bruce, *Chus His and Masters*; Bodde tr., *History*; Graham, *Two Philosophers*), "fluid" (Forke, *World-Conception*; Graham, *Tao*), "matter" (Le Gall, *Tshou Hi*), "material force" (Chan, *Source Book*), "matter-energy" (Dubs, "Mencius and Sun-dz on Human Nature", *Phil. E. & W.* 6 (1956), "vital force" Huang, "Chang Tsai's Concept of *Ch'i*", *Phil. E. & W.* 18 (1968), "configurational energy" (Porkert, *Chinese Medicine*), "ether of materialization" (Metzger, *Escape*), and "psychophysical stuff" (Gardner, *Chu Hsi: Learning*). For more detailed information about the translation of the term into Western languages, see Onozawa, *Ki no shi sô*, 557-567.

The dichotomous framework of the Aristotelian approach cannot account satisfactorily for the relationship between the mind (*hsin*) and the spirit (*kuei-shen*), two major immaterial entities in Chinese metaphysics. Simply because the mind and the spirit are said to be composed of *ch'i*, which can be described as having the properties of "matter," surely one would not jump to the conclusion that Chinese thought is materialistic. By the same token, it would be far-fetched for anyone to cite modern scientific theory which accounts for mental conditions such as memory as "matter" in an attempt to justify the relevancy of Aristotelian categories to Chinese concepts of the mind. It is high time to take a look at the way in which the Chinese themselves have understood *ch'i*.

Although the various descriptions of the nature of *ch'i* given by Chinese philosophers would seem to be irreconcilably in conflict--except with respect to their concensus that it is implicitly "above form" and explicitly "below form"--it is my view that there is in fact basic agreement between, for example, the views expressed in *Kuan-tzu*, and later by Chu Hsi, that *ch'i* belongs to both the knowable and observable phenomena in the world and the ineffable realm described in *Kuan-tzu* as "that which cannot be spoken of."

Kuan-tzu and his contemporaries obliquely describe *ch'i* as ineffable, but at the same time they rely upon *ch'i* in explaining the composition of both inner and outer worlds (pan-*ch'i*ism). From this obvious contradiction, one must

conclude that for them *ch'i* has a nature that is both ineffable and effable.

Chu Hsi, on the other hand, characterizes *t'ai-chi*, the Ultimate reality, as "ineffable but still effable" (*wu-chi erh t'ai-chi*).² As will be seen, the meaning of this phrase is as follows: *t'ai-chi*, the Ultimate reality, consists in *ch'i*, whose active nature is inaccessible through language (*wu-chi*). For this reason, the Ultimate reality as it is, *t'ai-chi* cannot be claimed to be the Ultimate reality, since it cannot account for the genesis of phenomena. In order to solve this problem, Chu Hsi, taking advantage of the traditional notion that began with Kuan-tzu which divides *ch'i* into substance and function, posits the substance of *ch'i* as *t'ai-chi*, the Ultimate reality, and thereby deduces phenomena from the substance of *ch'i*, *t'ai-chi (li)*, which stands for effability. Understood in this context, Chu Hsi's statement implies that the character of *ch'i* involves both ineffability and effability. From this, one can clearly see that Kuan-tzu and Chu Hsi agree about the nature of *ch'i* in terms of ineffability and effability.

In short, it seems that the conventional renderings of *ch'i* are unsatisfactory because they have confused the

². Do Kuan-tzu and Chu Hsi discuss the same topic? As conventionally understood the difference between *t'ai-chi*, *li*, and *ch'i* is such that there is no way to even conceive of a relevant connection between them. But as will be proven in the course of discussion, they are talking about the same thing. Simply put, one of the purposes of this dissertation is to bridge the two statements.

difference between its nature as substance and its role as function, and thereby unduly imposed the criterion of substance on the concept of *ch'i*. In other words, the concept of *ch'i* has been forced to comply with Aristotelian principles. Therefore, in this chapter, in lieu of an analysis of *chi'i* as substance, I propose to look at the ways in which its function has been defined, in the belief that this will provide a more satisfactory way to understand the uniqueness of *ch'i*.³ And it is also my contention, as I will argue in part one of this chapter, that the best way to treat the term *ch'i* is to leave it untranslated, thereby leaving to consideration its idiosyncratic character in the varying historical and intellectual contexts to which the concept owes its breadth and depth in meaning.⁴

This chapter is divided into two parts. First, I will discuss these contexts, and illustrate the instances in which *ch'i* also refers to "spirit" or "mind" in the works of major

³. Li Tse-hou seems to adopt a similar approach toward *ch'i* when he holds that "the categories of ancient Chinese philosophy such as *yin-yang*, *wu-hsing*, *ch'i*, *tao*, *shen*, *li*, and *hsin* are not so much substantial concepts as functional concepts." See, "K'ung-tzu tsai-p'ing-chia," *Chung-kuo she-hui-k'o-hsüeh*, 2 (1980), 91.

⁴. Needham first tries to translate *ch'i* as "spirits" (2.23-24), "air" (2.41) and "vapour" (3.217) in *Science*, and leaves *ch'i* untranslated thereafter. However, he basically understands *ch'i* as "pneuma," "subtle matter" or "matter-energy." Kasoff leaves *ch'i* untranslated in *Chang Tsai* (36); but he distinguishes three meanings in Chang's concept of *ch'i*: *ch'i* (primal substance), *ch'i* (tangible matter), and *qi* (undistinguishable). Schwartz raises the issue of the untranslatability of *ch'i* in *World* (179-184). Graham, leaving *ch'i* untranslated in *Tao*, understands *ch'i* as "universal fluid" (101) or "energising fluids" (197).

thinkers up until the Later Han, and also point out the limitations of Aristotelian logic in explaining the concepts of mind and matter, and the meaning of *ch'i*, limitations which in the past have significantly compromised the understanding of those reading Chinese philosophy translated into Western languages.

Then I will then discuss the reasons for these varying meanings and contexts in the original texts, beginning with Wang Ch'ung (27-c.100), a revolutionary figure in purging the legacies of supernaturalism and syncretism that had become associated with the concept of *ch'i*, and in finding a philosophical or rational way to treat it. At this point the focus of my thesis will shift to the syncretic blending which occurred between Kuan-tzu's rational idea and Wei-Chin Taoist metaphysics. With syncretism comes the introduction of the concept of principle (*li*) as a way of defining the substantial or essential aspect of *ch'i* in the conceptual schema of *wu* and *yu*. The substance of *ch'i* can be differentiated as ideational *li* and representational *ch'i*, depending on whether the substance is explained through the mediation of a mental activity which conceptualizes it (*li*) or a configurational image of things (*hsiang*). Chang Tsai in his philosophy of *ch'i* inherits the legacies of the representational idea of *ch'i*, ultimately leading to the exposure of a fundamental conflict over whether *ch'i* should be described as ineffable or effable. In this section the characteristics of ineffability and

effability will be used as the essential criteria in determining the proper meaning of *ch'i*.

Ch'i does not appear at all on the oracle-bones and bronze scriptures, but it can be found in thirteen entries in *Tso Chuan*,⁵ a total of twenty times (three of them in the form of *fen*). In *Tso Chuan*, *ch'i* is used to describe a kind of inner energy which is psycho-physiologically involved with man. This inner energy can be reduced to two categories, physiological energy and psychological energy. Physiological energy is supplied by food (nutrition).⁶ Although there is no explanation accompanying this use of *ch'i*, it is understood to be mediated by *hsüeh-ch'i*, blood-*ch'i*.⁷ Psychological energy

⁵. These are entries of Duke Chuang 10th, 14th; Duke Hsi 15th, 22nd; Duke Jang 21st, 27th; Duke Chao 1st, 9th, 10th, 11th, 15th, 20th, and 25th year.

⁶. We can see cases in which *ch'i* means physiological energy in Duke Shao 1st and 11th year (*shou-ch'i*: preserving energy). See Legge, *Classics* (hereafter, Legge) 5.573,632. The relationship between food and energy is seen in the following: "flavor is thereby to replenish energy (*hsing-ch'i*), energy (*ch'i*) is thereby to substantialize will" (*ibid.*, 5.624). A similar case is also seen in "Chou-yü B" in which both a sound and a flavor are held responsible for the production of energy: *sheng wei sheng ch'i* (*Kuo-yü*, 3.13b).

⁷. In *Tso-chuan*, *hsüeh-ch'i* is used in two ways: in the entry of Duke Jang 21st (Legge, 488), it refers to a positive "inner energy", while in that of Duke Shao 10th year (Legge, 627), it means a negative energy which causes troubles (*cheng-hsin*; disputing mind). Both cases are also seen in the *Kuo-yü*; "Lu-yü A" has the positive case (2.4.9b), and "Chou-yü B" shows the negative one: "if *hsüeh-ch'i* is not controlled, one becomes an animal" (1.2.7). It appears that the negative meaning of *hsüeh-ch'i* provides Confucians with the impetus for morality, whereas the positive one provides Chinese medicine with its theoretical basis: "*Hsüeh-ch'i* is the mysterious/ineffable (*shen*) of man." See "Pa-

can be translated as "morale," and this type of *ch'i* could be stirred up by the sounds of a drum.⁸ Though not clearly linked to either type of energy, "breath," which is the major meaning of *ch'i* in Lao-tzu and *ch'i*-cultivation (*ch'i-kung*),⁹ is also included among the usages of *ch'i* found in *Tso Chuan*.¹⁰

In the entry of Duke Chao 1st year, *ch'i* is given six categories, "yin, yang, wind, rain, dark, and brightness."¹¹ And in the 25th year, its scope is further expanded as it is assigned responsibility for the "five smells, five colors, five sounds,"¹² and even for emotions such as "liking, dislik-

cheng shen-ming lun," *Huang-ti nei-ching*, 8.26.168.

⁸. Duke Chuang 10th (*yung-ch'i* and *tso-ch'i*) and Duke Hsi 22nd year (*sheng-ch'i*). See *ibid.*, 85,182. And Sun-tzu speaks of this kind of *ch'i* in "Chün-cheng" (*to-ch'i* and *chih-ch'i*). See Sun-tzu (*CKTHMCCC* 72.165,168). This kind of *ch'i*, possibly a big issue in the power-oriented Warring States period (475-221 B.C.), can be seen in "Wu-tu" (*ch'i-li*) of Han-fei-tzu (*HPCTCC* 5.49.341), and in "Ch'i-ts'e" (*sheng-chih ch'i*) of Chan-kuo *ts'e*, 3.4.59b.

⁹. In Lao-tzu, *ch'i*, appearing 3 times (chap. 10, 42, and 55), has the meaning of "breath", or "energy." For more information, see Lao's (15,63,81), Chan's (116,176,197), and Wu's translation (21,87,113). It seems that Lao-tzu's concept of *ch'i* has something to do with *ch'i-kung*, or *ch'i*-cultivation. This is also the case with *ch'i* in the Taoism-related literature of later periods, especially of the Han (206 B.C.-220 A.D.) and after. However, we do not take it into our consideration of *ch'i*. For the interpretation of Lao-tzu from the perspective of *ch'i-kung*, see Chang Jung-ming, *Ch'i-kung*, 134-167.

¹⁰. Duke Chuang 14th, and Duke Shao 20th year. Legge, 91, 679.

¹¹. *Ibid.*, 573.

¹². It is also seen in Duke Chao 1st year (*ibid.*, 573). And the case in which *ch'i* refers to "smell" is also seen in "Ssu-tai": *shih wei wei, wei wei ch'i*. See *Ta-tai li-chi*, 2.9.69.7b.

ing, joy, anger, sorrow, and happiness."¹³ In other citations both *ch'i* and *fen* are used to mean "situation."¹⁴ And in two other place *fen* is used to refer to "atmosphere" and "clouds" respectively.¹⁵

Ch'i appears three times in the *Analects*. On two of those occasions the definitions of it given by Confucius (551-479 B.C.) are the same as those in *Tso Chuan*: "breath" and "blood-*ch'i*".¹⁶ The third usage of *ch'i*, however, provides a new meaning: *ts'u-ch'i* (speaking tone).¹⁷ It appears that, for Confucius, speaking is an outlet for one's inner energy which originates from blood, and is replenished by food.¹⁸

Mo-tzu (c.468-376 B.C.) introduces a broader meaning. The term *hsüeh-ch'i* appears only once in *Mo-tzu*, but judging from its context: *yu hsüeh-ch'i che*, i.e. one who has the blood-

¹³. Legge, 704.

¹⁴. Duke Hsi 15th year: *luan-ch'i*, or "a troublesome situation" (p.164), and Duke Jang 27th year: *Ch'u-fen shen-o*, or "the situation in Ch'u is so bad" (p.529).

¹⁵. Duke Chao 15th: *sang-fen*, bad atmosphere (p.657), and 20th year: *wang-fen*, reading clouds (p.676).

¹⁶. There are two cases in which *ch'i* is used in the *Tso-chuan* context: "breath" (*p'ing-ch'i*) in "*hsiang-tang*," and "blood-*ch'i*" in "*Chi-shih*." There is another citation in "*Hsiang-tang*." In this case, although appearing *shih-ch'i*, it is pronounced *szu-hsi*, or "rice." See Lau, *Analects*, 86, 164, 90, respectively. The case of *shih-ch'i* is seen in "*Lun-szu*" of the *Lun-heng* (HPCTCC 7.7.205), and in *Shuo-wen*, the entry of *hsin*: *shen shih-ch'i* (2.10a). In both cases, *shih-ch'i* means the acceptance of offerings by spirits.

¹⁷. "T'ai-po" (Lau, *ibid.*, 68). We can see the same expression in "*Ta-lüeh*" of *Hsün-tzu* (HPCTCC 2.27.332).

¹⁸. The relationship between *ch'i* and language becomes clear in "*Chou-yü*": *ch'i tsai k'ou wei yen*. See *Kuo-yü*, 3.13b.

ch'i,¹⁹ it seems that the term blood-ch'i has now been expanded to apply generally to a sentient being.

Mo-tzu also uses the expression *chih-ch'i* (will-ch'i),²⁰ which implies that he attributes to *ch'i* a kind of mental reality. He also suggests that *ch'i* is related to mental phenomena in his use of *wang-ch'i*, or reading *ch'i*.²¹ This was an ancient form of divination which predicted the future by reading clouds. Cloud shapes were categorized as *ta-chiang ch'i*, or greatly favorable *ch'i*, *hsiao-chiang ch'i*, or less favorable *ch'i*, *wang-ch'i*, or departing *ch'i*, *lai-ch'i*, or arriving *ch'i*, and *pai-ch'i*, or thwarting *ch'i*.²² It is obvious that here *ch'i* does not refer to a mere natural object, but a natural entity invested with subjective human emotions, implying that Mo-tzu perceives some correlation existing between the human world and clouds.²³ This association can be viewed as an incipient form of Correlative thought whose full development will be seen in the later Han Dynasty.

With Mencius (371-289 B.C.), salient developments occur in the way *ch'i* is used. Mo-tzu originally uses *chih-ch'i* to describe a mental outlet for inner energy. He then takes a

¹⁹. "San-pien," *HPCTCC* 6.7.23.

²⁰. "Ching-shuo A," *ibid.*, 6.42.204.

²¹. "Ying-ti-ts'u," *ibid.*, 6.68.339,340., and "Hao-ling," *ibid.*, 6.71.359.

²². "Ying-ti-ts'u," *ibid.*, 6.68.339.

²³. *Wang-fen* in *Tso Chuan* is also used in this sense.

further step and posits an order between will and *ch'i*; "the will is commander over the *ch'i* while the *ch'i* is that which fills the body."²⁴ Mencius thinks of *ch'i* as a source of energy with much potentiality which needs to be guided by a determined moral will:

Nourish it [*ch'i*] with integrity and place no obstacle in its path, and it will fill the space between Heaven and Earth.²⁵

This passage refers to what Mencius calls the plane of *hao-jan-chih-ch'i*, or flood-like *ch'i*,²⁶ a kind of religious experience in which one feels enlarged and extended in a flood-like way, becoming one with the Universe. For him the only way to obtain this experience is to nourish the *ch'i*, because "it is *ch'i* which unites rightness and the Way" for man.²⁷ From this context, one can posit that, for Mencius, *ch'i* assumes an integral but auxiliary role in moral activity. It is through the medium of *ch'i* that one's moral effort is consummated, but it is through subjective initiative that *ch'i* can be enlisted for moral purposes. That is, *ch'i* in Mencius is subservient to moral cultivation. Though assuming a material form, that is, "flood-like," the character of *ch'i* in this case involves moral will and ensuing psychological energy. From this, one can clearly see the complex character

²⁴. Lau, *Mencius*, 1.2.A.57.

²⁵. *Ibid.*

²⁶. *Ibid.* and Graham, *Tao*, 118.

²⁷. Lau, *ibid.*

of *ch'i*, which makes impossible any definition as a single term, matter.

There is another concept of *ch'i* which deserves mention with regard to the correlation between the natural environment and human beings. We have seen in *Tso Chuan* and in *Mo-tzu* that human situations are related to *ch'i* in that divination is possible by reading *ch'i*. Mencius thinks that humans and their environment are related, in that one's surroundings can change one's *ch'i*.²⁸ This use of *ch'i* refers to an outer expression of inner energy.²⁹

Kuan-tzu,³⁰ one of the most important source materials in the study of the concept of *ch'i*, vividly illustrates the pan-*ch'i*istic application of *ch'i* in describing both the outer and inner aspects of the world. First of all, *Kuan-tzu*, due to its affiliation with the Chi-hsia Academy, contains various functions and meanings of *ch'i* which presumably were derived from the ideas about nature available in the mid-Warring

²⁸. "Chin-hsin A": *chü i ch'i*. See Lau, *ibid.*, 2.7.A.280.

²⁹. Hsün-tzu's *ch'i-se* in "Ch'üan-hsüeh," and Lieh-tzu's *ch'i-jo* in "T'ang-wen" are in the same vein. See *HPCTCC* 2.1.10., and 4.5.59., respectively.

³⁰. Though Kuan-tzu (died 654 B.C.) was a revered chief minister in Ch'i, Kuan-tzu is believed to have been written between the 4th to 2nd centuries B.C. See, Graham, *Tao*, 100, and Rickett, *Kuan-tzu*, "introduction." The dating of *Kuan-tzu* has caused much debate. For details, see Li Chü-yang, "Tui k'ao-cheng *Kuan-tzu* ti i-tien k'an-fa", in *Kuan-tzu yen-chiu*, no.1, 30-41.

States period.³¹ Some of these meanings include that which constitutes the universe, the idea that *ch'i* is responsible for life, death, the four seasons, time, the change of day and night,³² and that it is value-laden.³³ Also in *Kuan-tzu* we can see that the term *ch'i* has acquired a whole new spectrum of meanings, being used in the description of natural conditions such as dry, humid, ceasing, smooth, heavenly, earthly, and human emotions such as liking, disliking, joy, anger, sorrow, happiness, resentment, dread, and intention.³⁴

One new development in *Kuan-tzu* is its elaborate description of the relation between *ch'i* and its rareification (*ching*), which is ultimately connected to the essence of *ch'i*, or to the mind. This explanation of their connection, the importance of which has long been ignored, will be seen to suggest the influence of the rational tendency which became important in pan-*ch'i*ism. This rational idea is predicated on the concepts of Tao and Power (*te*), or essence and reality, which would have to wait for Wang Pi (226-249) to be finally defined as substance and function in *ch'i*.

For *Kuan-tzu*, *ch'i*, pervading the universe, is a mysteri-

³¹. See Ts'ai Te-kuei, "chi-hsia tzu-jan-kuan chih chin-chan," *Chung-kuo che-hsüeh-shih yen-chiu*, 1 (1984): 36-44.

³². *HPCTCC* 5.37.222; 5.11.64; 5.5.13 respectively.

³³. We can see this in the concepts of *ch'i* involving rightness (*i*), good (*shan*), and bad (*o*). See *ibid.*, 5.8.38; 5.9.44; 5.37.223.

³⁴. See *ibid.*, 5.8.38; 5.26.156; 5.32.180; 5.37.222, respectively.

ous entity (*ling-ch'i*),³⁵ because although *ch'i* is believed to be responsible for the genesis of all things and phenomena, man has no direct access to it. However, Kuan-tzu appears to think that this mysterious entity must inevitably be relied upon if the ineffability of *ch'i* is to be accounted for. Here, one can sense the difficulty of describing the dual nature of *ch'i*, which partakes of both ineffability and effability. In *Kuan-tzu*, it seems that ineffability is represented by *wu*, non-being, while effability is represented by *Tao*. As to the effable nature of *ch'i*, Kuan-tzu further differentiates it into *Tao* and "power," which was perhaps the precursor of the concepts of substance and function. In this context, Kuan-tzu says:

The void (*hsü-wu*) and formless (*wu-hsing*) are *Tao*.³⁶

And:

Tao cannot be seen through its form (*hsing*) upon moving, through its power (*te*) upon acting, yet all things thereby have their essence. However, no one knows its limits. Therefore, it is said that [*Tao*] can bring about peace, but it is ineffable (*pu-k'o shuo*).³⁷

The substance of *ch'i*, that is, *Tao*, has a special meaning for Kuan-tzu. As the passage immediately above implies, *ch'i* is not a static entity; rather, it has motion as its major property. In order for this *ch'i* to produce things,

³⁵. "Nei-yeh," *ibid.*, 5.49.272.

³⁶. *Ibid.*, 5.36.219.

³⁷. *Ibid.*, 5.36.221.

Kuan-tzu postulates a condition of "acquiring Tao" for *ch'i*, or attaining its substance. Kuan-tzu holds:

The void is the progenitor of all things.³⁸

And:

Ch'i, upon acquiring Tao, produces [things].³⁹

What does "acquiring Tao" mean? Or, what does the substance of *ch'i* refer to? This context seems to require another set of paired concepts, *ching* (rarefaction) and *ch'i*, which can be translated as essence and reality.

The concept of the rarefaction of *ch'i* seems to presuppose a general notion that *ch'i* itself is coarse, or at least, not refined qualitatively. It seems that the Neo-Confucian consensus concerning the association of evil factors with *ch'i* is predicated on this idea. Meanwhile, as far as Kuan-tzu was concerned, there should be a logical need to differentiate the general function of *ch'i* which is responsible for natural reality from its special function involving production. Kuan-tzu envisions this special function as belonging to rarefied *ch'i*, which is described as having a particle-like shape.⁴⁰ In other words, he postulates the presence of the essential *ch'i* in the form of rarefaction within the universal *ch'i*, thereby attributing the function of the production of things and life

³⁸. *Ibid.*, 5.36.221.

³⁹. *Ibid.*, 5.49.270.

⁴⁰. *Ch'i hsi wu-nei, ch'i ta wu-wai*. See "Nei-yeh," *ibid.*, 5.49.272.

to the essential *ch'i*.⁴¹ From this, one can clearly see that Kuan-tzu's concept of *ch'i* includes the special aspect of *ching*, which is differentiated, but inseparable from, the ever-moving *ch'i* itself.

Kuan-tzu applies the same notion to the mind, in which the concept of *ching*, with definitive help from another concept, *li* (orderliness, or principle), comes to acquire the status of mental essence. Kuan-tzu says:

When the mind becomes calm (*ching*), *ch'i* becomes orderly (*li*).⁴²

This is the first case which shows the association of *ch'i* with *li* (principle) in the history of *ch'i* and *li*. Kuan-tzu appears to ascribe the causes of trouble in human life to *ch'i*. To be more specific, he appears to associate the turbulent and erratic mind with unrefined and turbulent *ch'i*. Therefore, it seems to be Kuan-tzu's underlying logic that if *ch'i*, the substance of the mind, subsides, thereby becoming orderly, then the mind, accordingly, could recover its essential human capacity, which, Kuan-tzu thinks, derives from the essence of *ch'i*, or *ching*.

The way to recovery, according to Kuan-tzu, lies in the

⁴¹. *Fan wu chih ching, tz'u tse wei sheng* (Always, the essence of a thing constitutes life). See "Nei-yeh," *ibid.*, 5.49.268.

⁴². *Hsin ching, ch'i li*. See "Nei-yeh," *ibid.*, 5.16.269. Meanwhile, the earliest record which shows the association of *ch'i* with order appears in *Kuo-yü*: "The *ch'i* in Heaven and Earth never loses its order (*t'ien-ti chih ch'i, pu-shih ch'i-hsü*). See "Chou-yü A," 10a.

curbing of *ch'i* by inner training (*nei-yeh*). In other words, if one concentrates on thinking (*chuan yü i*) and unifies the mind (*i yü hsin*), then one can predict things to come (*chih yüan chih cheng*), and can foretell good and bad luck fortune without divination (*wu pu-shih erh chih hsiung-chi*). With effort, Kuan-tzu holds, these things are possible for every man because of the extremely essential *ch'i* (*ching-ch'i chih chi*) with which each human is endowed.⁴³

From the above discussion, it can safely be said that *ch'i* is to *ching* what *ch'i* is to *li* (*t'iao-li*, or orderliness), and that both *ching* and *li* imply the essence of both *ch'i* and human being. What is apparent is that *ching* and *li* are qualitatively different from *ch'i*, though they are inseparable from it, because *ching* obviously refers to the mental essence of human beings, and *li*--though it will be a long time before *li* finally becomes "principle"--still has a potential status quite distinctive from *ch'i*.

The case of *ching-ch'i*, as has been seen, might serve as a graphic illustration of the functional approach to *ch'i*, because the concept of *ching* can refer to both rarefaction and essence, depending on the function the concept of *ching* performs. Clearly, the substantial approach, which accounts for only the particle-like, and ever-moving state of *ch'i*, is inapplicable to this explanation of the relationship between

⁴³. See "Hsin-shu B," *HPCTCC.*, 5.37.222. Similar expressions are also seen in "Nei-yeh," *ibid.*, 5.49.271.

ch'i and *ching*, a conception which might be described as illustrative of the uniqueness of Chinese logic, in which the the ineffable nature of something is explained by means of that part of it which is effable, thereby keeping them in a differentiated but inseparable relationship.

Hsün-tzu's (c.313-238 B.C.) ideas about *ch'i* are such a *mélange* that it is difficult to distill a coherent image from them, and in fact they lend support to my argument that the term ought not be translated with a fixed phrase. In Hsün-tzu's world-view, *ch'i* occupies the lowest level of existence below human beings, animals, and plants. He represents *ch'i* as water and fire, and assigns to it a material status without life.⁴⁴ On the other hand, he implies that *ch'i* is an essential common denominator shared by things with life, to the extent that the loss of *ch'i* leads to death.⁴⁵

The main use of *ch'i* in Hsün-tzu is in the expression *hsüeh-ch'i*, and here the influence of *Tso Chuan* and Mo-tzu is visible.⁴⁶ *Hsüeh-ch'i* is something which blocks the way of life, or something which encumbers moral cultivation. Hsün-tzu suggests that *ch'i* needs to be controlled in order to nourish life, and in order to cultivate the mind in which, he thinks,

⁴⁴. "Wang-chih," *ibid.*, 2.9.104.

⁴⁵. "Chieh-pi," *ibid.*, 2.21.270.

⁴⁶. *Hsüeh-ch'i ho-p'ing* ("Chün-tao," *ibid.*, 12.154), and *hsüeh-ch'i chin-li tse yu-shuai* ("Cheng-lun," *ibid.*, 18.222) show the positive aspect of *Tso-chuan* tradition in that they refer to energy. While, *yu hsüeh-ch'i chih shu* ("Li-lun," *ibid.*, 19.247) shows some affinity with Mo-tzu's *yu hsüeh-ch'i che*.

moral will and intention reside.⁴⁷ Though the term *hsüeh-ch'i* suggests that there are obstacles to it, Hsün-tzu appears to be optimistic about the possibility of moral cultivation. He believes that human beings are innately endowed with a special capability which derives from the essence of *hsüeh-ch'i* (*hsüeh-ch'i chih ching*).⁴⁸ So Hsün-tzu's usage of *ch'i* refers to both matter and mind, and imputes both negative and positive values to it, as is illustrated in the following passage from "Yüeh-lun" (Essay on Music). Hsün-tzu says:

When lecherous sounds affect man, an adverse *ch'i* (*ni-ch'i*) responds to it; and when pure sounds touch man, a favorable *ch'i* (*shun-ch'i*) responds to it.⁴⁹

In his cosmogonic sketch in "Chih-pei-yu,"⁵⁰ Chuang-tzu (c.369-286 B.C.) attributes life and death to the gathering and dispersion of *ch'i*.

Originally there was no *ch'i* at all. But, in the midst of disorderly wonder and mystery, a change took place, and thereby *ch'i* came into being. The *ch'i*, upon changing, caused a form, and thereby a life.⁵¹

What is obvious from the above passage is that *ch'i* is between *wu* and *yu*; both form and life originate from *ch'i*,

⁴⁷. *Chih-ch'i yang-sheng*, and *chih-ch'i yang-hsin*. See "Hsiu-shen," *ibid.*, 2.2.13,15.

⁴⁸. See "Fu," *ibid.*, 2.26.314. It is quite clear that Hsün-tzu is in the same line with Kuan-tzu in terms of the concept of *ching*.

⁴⁹. *Ibid.*, 2.20.254. This is also seen in "Yüeh-chi," of *Li-chi*. See *SSCTP* 3.11.1637.

⁵⁰. *HPCTCC* 3.22.320.

⁵¹. *Ibid.*, 3.18.271.

which came from *wu*. From a different perspective, this could be described as the unique mode of being in *ch'i* which spans both *wu* and *yu*. What kind of an entity is this *ch'i* which occupies a place between *wu* and *yu*? Has this *ch'i* anything to do with clouds (*yün-ch'i*), which are often mentioned by Chang-tzu in connection with *ch'i*?⁵²

The Shang Dynasty (16-11C B.C.), like all agricultural societies, was dependent upon favorable environmental conditions for its survival and security. For each successful harvest, essential for the prosperity of the state, it was at the mercy of natural conditions such as adequate precipitation, which in turn depended upon wind and clouds. For this reason, rain, wind, and clouds were regarded as different forms of the same thing, and were objects of worship. The sacrificial worship offered to clouds, in particular, was called *liao-chi*.⁵³

This sort of nature worship was common in Chuang-tzu's time and even in the Later Han period (25-220), more than 300 years after Chuang-tzu's death.⁵⁴ Given this social milieu, it is possible that *ch'i* (clouds) were still considered not so

⁵². See *ibid.*, 3.1.8,10; 3.2.46; 3.11.172; 3.14.232.

⁵³. This brief summary is based on Onozawa, *Ki no shi sô*, 18-28.

⁵⁴. See T'ang Chia-hung, "Chien-lun ch'un-ch'iu chan-kuo shih-ch'i ti liao-chi chi ch'i yüan-liu", *Chi-lu hsüeh-k'an*, 4 (1986), 3-9. And in "Chih-shih hsing" of *Ch'ien-fu lun* by Wang Fu, we can see that the surname of Fu Hsi, a legendary figure to whom the progenitorship of man is attributed, is "wind." See *HPCTCC* 2.35.170.

much a natural phenomenon as a divine one; *ch'i*, invested as it is with deity, still appears to be mysterious to Chuang-tzu, to the extent that he alternated between describing it as *wu* and *yu*. Possibly it is on account of this mysterious power of *ch'i* that Chuang-tzu uses *chi* to refer to a mental capacity at the same time.⁵⁵ The character *shen* will be used to define this ineffable mysterious/spiritual aspect of *ch'i* in discussion to follow.

The *I Commentaries* (*I Chuan*), otherwise known as *The Ten Wings*,⁵⁶ is a collection of Confucian essays on the *I Ching*. Confucians, incorporating the ideas of the Yin-yang School and of Taoism, expressed their thoughts about Nature and man in the form of a commentary on *I Ching*,⁵⁷ transforming it from a

⁵⁵. Chuang-tzu also uses *ch'i* to mean spirit as in "listen with *ch'i*," and "human-*ch'i*" (*jen-ch'i*). See *ibid.*, 3.4.67,63. A similar case to the former is also seen in "T'ang-wen," *Lieh-tzu*. See *ibid.*, 4.5.54.

⁵⁶. It has generally been agreed that *The Ten Wings* was not written by one person, namely, Confucius. Instead, it is thought to have been written by more than one author over a long period of time. In terms of dating, there have been conflicting ideas: "the later half of the Warring States," Chang Tai-nien, ("Lun I ta-chuan", *Chung-kuo che-hsüeh*, 1:1979.127) and Chu Po-k'un (*I-hsüeh*, 1.39); "between the Warring States and Ch'in-Han," Fung Yu-lan, ("I-chuan," *Che-hsüeh yen-chiu*, 7-8:1960.59); "before Ch'in ("Shuo," "Hsü," and "Tsa-kua") and after Ch'in (the rest)," Kuo Mo-jo, (*Ch'ing-t'ung shih-tai*, 69); "6 B.C.-1 A.D.," Shchutskii (*Researches*, 197, and for his arguments, 129-195); "within a few decades on either side of 200 B.C.," Graham (*Tao*, 359); "between Ch'in-Han and the later half of the Former Han," Li Ching-ch'ih (*Chou-I*, 326). For detailed arguments about the authorship of *The Ten Wings*, see Li Ching-ch'ih, 292-300.

⁵⁷. For detailed information about the influence of the yin-yang theory on *I Chuan*, see Yü Tung-k'ang, "Ts'ung I Ching tao I Chuan," *Chung-kuo che-hsüeh*, 7 (1982), 25-7, and for Taoist impact, see Hsü Chih-jui, "Lun Chou-i Ta-Chuan ti tzu-jan kuan," *Ch'i-lu*

divinational book into a philosophical one. Because of this background, the concept of *ch'i* in *I Chuan*, while somewhat tinged with supernatural beliefs which were strongly held at that time, is described in general in a more rational way. Neo-Confucianism, as will be discussed, is indebted to this momentum for its theoretical foundation.

In *I Chuan*, the world is viewed as a kind of "womb" whose "great characteristic is to produce" (Great Treatise B),⁵⁸ and the production of things in the world is mediated by *ching-ch'i* (Great Treatise A). The same form of relationship that is described in *Kuan-tzu* as obtaining between *ch'i* and *ching* is described in *I Chuan* as obtaining between *yin-yang ch'i* and *ching-ch'i*. According to *I Chuan*, the production of things in the world is mediated by *ching-ch'i* (Great Treatise A). What is novel about the term *ching-ch'i* as it appears here is that it is ascribed to the result of mutual attraction (*chiao-kan*) of *yin-yang ch'i* ("Hsien," Commentary on the Decision). *Ch'i*, embracing both *ching-ch'i* and *yin-yang ch'i*, is ineffable, or unfathomable (*pu-k'o ch'iu*ng, Sequence of the Hexagrams) and serves as a "gate from which morality (*tao-i*) derives" (Great Treatise A). The following passage succinctly conveys these ideas:

The successive movement of yin and yang constitutes Tao. What issues from the Tao is good, and that

hsüeh-k'an, 4 (1986), 32.

⁵⁸. The translation of the titles of *The Ten Wings* comes from Wilhelm/Baynes, *I Ching*.

which realizes it is the individual nature. The man of humanity sees it and calls it humanity. The man of wisdom sees it and calls it wisdom. And the common people act according to it daily without knowing it. In this way the Tao of the superior man is fully realized.⁵⁹

Ch'i, as Kuan-tzu describes it, is basically incomprehensible (*pu-ts'e*). Since *ch'i* has no spatial restriction (*wu-fang*), it "can make speed without hurry, and reach its destination without traveling" (Great Treatise A). This gives *ch'i* a spiritual/mysterious or ineffable character called *shen*. This *ch'i* in *I Chuan* is believed to cover the whole universe, which, again in the manner in which "essence" and "reality" are used in *Kuan-tzu*, is distinguished as "above form" and "below form," or *yu* (hidden) and *ming* (manifest),

⁵⁹. Chan, *Source book*, 266. This translation represents the philosophical (Neo-Confucian) interpretation. If interpreted in the original (divinational) context, it would be as follows:

"Once yin and once yang (once yin and then yang) is called Tao. What is inherited from the once yin and once yang is good, and that which realizes it is the individual nature. The man of humanity sees [one of] it and calls it humanity. The man of wisdom sees [one of] it and calls it wisdom. And the common people act according to it daily without knowing it. In this way the Tao of the superior man is hardly realized."

"Once yin and once yang" here means no more or no less than that yin-yang, conceived to be complementary to each other, form not only the basic category of the hexagrams and trigrams, but also the fundamental characteristic of all things. This is the reason why "once yin and once yang" is called Tao. However, people, unable to grasp both yin and yang, see only one of them. This results in Tao being understood as "humanity" or "wisdom." For this reason, it is difficult to realize Tao.

All of the discrepancies between the translations result from a different understanding of two characters: *chih* and *hsien*. In the former, the pronoun *chih* refers to "once yin and once yang"; in the latter, it refers to Tao. And *hsien*, taken to mean "few" in the former, is interpreted as "to the fullest extent" in the latter. This interpretation is based on that of Chu Po-k'un. See *I-hsüeh*, 1.76.

that is, noumenon and phenomenon. The following is a more detailed exposition of the process:

Therefore in the system of Change there is the Great Ultimate (*t'ai-chi*). It generates the Two Modes (yin and yang). The Two Modes generate the Four Forms (major and minor, yin and yang). The Four Forms generate the Eight Trigrams. The Eight Trigrams determine good and evil fortunes. And good and evil fortunes produce the great business [of life].⁶⁰

Here *t'ai-chi* refers to the Ultimate reality, the Two Modes mean yin and yang, or Heaven and Earth, the Four Forms mean the four seasons, and the Eight Trigrams mean the eight kinds of natural phenomena.⁶¹ As to *t'ai-chi*, if considered in the framework of such concepts as *wu-yu*, "essence-reality," and "above-below form," it is not difficult for one to sense the possibility of identifying *t'ai-chi* with the essence or substance of *ch'i*, that is, the ineffable aspect of *ch'i*.

Lü-shih ch'un-ch'iu (The Spring and Autumn of Mr. Lü) is a philosophical encyclopedia compiled in 238 B.C.⁶² As is usually the case with works in this period, *LSCC* reflects a syncretic blending of the ideas prevalent at the time. Possibly for this reason, the book introduces a syncretic and

⁶⁰. Chan, *ibid.*, 267.

⁶¹. In the original interpretation, the quotation stands for the process of sorting out the divining stalks or of drawing the Hexagrams and Trigrams; in which *t'ai-chi* refers to *Chou I* or the divining method, and the Two Modes, Four Forms, and Eight Trigrams mean the numbers in the process of divination. See Chu Po-k'un, *I-hsüeh*, 1.62.

⁶². See Chin Ch'un-feng, "Lun Lü-shih ch'un-ch'iu ti ju-chia ssu-hsiang ch'ing-hsiang," *Che-hsüeh yen-chiu*, 12 (1982), 60.

novel term combining *ch'i*, *t'ai-i*, or the Great One, and Tao. The influence of syncreticism on the concept of *ch'i*, as will be seen below, always serves to emphasize and embellish descriptions of the spiritual, mental, or ineffable aspects of *ch'i*.

LSCC, in the same manner as in *Kuan-tzu*, attributes the essence of all things to the gathering together of essential *ch'i*" (*ching-ch'i chih chi*); "it makes birds to fly, animals to run, jewels to be clear and shining, trees to grow, and sages to be great and bright."⁶³ And it also, as in *Kuan-tzu*, identifies this essential *ch'i* with Tao, and also with *t'ai-i*, which represents the ineffable aspect of *ch'i*:

Tao is invisible, inaudible, and undescribable (*wu-chuang*)...Tao, the utmost essential (*chih-ching*), is undepictable, and unnamable. [However], we forcefully call it *t'ai-i*.⁶⁴

And:

T'ai-i produced the two Forms (*liang-i*). The two Forms produced yin-yang....[As to] that which produces all things, they are produced by *t'ai-i*, and transformed (*hua*) by yin-yang.⁶⁵

According to *LSCC*, these explanations are about "understanding the origin" (*chih-pen*) of all things.⁶⁶ The way to understand the origin is "to indulge in thinking to a limitless level" (*yu-i hu wu-ch'iung chih tz'u*) and "to steer the

⁶³. "Chi-ch'un-chi." See *HPCTCC* 7.3.26.

⁶⁴. "Chung-hsia-chi." See *ibid.*, 7.5.47.

⁶⁵. *Ibid.*, 7.5.46.

⁶⁶. "Chi-ch'un-chi." See *ibid.*, 7.3.26.

mind in the natural path" (*shih hsin hu tzu-jan chih t'u*). If one is able to do this, then no harm is done to Heaven (*wu-i hai ch'i-t'ien*). "Understanding the origin" is the way of understanding essence (*ching*), which in turn results in knowing *shen* (the mysterious, or ineffable); and knowing *shen* is called attaining the One (*t'ai-i*).⁶⁷ In short, "understanding the origin" is to grope, through thinking, for the mysterious origin of *ch'i*, that is, the essential *ch'i* (*ching-ch'i*), to which all the myriad things are indebted for their existence.

While the essential *ch'i* in *LSCC* is an ontological term, *ch'i*, which is the product of the essential *ch'i*, is a more concrete term describing life (*sheng-ch'i*), will (*chih-ch'i*), the mind (*hsin-ch'i*), atmosphere (*t'ien-ti chih ch'i*), autumn (*ch'iu-ch'i*), and chilling atmosphere (*sha-ch'i*). Moreover, in *LSCC*, *ch'i* is one of the six elements which can make the mind go astray (*miou-hsin*).⁶⁸

One can see significant confusion involving the concepts of *ch'i* and *ching*. In *Kuan-tzu*, the concept of *ching* is based on *ch'i*. In other words, *Kuan-tzu* deduced the concept of *ching* from the unrefined state of *ch'i*.⁶⁹ However, in *LSCC*, *ch'i* is derived from *ching*, the origin of all beings.

⁶⁷. "Chi-ch'un-chi" (*hsien-chi*), *ibid.*, 7.3.29.

⁶⁸. "Szu-shun lun" (*pie-liu*), *ibid.*, 7.25.321.

⁶⁹. On another occasion, however, *Kuan-tzu* contradicts this *ch'i-ching* description by observing that *ching* is the fountain-head of *ch'i* (*ch'i-yüan*). See "Nei-yeh," *HPCTCC* 4.49.270-1.

Li-chi, *The Book of Rites*, composed from works written no earlier than the Warring States period and no later than the beginning of the Former Han period (206 B.C.-24 A.D.), was compiled by Tai Sheng, who lived in the Former Han.⁷⁰ This book exhibits another aspect of thought with respect to *ch'i*: animism. Apparently this animism was an integral part of the traditional conception which held *ch'i* responsible for natural phenomena.⁷¹ This animistic idea is predicated on an understanding that man is the manifestation of Universal *ch'i*, which materializes into spirit and body, another term for the ineffable and the effable:

Man is the crystalization (*te*) of Heaven and Earth, the meeting of yin-yang, the gathering of *kuei-shen*, and the essential *ch'i* (*hsiu-ch'i*) of the Five Phases.⁷²

Here, Heaven, yang, and *kuei-shen* refer to the *ch'i* which constitutes spirit, while Earth, yin, and the essential *ch'i* of the Five Phases, signify the *ch'i* which makes up the body. At death, man decomposes into the original elements, and thereby the spirit (*hun-ch'i*) returns to Heaven, and the body (*hsing-p'o*) goes down into the Earth.⁷³ For this reason, worship of the dead is an occasion during which the spirit of

⁷⁰. For dating of the works, see Chu Po-k'un, *I-hsüeh*, 1.44., and for compilership, see Chu Jui-k'ai, *Liang-han ssu-hsiang shih*, 34.

⁷¹. See "Yüeh-chi," *SSCTP* 3.11.1635.

⁷². "Li-yün," *ibid.*, 1579, 1580.

⁷³. "Chiao-t'e-sheng," *ibid.*, 1595.

the living communicates with the spirit of the dead (*hun-ch'i*) which has gone to Heaven and hence has "no place to go."⁷⁴ This worship is done with a sacrifice consisting of blood or an animal part, which is believed to be the place where *ch'i*, that is, spirit, resides.⁷⁵ This *ch'i* in *Li-chi* is thought to be "flourishing with the ineffable nature (*shen*)."⁷⁶ As a graphic example, the saliva of a dead person is believed to contain it:

After a mother's death, her cup must not be used, because the *ch'i* of her saliva still lingers on it.⁷⁷

Li-chi also illustrates an exceptional usage of *ch'i*, in "Shao-i," as a verb, used in the imperative *wu-ch'i*, which means "do not smell."⁷⁸

Huai-nan-tzu, written about 140 B.C.,⁷⁹ is another syncretic work basically following the Taoist tradition which conceptualizes *ch'i* within the framework of *hsü (wu)-yu*, the most noticeable evidence of syncretism here being the ideational interpretation of the essence of *ch'i*, which had already made its appearance in *Kuan-tzu* and *Lü-shih ch'un-ch'iu*. And in *Huai-nan-tzu*, concepts such as *t'ai-i* (the Great

⁷⁴. *Wu pu chih yeh*. See "T'an-kung B," *ibid.*, 1531.

⁷⁵. See "Chiao-t'e-sheng," *ibid.*, 1595.

⁷⁶. *Ch'i yeh che shen chih sheng yeh*. See "Chi-i," *ibid.*, 1672.

⁷⁷. "Yü-tsao," *ibid.*, 1612.

⁷⁸. *Ibid.*, 1628.

⁷⁹. Graham, *Tao*, 238.

One), *hsü*, *wu*, and the One are used to characterize the ineffable aspect of *ch'i*. However, it is understandable that the concepts of *t'ai-i* and the One, which certainly are based on an embellished description of this ineffability, have their semantic roots in *wu* or *hsü*. Huai-nan says:

The formless (*wu-hsing*) is the great ancestor of things....What is called the formless is the One. What is called the One is matchless in the Universe. It stands aloft, [and] stays alone. It reaches up to the nine Heavens, stretches down to the nine fields. Its circumference and size are beyond measurement. It, in its great entirety, is the One....Therefore, invisible its form, inaudible its sound, unseekable its body. Formless as it is, it produces things....Thus, *yu* is born of *wu*, and reality (*shih*) is produced from the void (*hsü*).⁸⁰

What is new in *Huai-nan-tzu* is that the genesis of things, which has been explained within the *wu-yu* framework, is mediated by the Universe (*yü-chou*). In addition to this, one can see a confusing differentiation of meaning occurring within the term *ch'i* and pan-*ch'i*ism. While the Taoist tradition speaks of the holistic nature of *ch'i*, or pan-*ch'i*ism, which Huai-nan represents as Tao, the character *ch'i* is used to refer only to the characteristic of *yu*, whose precedence was already described in *LCCC*. Huai-nan says:

Tao originates (*shih*) in the void, and the void produces the Universe. The Universe produces *ch'i*,⁸¹ so *ch'i* comes to take form (*ya-yin*).⁸²

⁸⁰. "Yüan-tao hsün," *HPCTCC* 7.1.10-11.

⁸¹. Apparently *ch'i* in this passage refers to the primordial *ch'i* (*yüan-ch'i*), which, first appearing in *Huai-nan-tzu* cited in *T'ai-p'ing yü-lan*, "T'ien-pu," is not found in the edition of *Huai-nan-tzu* available now. See Onozawa, *Ki no shi sô*, 138.

We have already seen that in *Kuan-tzu*, *ch'i's* functional properties were attributed to *ching-ch'i*, the substantial *ch'i*. *Huai-nan-tzu* follows this tradition, but modifies it so that the production of *ch'i* is explained through the medium of the Universe. Here the Universe does not refer to the physical Universe, but instead to "above form," which has the potential for taking the form of Heaven-Earth, the symbol of myriad things.⁸² In other words, in *Huai-nan-tzu* it is contended that the production of *ch'i*, which involves physical forms, is preceded by a stage "above form" called the Universe. As will be seen, the Universe is to be the precursor of *hsiang*, or configurational image of things.

One can also detect the influence of Mencius's conception of *ch'i* in *Huai-nan-tzu*, in the sense that *ch'i* is associated with morality. However, while in Mencius "flood-like *ch'i*" assumes a complex character involving moral cultivation and psychological energy, *ch'i* in *Huai-nan-tzu* denotes mental posture, and the cultivation of the mental posture is called *hsing-ch'i*. *Huai-nan* says:

The man of principle (*Chün-tzu*) practices the right-*ch'i*, [while] man of no-principle (*hsiao-jen*) practices the evil-*ch'i*. Inwardly, content with [Heaven-given] nature, outwardly, united with rightness, abiding by principle in activity, and

⁸². "T'ien-wen hsün," *ibid.*, 7.3.35. In another place, *Huai-nan* explains this cosmogonic idea, which implies *Chuang-tzu's* influence, in the version of *Lao-tzu* seen in chap. 42 of *Tao-te ching*: *i sheng erh, erh sheng san, san sheng wan-wu*. See *ibid.*, 7.3.46.

⁸³. *Chiang ch'eng t'ien-ti chih mao yeh*, *ibid.*, 7.3.35. See commentary on the passage.

not attracted by things, [these are] the right-
ch'i. [On the other hand] Valuing delicious fla-
vors, indulging in [bad] music and women, [easily]
letting out [emotions of] happiness and anger,
unmindful of ensuing troubles, [these are] the
evil-ch'i.⁸⁴

Huai-nan-tzu also contains a novel use of the term *ch'i*,
in which sound is explained as a phenomenon produced by *ch'i*.⁸⁵
In addition to this, *ch'i* in *Huai-nan-tzu*, especially in
"Ching-shen hsün", appears to be closely related to the
medical theories prevalent in the transitional period between
the Warring States and the Former Han. The concept of *ch'i* in
the *Huai-nan-tzu*, while incorporating ideas about *ch'i* from
the *Yellow Emperor's Classic of Internal Medicine* (*Huang-ti
nei-ching su-wen*), embodies pre-Ch'in Taoist ideas about *ch'i*
in the context of everyday life.⁸⁶ The following might be said
to be two of the core concepts which underlie the medical
theory of *ch'i*: "*ch'i* is filled with life,"⁸⁷ and "*the will of
ch'i* is the envoy of the five viscera."⁸⁸

⁸⁴. "Ch'üan-yen hsün," *ibid.*, 7.14.242.

⁸⁵. "*Ch'i*, when combined, becomes a sound." See "T'ien-wen
hsün," *ibid.*, 7.3.42.

⁸⁶. See Onozawa, *ki no shi sô*, 144. For more information about
ch'i in Chinese medicine, especially for a discussion of the
medical terms with the character *ch'i*, see Porkert, *Chinese
medicine*, 167-176. And for information about the concept of *ch'i* in
nei-ching, see Liu Ch'ang-lin, "Lun Huang-ti nei-ching chung ti
ch'i," *Che-hsüeh yen-chiu*, 7 (1978), 57-64.

⁸⁷. "Yüan-tao hsün," *HPCTCC* 7.1.17.

⁸⁸. "Ching-shen hsün," *ibid.*, 7.7.101.

Ch'ien-tso-tu, the Apocrypha of Chou I,⁸⁹ offers a detailed picture of cosmogony involving *ch'i*, form (*hsing*), and quality (*chih*). But the basic grammar of cosmogony is predicated on the framework of *wu-yu*. As has been seen, the *wu-yu* framework is prone to encourage an ideational interpretation of the substance of *ch'i*, since *wu-yu* itself is a conceptual rendering of *ch'i*. The Apocrypha identifies the substance of *ch'i* with "the Great One" and "Change":

Therefore, it is said that there are the Great One (*t'ai-i*), the Great Initial (*t'ai-ch'u*), the Great Beginning (*t'ai-shih*), the Great Element (*t'ai-su*). The Great One is [the stage in which] *ch'i* is invisible. The Great Initial is the beginning of *ch'i*. The Great Beginning is the beginning of form. The Great Element is the beginning of quality. *Ch'i*, form, and quality are complete and undifferentiated, therefore, it is called chaos (*hun-lun*). Chaos means that all things are intermixed and undifferentiated. Invisible, inaudible, unseekable, therefore, it is called Change (*i*).⁹⁰

This is an exposition of how *yu* is born out of *wu*. According to a commentary by Cheng Hsüan (127-200), the above quotation should be understood as having two parts: the Great One (*t'ai-i*) and the Great Initial, Beginning and Element. The Great One is the invisible and inaudible. And Cheng Hsüan refers to the undifferentiated chaotic stage as the Great Ultimate (*t'ai-chi*), which is the stage in which the primordial *ch'i* (*yüan-ch'i*) is not yet differentiated into its three

⁸⁹. Chu Po-k'un dates the book between 6 B.C. and 1 A.D.. See his *I-hsüeh*, 1.119.

⁹⁰. ICC 157.A.29. It is also seen in "T'ien-jui," *Lieh-tzu*. See *HPCTCC* 4.1.2.

aspects: "ch'i, form, and quality."⁹¹

What is noteworthy about the treatment of *ch'i* in the *Apocrypha* is that, first of all, it posits the substance of *wu* within what is called Change. With Change, the *Apocrypha* implies that *wu* is concerned not so much with non-being as with the substantiality of *ch'i*. It is in this sense that the *Apocrypha* attributes invisibility, inaudibility and inaccessibility to the Great One. Secondly, in the *Apocrypha*, *ch'i* is conceptualized as having four phases, the Great Ultimate, Initial, Beginning, and Element.

The concept of *ch'i* in the *Apocrypha* also illustrates that it can be posited as the foundation of moral values:

Therefore, upon birth, man responds to the substance of the eight trigrams, [and] acquires five *ch'i*, thereby, [they] become the five constants (*ch'ang*), which are humanity (*jen*), righteousness (*i*), propriety (*li*), wisdom (*chih*), and faithfulness (*hsin*).⁹²

T'ai-hsüan-ching, written in c.4 B.C.⁹³ by Yang Hsiung (53 B.C.-18 A.D.), describes an integral system composed of Heaven, Earth, and man. He builds his system upon the concept of a subtle reality (*hsüan*), which is his own version of the concept of *ching*, as it appeared in *I Ching*. Yang Hsiung incorporates ideas from Confucianism, Taoism, *Kuan-tzu*, the

⁹¹. See *ICCC* 157.A.29.

⁹². *Ibid.*, 157.A.9.

⁹³. Nylan and Sivin, "The first Neo-Confucianism: An introduction to Yang Hsiung's Canon of Supreme Mystery," 41, in Le Blanc and Blader, eds., *Chinese Ideas about nature and Society*.

Yin-yang School, and knowledge of the natural sciences of his time: astronomy, almanacs, and Correlative theory of Hexagrams with *ch'i*, the seasonal periods (*kua-ch'i-shuo*).⁹⁴ In this sense his concept of *ch'i* suggests that he is amalgamating all the ideas about *ch'i* available to him, but with regard to the concepts of *ch'i* and *hsüan* (*ching*), the influence of *Kuan-tzu* and *Lü-shih ch'un-ch'iu* is most apparent. Explaining *hsüan*, the substance of *ch'i*, he says:

Hsüan abstrusely displays (*yu-li*) all things, but it is invisible....It arranges (*li-ts'o*) yin-yang, and thereby issuing *ch'i*.⁹⁵

Yang holds that the fundamental characteristic of *hsüan* lies in its being *ching* (rarefication).⁹⁶ *Hsüan* is beyond human perception (ineffable), since it is shapeless (*hsü-hsing*); however, it is certain that *hsüan* is out there, because everything derives from this mysterious being. In this sense, Yang thinks that *hsüan* is tantamount to Tao.⁹⁷ Not only this, but *hsüan* also underlies moral values:

Therefore, the *hsüan* is [also] the great function. The capacity of knowing the *hsüan*, upon seeing it, is wisdom (*chih*); that of loving the *hsüan*, upon seeing it, is humanity (*jen*); and that of discarding the doubts of the world, upon seeing it, is

⁹⁴. For details, see Cheng Wan-keng, "T'ai-hsüan yü tzu-jan k'o-hsüeh," *Chung-kuo che-hsüeh*, 12 (1984), 76-86.

⁹⁵. "Hsüan-li," *T'ai-hsüan-ching*, in *CKTHMCCC* 9.312-3.

⁹⁶. "... except the *ching*, who can do that?" (*fei ching, ch'i shu neng chih*). See "Hsüan-ying," *ibid.*, 10.334-5.

⁹⁷. *Hsü-hsing, wan-wu so-tao, chih wei tao yeh*, "Hsüan-li," *ibid.*, 9.318.

intrepidity (*yung*).⁹⁸

Summarizing all these characteristics, Yang calls the *hsüan* "the chief of the ineffable (mystery)."⁹⁹ This perhaps explains the ineffable character involved in Yang's concept of the *hsüan*. The ineffability of the *hsüan* in Yang's idea seems to be more supernaturally oriented. Yang's idea of the spirit (*kuei-shen*), which is the mysterious *ch'i* (*ling-ch'i*),¹⁰⁰ might be taken to support the statement: "the spirit is both *wu* and *ling* because it is invisible."¹⁰¹

Lun-heng, written by Wang Ch'ung (27-c.100), occupies a crucial place in the history of the concept of *ch'i*, which had come to be described in an increasingly grandiose way ever since it had begun being associated with abstruse concepts such as *Tao*, *shen*, *hsü*, *wu*, *t'ai-i*, *ling*, and so forth. By Wang Ch'ung's time this expansive trend had coalesced into two forms, Correlative thought¹⁰² and alchemy (*lien-tan shu*).¹⁰³

⁹⁸. *Ibid.*

⁹⁹. *Shen chih k'uei*, "Hsüan-kao," *ibid.*, 15.425.

¹⁰⁰. *Ibid.*, 1.24.

¹⁰¹. *Ibid.*, 5.220.

¹⁰². *Kua-ch'i shuo*, which was designed to explain the changes of the seasonal periods using the changes of 64 hexagrams, and *Tung Chung-shu* (c.179-c.104 B.C.), can be said to represent the gist of Correlative thought. For the general idea of Correlative thought and *kua-ch'i shuo*, see Henderson, "Correlative Thought in Early China," in *Chinese cosmology*, chap.1, and Graham, *Correlative thinking*. For *Tung's* thought, see, Fung, "Tung Chung-shu and the New Text School," in *History*. For Chinese information about *kua-ch'i shuo*, see Chu Po-k'un, *I-hsüeh*, 1.110-151.

Wang's objective is to refute these kinds of ideas about *ch'i*, which he believes are unfounded and absurd (*hsü-wang*).¹⁰⁴ What then is the truth about *ch'i* for Wang Ch'ung?

His sole criterion for defining *ch'i* is *tzu-jan* (self-so or, by extension, natural). He argues that if anything is "not congruent with [the way of] *tzu-jan*, its meaning is dubious."¹⁰⁵ This idea might account for his definition of *ch'i*, which is more rational¹⁰⁶ and materialistic than those he disagrees with. His description of *ch'i* cited below supports this:

Ch'i is [something] like clouds and smoke. How can it listen to human words?¹⁰⁷

It had been a tradition ever since *Tso Chuan* to associate *ch'i* with clouds. In fact, however, the origin of this cloud-*ch'i* association, as mentioned earlier, goes back further to

¹⁰³. For information about alchemic thought up to Wang Ch'ung's time, see Ko Chao-kuang, *Tao-chiao yü chung-kuo wen-hua*, 107-121. For information about Wei Po-yang and his *Ts'an-t'ung-ch'i*, see Chu Po-k'un, *I-hsüeh*, 1.212-233, and Hu Fu-ch'en, *Wei-chin shen-hsien tao-chiao*, 316-336. For its later development in *Pao-p'u-tzu* by Ko Hung (283-363), see Hu Fu-ch'en, *ibid.*, 229-296. For general information about alchemy, see Chang Chüeh-jen, *Chung-kuo lien-tan-shu yü tan-yao*. For information in English see Maspero, *Taoism*, 413-554., and Sivin, *Chinese Alchemy*.

¹⁰⁴. "Lun-szu," *HPCTCC* 7.202. For Wang's criticism of Correlative thought and alchemy, see "Han-wen," "Tao-hsü," and *passim*.

¹⁰⁵. "Tzu-jan," *ibid.*, 7.177.

¹⁰⁶. As a good example of rationality involving *ch'i*, Wang's explanation of spirit (*kuei-shen*) can be cited. See "Ting-kuei," *ibid.*, 7.222. Obviously, Wang's rationalism is an expression of the scientific ideas in the Han dynasty. For details, see Cheng Ju-hsin "Wang Ch'ung ti che-hsüeh ssu-hsiang yü han-tai ti ch'i-hsiang-hsüeh," *Chung-kuo che-hsüeh-shih yen-chiu*, 1 (1985), 43-8.

¹⁰⁷. "Pien-hsü," *ibid.*, 7.43. And a similar one is also seen in "Tzu-jan," *ibid.*, 7.177.

nature worship in the Shang Dynasty. It was Chuang-tzu who first envisioned a cosmogony with cloud-*ch'i* as its agent; and this resulted, as we have seen, in *ch'i* being assumed to have supernatural properties.

Wang Ch'ung attempts to demystify the concept of *ch'i* and implies that it is not a supernatural entity but a natural one. But though relegating *ch'i* to a natural state, he still follows the traditional division of *ch'i* into substance and function. His version of this division is *tzu-jan* and *wu-wei* (non-action). In other words, he associates the substantial aspect of *ch'i* with its being *tzu-jan*, while describing its functional aspect as coming from its "non-action":

Upon moving, Heaven has no intention of, thereby, producing things, but they come into being on their own. This means *tzu-jan*. Upon activating (*shih*) *ch'i*, [Heaven] has no intention of [thereby] making things, but they come into being on their own. This refers to *wu-wei*. What does it mean to say that Heaven is *tzu-jan*, and *wu-wei*? It signifies *ch'i*.

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What is obvious here is that Wang Ch'ung, by identifying the substance of *ch'i* with *tzu-jan*, denies any possibility that *ch'i* could be associated with metaphysical terms such as Tao, *wu*, or the Great One. He insists on defining the substance of *ch'i* from a representational point of view. This idea comes through clearly in following passages:

Between Heaven and Earth, *ch'i* [covers] every place. Heavenly bodies hang down *hsiang* (configura-

¹⁰⁸. "Tzu-jan," *ibid.*, 7.177. Wang Ch'ung seems to share the idea of *wu-wei* *tzu-jan* with the Taoist Huang-lao School. For his indication of his association with the Huang-lao, see *ibid.*, 179.

tional image of things) from above. *Ch'i* descends, thereby producing things; its harmonious one cultivates life. The configurational image of a thing (*hsiang*), *ch'i* is responsible for that.¹⁰⁹

And:

Form is congealed by *ch'i*, and *ch'i* is known by form.¹¹⁰

Hsiang refers to the stage prior to the congealing of form, namely, "above form." *Hsiang* has only natural properties such as hard (*kang*), soft (*jou*), movement (*tung*), stillness (*ching*). *Hsiang* does not necessarily result in form, but form, without fail, must always have *hsiang*.¹¹¹

As Wang Ch'ung explains, *ch'i*, covering the whole universe, is responsible for the production of the myriad things. One can have no access to *ch'i*, since, logically speaking, *ch'i* is invisible. But one knows that *ch'i* does exist, since, if it were not for *ch'i*, phenomena would not be possible. To be more specific, one can have access only to the function or reality of *ch'i*, but not to the substance or essence of *ch'i*.

Hsiang seems to be an explanatory tool, Wang Ch'ung believes, which enables one, epistemologically, to try to identify the substance of *ch'i* and, in terms of the genesis of things, to explain the functional reality of *ch'i*. In other words, *hsiang* is a "bridge" between the inaccessible substance

¹⁰⁹. "Ting-kuei," *ibid.*, 7.220.

¹¹⁰. "Lun-szu," *ibid.*, 7.204.

¹¹¹. Chu Po-k'un, *I-hsüeh*, 2.286.

and the accessible reality of *ch'i*. From this exposition, one can divine his motive in making *ch'i* accessible through effable *hsiang*. However, the problem is that Wang Ch'ung, having claimed that it is theoretically impossible for the mind to have access to *ch'i*, represents it as clouds and smoke, thereby contradicting himself. His representational description of *ch'i* may have been born of Wang's strong reaction against the supernatural interpretation of *ch'i*. Eventually, his somewhat materialistically tinged rational idea of *ch'i* is predicated on this representational description.

Wang's concept of *ch'i* reflects the influence of an on-going trend in the study of *I Ching*, which started as early as the Former Han.¹¹² His rejection of supernatural belief paves

¹¹². In the Former Han (206 B.C.-24 A.D.), there were already three trends in the study of *I Ching*. The first, represented by Meng Hsi (fl. 69 B.C.) and Ching Fang (77-37 B.C.), was State Study which, representing the New Text school, came up with the theory of *kua-ch'i*, taking advantage of the idea explaining the relationship between configurational image of things and the numeric presentation of them (*hsiang-shu*). The second was Private Study which, represented by Fei Chih and the Old Text School, was oriented to the ideational interpretation (*i-li*). The third was the Taoist Huang-lao Study, represented by Huai-nan-tzu and Yang Hsiung.

In the Later Han (25-220), the study of *hsiang-shu* was still predominant; Cheng Hsüan (127-200) based his theory on the Five Phases; Hsün Shuang (128-190) and Yü Fan (164-233) promoted the theory of changing trigrams (*kua-pien*); Wei Po-yang based on the Huang-lao Taoism brought forward the combination of the theory of *kua-ch'i* with alchemy; Wang Su (195-256), going against this trend, promoted the study of *i-li*, or principle, and thereby, while continuing in the tradition of Fei's Old Text School, became the forerunner of Wang Pi (226-249).

Given Wang's association with the Huang-lao, he would have belonged to the Taoist Study, had he ever had any affiliation. However, Wang's concept of *ch'i*, as we have seen, is completely different from theirs. For the Former Han, see Chu Po-k'un, *I-*

a philosophical way for Wei-Chin metaphysics (*hsüan-hsüeh*), and for Neo-Confucianism, especially for Chang Tsai's philosophy. As will be discussed, this is one of the major contributions Wang Ch'ung's rational approach has made to the history of ideas concerning *ch'i*.

In our discussion of *ch'i*, it has been customary to divide *ch'i* into substance and function, or essence and reality. In most cases, this division of *ch'i* was explained in terms of *wu-yu*, which is the Taoist characterization of *ch'i*'s role in the genesis of things. It is Wang Pi (226-249) who, taking advantage of this "environment," comes up with an ideational interpretation of *ch'i*, in striking contrast to Wang Ch'ung's representational approach.

Wang Pi, the representative of the Wei-Chin Taoist metaphysical School (*hsüan-hsüeh*), finally conceptualizes what had been first described in *Kuan-tzu* as the relationship between Tao and Power (*te*) within *ch'i* as substance and function. Wang Pi also represents *wu* and *yu* as substance and function. This is what makes him unique in the history of ideas concerning *ch'i*. In order to explore this issue, an examination of Wang Pi's basic framework of ideas is in order.

Wang Pi says:

[As to] that whereby the things are produced, and that whereby the manifestations are accomplished, that is "no-form" (*wu-hsing*), and "no-name" (*wu-ming*). The "no-form" or "no-name" is the progenitor

hsüeh, 1.108-51, and 188-241 for the Later Han. For information about Wang's mention of *I Ching*, see "Cheng-shuo," *HPCTCC* 7.269.

of all things.¹¹³

And:

The origin of *yu* is based on *wu*.¹¹⁴

This statement would seem to suggest that Wang Pi's idea of *wu-yu* is bifurcational, that they are completely separate, an impression supported by his identification of *wu* with the One, the Ultimate principle (*chih-li*),¹¹⁵ and obliquely with the Great Ultimate (*t'ai-chi*).¹¹⁶ However, before jumping to this conclusion, one must recall that Kuan-tzu identified *hsü-wu*, or *wu-hsing* with *ch'i*, and also that ever since Chuang-tzu, it has been customary to understand the role assigned to *ch'i* in the genesis of things within the *wu-yu* framework. In other words, Wang Pi's idea expressed in the passages above is very much in line with the traditional interpretation of *ch'i*. That is, *ch'i*, or panch'iism, underlies this seemingly bifurcated definition.

In fact, Wang Pi apprehends the characteristics of *ch'i* from a quite different angle. He expands the *wu-yu* framework of *ch'i* into the three elements of "principle" (*li*, or essence), "concept" (*i*) and "phenomena" (*hsiang*, or configura-

¹¹³. *Lao-tzu wei-chih li-lüeh*, 1. See Yen Ling-feng, *Lao-tzu wei-chih li-lüeh and Lao-tzu chung-shuo chiu-miou*.

¹¹⁴. Modified from Rump, *Commentary on the Lao Tzu*, 123.

¹¹⁵. See *ibid.*, 128-9.

¹¹⁶. Wang calls the One the Great Ultimate. See "Commentary on the Great Treatise," ICC 2.A.146.

tion of things).¹¹⁷ Wang Pi says:

Change is all about *hsiang* (*i-che hsiang yeh*). [As to] that which produces *hsiang*, it is "principle" (*i*).¹¹⁸

And:

Hsiang manifests the "meaning" (*i*), and "words" (*yen*) expound *hsiang*. Nothing matches *hsiang* in fathoming the "meaning," and nothing excels "words" in expounding *hsiang*. "Words" are born out of *hsiang*; therefore, we can observe *hsiang* by looking for "words." *Hsiang* is born out of "meaning"; therefore, we can observe "meaning" by seeking for *hsiang*. "Meaning" is fathomed by *hsiang*, and *hsiang* is manifested by "words."¹¹⁹

In this passage, *hsiang* means the "*hsiang* of the trigram and hexagram," or the configuration of things revealed in the trigram and hexagram, that is, "phenomena." The "words" signify the "explanation of the trigram and hexagram," or "concept." The "meaning" refers to the "principle of the *hsiang*," namely, "essence."¹²⁰

Wang Pi seems to acknowledge that phenomena consist of Change, which stands for the activity of *ch'i*. In other words, he implies that *ch'i*, or pan-*ch'i*ism, underlies phenomena.

¹¹⁷. The meaning of the term *hsiang* varies depending on the interpretation of *ch'i*. Its ideational reference is "below form," but its representational reference is "above form." My translations of *hsiang* into "configuration of things" and "configurational image of things" reflect this understanding. For information about the representational interpretation of *hsiang*, see P.39-40.

¹¹⁸. "Ch'ien, wen-yen," *Commentary on the Chou-i*, in *ICCC*, 2.A.5.

¹¹⁹. 'Ming-hsiang,' in "Lüeh-li." See *ibid.*, 196.

¹²⁰. Chu Po-k'un expands the meaning of *yen*, *i*, and *hsiang* in Wang Pi further to the "concept," "essence" and "phenomena." See *I-hsüeh* 1.281.

However, one has no access to the substance of Change, which is incomprehensible. The substance, therefore, is tantamount to *wu*. In order to make the substance of *ch'i* accountable, Wang Pi comes up with three conceptual tools, "principle," "concept," and *hsiang* (phenomena). He seems to believe that since it is impossible to apprehend the substance of *ch'i* directly, one can get around this problem by conceptualizing the genetic process of *ch'i*, the precursor to which has appeared in *Ch'ien-tso tu*.

Wang Pi appears to think that although the substance of *ch'i* is described as *wu*, this cannot be taken to refer to the non-being, *wu*, of the substance. Considering the order among the vicissitudes of phenomena, Wang contends, there must be something of "principle," which underlies the activity of *ch'i*, and so is the source of "meaning" for phenomena. The reason Wang Pi calls *wu* the Ultimate principle or the Great Ultimate can be understood in this context.

Since one has direct access to *hsiang* (phenomena), which is the manifestation of principle, Wang Pi assumes, by digging in phenomena, one can grasp the principle on which phenomena are based. In other words, Wang Pi believes that "the explanation of *hsiang*," that is, the translation of physical reality into intellectual reality (concept), could bridge the gap between principle and *hsiang*, or phenomena.

This ideational approach to *ch'i* makes a good contrast with that of Wang Ch'ung, who tried to connect inaccessible

ch'i and phenomena (form) through the medium of *hsiang*, by which he meant the configurational image of things, or representational images, to speak about *ch'i*. In Wang Pi's replacement of the triad, *ch'i*, *hsiang*, and form (*hsing*) with the triad of principle, concept, and *hsiang* (phenomena), one finds a new way of describing *ch'i*, or pan-*ch'i*ism. This idea, together with Wang Ch'ung's, was to have a lasting influence in the interpretation of *ch'i* in Chinese thought. The development of these different interpretations of *ch'i* illustrates how important the "functional approach" toward *ch'i* is in defining it. Wang Pi's contribution seems to lie in his ingenuity in conceiving of the possibility of different approaches to *ch'i*, which had already been seen in Kuan-tzu, Chuang-tzu, I Chuan, and Ch'ien-tso tu, to name a few.

The concept of *ch'i* in the writings of Han K'ang-po (fl. 371-385) is basically derived from Kuan-tzu, Wang Ch'ung, and Wang Pi.¹²¹ This formative background is, as will be seen, conducive to the syncretic nature of his concept of *ch'i*. In interpreting the role of *ch'i* in the genesis of things, first of all, he subscribes to Wang Ch'ung's representational description of *ch'i*. Han K'ang-po says:

[Yin-yang *ch'i*] in Heaven becomes *hsiang*, in Earth becomes form. Yin-yang refers to the Heaven's *ch'i*, the hard and soft (*kang-jou*) refers to the Earth's form. Change, which begins with *ch'i* and *hsiang*,

¹²¹. In his explanation of *t'ai-chi*, Han repeats Wang Pi's idea: *yu* is based on *wu*. See *Commentary on the Great Treatise by Han K'ang-po*, ICCC 2.A.151.

finishes with form.¹²²

Remember that Wang Ch'ung wanted to demystify supernatural claims that had been made for it. He did this on the one hand by relegating the substance of *ch'i* to a category he called *tzu-jan*, a natural entity, and on the other hand, by explaining *ch'i* as being dependent on *hsiang*. In the process, *ch'i* ended up assuming the character of a physical entity previously asserted for *hsiang*. As the result of this, for Wang Ch'ung *ch'i* was not ineffable but effable.

Though agreeing with Wang Ch'ung's representational description, Han K'ang-po does not agree that the fundamental nature of *ch'i* is effable, but appears to think that *ch'i* should still be thought of as ineffable. In this respect he seems to have been influenced by the ideas of Kuan-tzu and Wang Pi. He accepts the *wu-yu* framework used by Wang Pi, and identifies the substance of *ch'i*, in the manner Kuan-tzu did, with Tao and *wu*. In this way the concept of *ch'i* regains its ineffable status in his thought. Han K'ang-po says:

What is Tao? It refers to *wu*. There is nothing *wu* does not cover, and nothing does not derive from *wu*. [That's the reason] *wu* is compared to and called Tao (Way). *Wu* [in its essence] is still and without physical form, and accordingly is ineffable (*pu-k'o wei hsiang*).¹²³ Only when the function of

¹²². *Ibid.*, 2.A.171-2.

¹²³. There is a fundamental discrepancy concerning this line between the Northern Sung edition and the editions after that; in the former, *wu* is said to be effable, while in the latter, *wu* is said to be ineffable (*pu-k'o wei hsiang*). This translation follows the latter, since the former causes a difficulty in explaining the substance of *ch'i* which is ineffable. For detail, see *ICCC* 2.A.141

yu is fully exerted is the power (*kung*) of *wu* manifest; therefore, when the understanding that "the ineffable (*shen*) has no spatial restriction" and "Change (*i*) has no physical form" is realized, Tao is comprehensible.¹²⁴

Seemingly, Han Kang-po's conception of the substance of *ch'i* looks back to the period after Wang Ch'ung, in that he reconferred upon it the characteristic of ineffability which Wang Ch'ung had denied. But is the ineffability to which he refers the hallmark of the same kind of supernatural belief that Wang Ch'ung set out to refute? At this point, a look into the nature of the ineffability Han K'ang-po has claimed for the substance of *ch'i* is in order.

Remember that Kuan-tzu's concept of *li* derived from the orderliness of ever-moving *ch'i*, while Wang Pi's concept of *i*, principle, referred to *wu*, the substance of *ch'i*. The two ideas, as they are, do not have any connection to each other. However, they make a good contrast in terms of the way *li* and *i* are connected to *ch'i*. Kuan-tzu uses a rational analysis, while Wang Pi uses an ideational idea.

Han Kang-po's assumption of Wang Ch'ung's representational definition in his basic understanding of *ch'i* seems to have oriented him toward a rational explanation in terms of the concept of principle. He appears to think that the

(N.Sung ed.); *ibid.*, 2.B.172 (S.Sung ed.); *ibid.*, 6.703 (Ming, Shih-san ching ed.); *ibid.*, 3.290 (Ch'ing, Wu-ying tien ed.); and *Ssu-k'u ch'üan-shu: Chou-I chu-shu*, 11.15.

¹²⁴. *ICCC* 2.B.172. This translation is based on K'ung Ying-ta's commentary (*ibid.*, 6.704).

operation of *ch'i* in Heaven complies with principle (*li*). This gives him a reason to think that "investigating principle (*li*), which underlies the gathering and dispersing of *ch'i*, could lead to the grasping of Tao."¹²⁵ In other words, he implies that the reason why the substance of *ch'i* is called Tao is because the fundamental characteristic of substance is principle, *li*, through which functional *ch'i* operates. This is also the reason why the substance of *ch'i* is, for him, ineffable. From this, one can sense that the ineffability he claims for *ch'i* is not so much based on supernatural belief as on a rational idea.

The ideas of K'ung Ying-ta (574-648), a temporary stopping point in this excursion into the history of *ch'i*, are the product of an interesting blend of the ideas of Kuan-tzu, Wang Ch'ung, Wang Pi and Han K'ang-po. In addition to using the grammar of Taoist metaphysics which interprets *ch'i* within the *wu-yu* framework, he synthesizes Wang Ch'ung's representational description and Wang Pi's ideational one.

First of all, he represents the Taoist framework of *wu* and *yu* as "yin-yang *ch'i*" and the "*hsiang* of hexagram" (configuration of things revealed in hexagram), namely, *ch'i* and phenomena, respectively. K'ung Ying-ta says:

From this, we know that the principle of Change (*i-li*) includes *yu* and *wu*....Therefore, the "Great Treatise" says that "above form" is Tao, which is *wu*, and that "below form" is a concrete thing, which is *yu*. Therefore, speaking of *wu*, it is in

¹²⁵. *Ibid.*, 2.A.140.

the substance of Tao, speaking of *yu*, it is in the function of a concrete thing (*ch'i-yung*). In terms of the transformational changes (*p'ien-hua*), [*wu*] is in the ineffable (*shen*), in terms of the production of things (*sheng-ch'eng*), [*yu*] is in Change (*i*). In terms of something true (*chen*), [*wu*] is in the human nature, in terms of something evil, [*yu*] is in the human emotions. In terms of *ch'i*, [*wu*] is in yin-yang, in terms of quality (*chih*), [*yu*] is in the *yao-hsiang*.¹²⁶

According to the above passage, Tao, the ineffable, human nature, and yin-yang (*ch'i*) are what he thinks of as *wu*, substance, or "above form," while concrete things, Change, human emotions, and *yao-hsiang* belong to *yu*, function, or "below form." It is implied here that the former, which yin-yang (*ch'i*) represents, are essence, while the latter, which the *hsiang* of hexagram represents, are reality. It seems that K'ung Ying-ta, through this division, hints that he wants *ch'i* to be the principle of phenomena. Therefore, it is not surprising to find him representing yin-yang as the Great Void, and eventually as principle:

[As to] that which makes *hsiang* (configuration of things) possible, how can that derive from *hsiang* itself? *Hsiang* derives from the Great Void of nature (*t'ai-hsü tzu-jan*). [As to] that which makes the number (*shu*) possible, how can that derive from the number itself? The number derives from the the Great Void of nature. That *hsiang* (configurational image)¹²⁷ of the Great Void, and the number of the Great Void are extremely essential (*chih-ching*) and extremely changing (*chih-pien*). Due to being extremely essential, it can produce the number. Due

¹²⁶. "The preface to *Chou-i cheng-i*," *ibid.*, 5.11.

¹²⁷. K'ung Ying-ta's usage of the term *hsiang*, as indicated through this translation, includes both "above form" and "below form." It seems that the influence of Wang Ch'ung and Wang Pi on his thought is responsible for this.

to being extremely changing, it can produce *hsiang*. If not being extremely essential, changing and ineffable (*shen*), it (the Great Void) can not participate in the rank of the abstruse principle (*hsüan-li*).¹²⁸

The above passage is interesting for the syncretism reflected of the ideas of Wang Ch'ung and Wang Pi in terms of *hsiang* and (*t'ai-hsü*) *tsu-jan*.¹²⁹ K'ung Ying-ta, as indicated, uses the concept of *hsiang* both in Wang Pi's ideational sense and in Wang Ch'ung's representational sense. This is also the case with K'ung's concept of the substance of *ch'i*. He combines the representational approach with the ideational one in that he posits the fundamental characteristic of the substance both in *tsu-jan* and in its being principle. While Wang Ch'ung used the concept of *tsu-jan* to argue against the ineffability of *ch'i*, K'ung Ying-ta uses this very concept to argue for it. He does this by identifying *t'ai-hsü tsu-jan* with the "abstruse principle."

In this marriage of *ch'i* with principle, which is the syncretism of the representational definition and the ideational definition with regard to the interpretation of *ch'i*, one can clearly see the influence of Wang Pi on K'ung Ying-ta's concept of *ch'i*. And this fact suggests indirectly that Wang Pi's concept of principle was predicated on *ch'i*, or pan-*ch'i*ism. In this sense, it can safely be said that K'ung Ying-

¹²⁸. *Chou-i cheng-i*, *ibid.*, 6.736.

¹²⁹. The *t'ai-hsü* is otherwise called *hsü-wu* or the One by K'ung. See "Great treatise," *Chou-i cheng-i*, *ibid.*, 6.703.

ta's idea is an elaboration of Wang Pi's unexpressed one. For this reason, as to the relevancy of *li*, principle, to *ch'i*, K'ung Ying-ta's idea is different from that of Han K'ang-po, who subscribed to Kuan-tzu's concept of principle, although the two share a similar conception of *ch'i*.

In short, two clear conclusions can be drawn from this discussion of the ideas of Wang Pi, Han K'ang-po, and K'ung Ying-ta concerning the relevancy of the concept of principle, *li*, to that of *ch'i*. First, the concept of *li* is interchangeable with the concept of *ch'i*, that is, the substance of *ch'i*. Second, *ch'i* is holistic in that it refers to substance and function, including phenomena, or essence and reality.

Throughout this chapter, we have seen that the term *ch'i* has been applied to a spectrum of realities, including the natural, the psycho-physiological, the supernatural, and axiological phenomena. It has even been used as a verb. It is my view that since there is no way of encompassing all these various these connotations of *ch'i* in a single term, that it would be preferable to leave it untranslated.

Excepting Wang Ch'ung, the consensus about *ch'i* among the authors who have been dealt with in this chapter is that it is characterized by ineffability (incomprehensibility, mystery, invisibility, or indescribability). However, these authors actually have incorporated *ch'i* as an effable substance in their descriptions of inner and outer reality. In spite of an

apparent conflict over ineffability and effability, they actually all were engaged in an attempt to describe the comprehensive or holistic nature of *ch'i*. This holistic character of *ch'i* is described in seemingly bifurcated terms such as *wu-yu*, substance-function, above form-below form, and essence-reality. We have also seen that these frameworks include *li-ch'i*. Despite the apparent inclusion of *ch'i* in both aspects, authors such as Han K'ang-po and K'ung Ying-ta represented only the former elements in each pair as *ch'i*. This is the reason why they described only *ch'i* as ineffable.

It has also been shown that both ideational and representational descriptions, which stand for *li* and *ch'i*, are possible with substance of *ch'i*. If *li* and *ch'i*, as have conventionally been understood, are considered to stand for mind and matter respectively, then, the concept of holistic *ch'i* can be said to include both mind and matter. This idiosyncrasy constitutes, in my view, a second reason that the term *ch'i* should be left untranslated.

What kind of significance does pan-*ch'i*ism have for the myriad beings, particularly for human beings? It seems that "the continuity of being,"¹³⁰ which can be described as homogeneity of being for the myriad beings, and as "no-self (*wu-wo*)" for human beings, is a concept implicit in pan-*ch'i*ism.

¹³⁰. For a detailed idea of the continuity of being, see Tu Wei-ming, "The Continuity of being: Chinese Visions of nature" in *Confucian Thought*, 35-50.

Let us consider this particular meaning of pan-ch'iism expressed in the ideas of three authors: Mo-tzu, Chuang-tzu, and Mencius.

Mo-tzu's idea of "reading *ch'i*" (*wang-ch'i*) is evidence of the influence of pan-ch'iism. As discussed above, Mo-tzu's idea is that man and natural reality, that is, clouds, are correlated to the extent that the future can be told by reading the signs manifested in cloud-*ch'i*. Obviously, this particular continuity between man and clouds is predicated on their both sharing *ch'i*. In other words, the continuity is guaranteed by homogeneous *ch'i*.

This reductive idea becomes more clear in *Chuang-tzu* when he contends, "Do not listen with the ears but listen with the mind; do not listen with the mind but listen with *ch'i*." He implies that the essence of man lies not in physical (or mental) conditions but in *ch'i*; therefore if one manages to recover the substantial *ch'i*, which consists in the effort of the self to transcend physical boundaries, one can realize the true self by being one with the myriad beings. In this sense, the true self is interchangeable with the enlarged self (*ta-wo*).

This Taoist theme of the connection between no-self and the enlarged self is also shared by Confucianism. This is the case with the Mencian concept of "the flood-like *ch'i*." As discussed above, pan-ch'iism underlies in the Mencian world-view. The uniqueness of Mencius's idea is that he regards *ch'i*

as something which should be controlled for moral purposes. He believes that if *ch'i* is subjected to moral guidance, it will enable man's capacities to be enlarged in a flood-like way. This is the stage at which one can experience no-self in the sense of no-selfishness (*wu-szu*).

In chapter two, we will examine the limitation inherent in the representational description of *ch'i*, a limitation that will be incorporated in Chang Tsai's approach. As will be argued, this limitation provides the momentum for the genesis of the so-called the School of Principle, and eventually of the School of the Mind. The central issue among these three parties can be described as a search for the ineffable reality, or the Ultimate reality, and the ways of securing it. In the course of discussion, we will also witness their development of the concept of "no-self (*wu-wo*)" with the connotations of "no-selfishness" and "the enlarged self" found at the center of their ideas concerning moral cultivation.

Chapter Two: A Dispute about Ultimate Reality: Chang Tsai and the Ch'eng Brothers

Despite his contributions to the development of Neo-Confucian thought,¹ Chang Tsai's (1020-1077) philosophy was not fully appreciated by the Ch'eng brothers, Ch'eng Hao (1032-1085) and Ch'eng I (1033-1107). After Chang's death, his disciples turned their backs on him in favor of the Ch'engs, and even mischaracterized Chang's relationship with the brothers.² Obviously a fundamental "misunderstanding," as Mou Tzung-san explains it, was involved in this reception of Chang's philosophy.³ From a critical point of view, however, some of the Ch'engs' criticisms were justified, for Chang's work is marred by logical inconsistencies. And these problems, in the final analysis, can be reduced to the issue of whether *ch'i* should be described as effable or ineffable.

¹. For example, two authorities, Fung Yu-lan and Mou Tzung-san, although fundamentally disagreeing on most issues, both assign an undisputed place to Chang Tsai in the development of Neo-Confucianism. Fung holds that Chang, together with the Ch'eng Brothers, is the founder of Neo-Confucianism, while Chou Tun-i (1017-1073) is a transitory figure. Mou, on the other hand, honors Chou and Chang as representing the mainstream of Neo-Confucianism. For Fung, see "Chang Tsai che-hsüeh ssu-hsiang chi ch'i tsai tao-hsüeh chung te ti-wei", *Chung-kuo che-hsüeh*, 5 (1981), 72. For Mou, see "Tsung-lun," *Hsin-t'i yü hsing-t'i*, vol.1.

². For general information about Chang's relationship with the Ch'engs, recorded by Chang's disciples, see Graham, *Two philosophers*, 176-7. For a detailed picture and evaluation of their relationship in terms of scholarship, see Kasoff, *Chang Tsai*, 143-7.

³. See *Hsin-t'i yü hsing-t'i*, 1.470.

One of the major social developments in the Northern Sung period (960-1127) was a new awareness of China's cultural identity. This nationalistic trend influenced the traditional conception of *ch'i*, which had been predicated on the Taoist framework of *wu-yu*. Chang Tsai subscribes to the traditional notion that *ch'i*, or the substance of *ch'i*, is ineffable. However, in an effort to avoid use of the Taoist concept of *wu*, also shared by Buddhism, Chang posits the substance of *ch'i* in *yu*, which paves the way for him to recast ineffable *ch'i* as effable. The Ch'engs' criticism of Chang's description of *ch'i* as "pure, void, one and great" (*ch'ing, hsü, i, ta*) implicitly gives us to understand this background.

In this chapter I will explore the Ch'engs' criticism of that particular description, in an attempt to describe the philosophical dispute about Ultimate reality that took place among Chang Tsai and the Ch'engs. This philosophical dispute is centered on the issue of how that which constitutes the ineffable can be defined, which necessarily involves the relationship between the ineffable and the effable. Ch'eng I, finding its substance in *li*, Tao, implies a differentiated but inseparable relation between ineffable *li* and effable *ch'i*, implicitly expressed in a dialectic involving "independence (transcendence)," "dependence," and "priority" between *li* and *ch'i*. Ch'eng Hao, finding its substance in mind, asserts a total identity between Tao and *ch'i*.

This chapter is divided into three parts. First, I will

consider the logical problems in Chang Tsai's philosophy with which the Ch'engs take issue, while continuing the discussion of *ch'i*. In the second and third parts, I will explore Ch'eng I's philosophy as an effort to overcome Chang Tsai's inconsistency, and Ch'eng Hao's philosophy as an antithesis to Chang Tsai and Ch'eng I. As they have different personalities and philosophical orientations, the Ch'engs find their answers in different ways. Ch'eng I, who is inclined to intellectualize, prefers transcendental immanence, while Ch'eng Hao, basing one's reasoning in experience, favors immanent transcendence.

1. Chang Tsai: *Ch'i*

Remember that traditionally the interpretation of *ch'i* had been based on the Taoist frame of *wu-yu*. Although *wu* is a Taoist concept, it did not so much refer to "non-being" as to "being," the substance of holistic *ch'i*, which can be translated either as ideational *li* or as representational *ch'i*. It came to Chang Tsai's attention that using the concept *wu* might compromise the Confucian orientation which he was promoting, and perhaps this consciousness of his identity as a Confucian led him to avoid its Taoist-Buddhist associations. To define the framework in which to place *ch'i*, Chang Tsai prefers *yu* (hidden, or invisible) and *ming* (manifest, or visible).

[As for] Heavenly bodies (*t'ien-wen*) and Earthly orders (*ti-li*), one knows them because they are manifest (*ming*); [in the world] other than the manifest, all is hidden (*yu*); this is that through

which one knows the causes of the invisible and the visible. The features of the myriad things are manifest (*hsien*) from (*hu*) noumenon (*li*);⁴ except noumenon, no features are to be manifest. That which is manifest is through (*yu*) phenomenon (*ming*); [as for] that which is not manifest, however, [one can not say that] that does not exist; this is [something which is related to] the abstruse place (*chih-ch'u*) of Heaven.⁵

Originally, *yu-ming* in "the Great Treatise A" refers to "above form" and "below form", and by extension, noumenon and phenomenon, which *I Chuan* represents as the basic structure of the world. In Chang Tsai's opinion, noumenon is characterized by both invisibility (*yu*) and brightness (*li*), which originally refers to the light shining from an eye. His reasoning here is perhaps that, from the phenomenal point of view, noumenon is invisible; however, noumenon is the source from which the manifest, or phenomenal brightness, originates. He holds in this vein that "the features of the myriad things are manifest from noumenon."

Speaking of the invisible or hidden, one might be tempted to identify noumenon with *wu* (non-being). Chang Tsai seems to be conscious of this temptation, which is actually tantamount to blasphemy for him. He defends himself against it:

Between Heaven and Earth is filled with things and their configurational images (*fa-hsiang*);⁶ in

⁴. This translation of *li* as noumenon is based on Mou Tsung-san's interpretation. For detail, see *Hsin-t'i yü hsing-t'i*, 1.467.

⁵. "Hsi-ts'u" A, *CTCS* 11.4a.

⁶. As discussed in the previous chapter, the meaning of *hsiang* varies depending on the interpretation of *ch'i*. The ideational tradition regards *hsiang* as "below form," or phenomena. Meanwhile,

observing the [Heavenly] bodies and [Earthly] orders (*wen-li*), but for noumenon (*li*), no configurational images (*hsiang*) are to be seen. When they are formed, one knows the cause of noumenon through "being" (*yu*); when they are not formed, one knows the cause of phenomenon through "being" (*yü*).⁷

This passage reiterates the interpretational framework for *ch'i* seen above, and upon close reading it seems that it contains a tautological error in the last line. Judging from the context, contrasting phenomenon with noumenon, and form with no-form, one might expect that "being" (*yu*) would be contrasted with "non-being" (*wu*). Instead, *yu* is coupled with another *yu* in the passage. Therefore, these two *yu*'s need to be differentiated.

In fact, they are compatible with the aforementioned pairs, phenomenon-noumenon and form-no form. Considered this way, one of the *yu*'s, specifically the latter one, should be associated with no-form and the invisible. All of these fall into the category of noumenon. From this, one can conclude that Chang Tsai would posit noumenon in *yu*, too, and thereby avoid unnecessary confusion either with Taoism or with Buddhism. It is on this point that he criticizes "those heretics" who "consider the abstruse place of Heaven as void (*k'ung-hsü*), because they only know phenomenon; they do not observe

the representational tradition considers *hsiang* "above form" in the sense that *hsiang* refers to the stage before things are formed. What Chang Tsai implies with *fa-hsiang* refers to phenomena (*fa*) and the stage before they are formed (*hsiang*). My translation of *hsiang* as "configurational images" reflects this understanding.

⁷. "T'ai-ho", *ibid.*, 2.3a.

noumenon, [therefore] that which they see is one-sided."⁸

What then is the noumenal *yu* like? What is the character of that "being"? Chang Tsai finds the answer in *ch'i*. Using the same framework as above, he restates the cardinal tenet of his philosophy:

If *ch'i* integrates, noumenon (*li-ming*)⁹ becomes effective and physical form appears. If *ch'i* does not integrate, noumenon is not effective and there is no physical form. While *ch'i* is integrated, how can one not say that it is temporary (*k'o*)? While it is disintegrated, how can one hastily say that it is *wu*? For this reason, the sage, having observed phenomenon and examined above and below, only claims to know the causes of the invisible and the visible but does not claim to know the causes of *yu* and *wu*.¹⁰

In the previous passage, Chang Tsai said that "the features of the myriad things are manifest from noumenon." Here he declares that "if *ch'i* integrates, noumenon becomes effective and physical form appears." For him the noumenal *yu* is none other than *ch'i* itself. He calls phenomena, the state owing its being to the gathering of *ch'i*, "temporary" (*k'o*, literally meaning a guest). In other words, he regards phenomena as transitory. This prompts one to question the constancy or substance of the noumenal *ch'i*. He calls the

⁸. "Hsi-ts'u A", *ibid.*, 11.4a.

⁹. The *ming* in *li-ming* and *yu-ming* should be differentiated. In the former, *ming* refers to noumenal brightness, and *li* also means the brightness of the eye. Therefore, *li-ming* is a tautology. In the latter, however, *ming*, an antonym of *yu*, hidden, signifies phenomenal brightness.

¹⁰. Modified from Chan, *Source book*, 503.

substance of *ch'i* the Great Void (*t'ai-hsü*).¹¹

The Great Void of necessity consists of *ch'i*. *Ch'i* of necessity integrates to become the myriad things. Things of necessity disintegrate and return to the Great Void. Appearance and disappearance following this cycle are a matter of necessity.¹²

Searching for a word to refer to the subtle substance of *ch'i*, he finally chooses a Taoist term, the Great Void, which K'ung Ying-ta also used for the substance of *ch'i*. The prefix "great" seems to suggest Chang Tsai's wish to dissociate the Void from vacuity, investing it with substantiality. However, the deep-rooted associations carried by the term Void have hindered this effort, and Chang Tsai appears to be conscious of this. This consciousness, coupled with his obsession with making *ch'i* a subtle *yu*, explains his verbosity with respect to *ch'i*. For example, he explains: "The integration and disintegration of *ch'i* is to the Great Void as the freezing and melting of ice is to the water. If one realizes that the Great Void is identical with *ch'i*, one knows that there is no such thing as non-being."¹³

This passage is very effective in conveying the idea that the Void is substantial. With this explanation, Chang observes, no one would associate the Void with non-being. Also in this context, Chang explains *ch'i* using adjectives such as

¹¹. The term originates in "Chih-pei-yu," *Chuang-tzu*. See *HPCTCC* 3.22.330.

¹². Modified from Chan, *ibid.*, 501.

¹³. Modified from *ibid.*, 503. This passage originally appears in *Lun-heng* by Wang Ch'ung. See "Lun-szu", *HPCTCC* 7.202.

"pure," "void," "one," and "great," which are ubiquitous in "Correcting Youthful Ignorance." However, acceptance of this explanation comes at a cost. The similes he uses of ice and water, and references to freezing and melting, are powerful enough to tether one's imagination about *ch'i* and the Great Void to phenomena, with the result that the ineffable aspect of *ch'i* is obscured. One can sense looming behind the issue of effability and ineffability the problem of how to use language to speak of Ultimate reality, and the danger that the difficulty of defining the ineffable aspect of *ch'i* will result in its not being dealt with at all.

Chang Tsai's term for the functional aspect of *ch'i* is the Great Harmony (*t'ai-ho*).¹⁴ If the Great Void can be called a macroscopic definition of the ineffable being, the Great Harmony can be considered as a microscopic description of its function. Together, they make a complementary picture of his view of *ch'i*.

The Great Harmony is called Tao. It embraces the nature which underlies all counterprocesses of floating and sinking, rising and falling, and motion and rest. It is the origin of the process of fusion and intermingling (*yin-yün*), of overcoming and being overcome, and of expansion and contraction. At the commencement, these processes are incipient, subtle, obscure, easy, and simple, but at the end, they are extensive, great, strong, and firm....Unless the whole universe is in the process of fusion and intermingling like fleeting forces (*yeh-ma*) moving in all directions, it may not be

¹⁴. Chu Hsi, in *CTYL* 99.2534., also interprets *t'ai-hsü* as *li*, substance, and interprets *t'ai-ho* as *ch'i*, function. With this interpretation of Chang Tsai's philosophy, Chu Hsi implies an affinity between so-called the *Li* School and the *Ch'i* School.

called Great Harmony. When those who talk about Tao know this, they really know Tao, and when those who study Change understand this, then they really understand Change.¹⁵

This passage clearly shows that the the Great Void consists of a harmonious activity of *ch'i*, which is implied by the "fusion and intermingling of fleeting forces." The term Great Harmony, as Chang Tsai explains it, is inspired by this state.

What then makes *ch'i* harmonious? He finds the answer in the nature of *ch'i*'s "impartiality" (*pu-lei*).¹⁶ Chang Tsai argues:

One thing with two aspects (*liang-t'i*), [this is] *ch'i*....If the two are not established, the one will not be manifest; if the one is not manifest, the function of the two will cease. The two aspects are void and substantiality (*hsü-shih*), motion and rest (*tung-ching*), integration and disintegration (*chü-san*), and clearness and turbidity (*ch'ing-chuo*). In the final analysis, however, they are one.¹⁷

These "two aspects" are attributed to the fundamental paired nature of yin and yang in *ch'i*. *Ch'i* never rests with either side. This is what Chang Tsai calls the "impartiality" of *ch'i*. He also calls this nature of *ch'i* "both aspects" (*chien-t'i*).¹⁸ For him the "two aspects" are theoretically differentiated but practically inseparable. Having "two aspects" is

¹⁵. Modified from Chan, *ibid.*, 500-1.

¹⁶. See "T'ai-ho", *CTCS* 2.2a.

¹⁷. Modified from Chan, *ibid.*, 505.

¹⁸. "T'ai-ho," *ibid.*, 2.2a. In "Tung-wu," Chang also asserts that "with regard to things, it is impossible to think about a non-paired principle (*ku-li*).\" See *ibid.*, 2.16b.

what makes the function of *ch'i* the Great Harmony. This is also what causes *ch'i* to move.

This does not, however, provide an explanation for the reason that the ever-moving property of *ch'i* is the origin of phenomena. Let's listen to what Chang Tsai says about this:

As the Great Void, *ch'i* is extensive and vague. Yet it ascends and descends and moves in all ways without ever ceasing. This is what is called in *I Ching* "fusion and intermingling" (*yin-yün*) and in *Chuang-tzu* "fleeting forces (*yeh-ma*) moving in all directions while all living beings blow against one another with their breath." Here lies the subtle, incipient activation of reality and unreality, of motion and rest, and the beginning of yin and yang, as well as the elements of strength and weakness. Yang that is clear ascends upward, whereas yin that is turbid sinks downward. As a result of their [mutual] attraction and contact (*kan-t'ung*) and of their integration and disintegration, winds and rains, snow and frost come into being. Whether it be the countless variety of things in their changing configurations, the mountains and rivers in their fixed forms, or [even] dregs and ashes, there is nothing which is not instructive (*chiao*) [of noumenon].¹⁹

This passage offers two important topics for consideration in reference to *ch'i*. One is that *ch'i* (*yin-yang*) has the inherent attribute of mutual attraction (*kan*).²⁰ From this, Chang Tsai describes the nature of this attraction,

¹⁹. Modified from Chan, *ibid.*, 503.

²⁰. According to Chang Tsai there are five patterns of attraction. The first one he cites is identity. The reason the sage can attract human-mind with Tao is that the same mind is shared between the sage and man. The second is difference: he cites sexual attraction as this case; mutual pleasure, and mutual fear, finally mutual responses (*ying*) can also attract each other as is seen in a magnet. See "Hsien," in "I-shuo," *CTCS* 10.1b. Though Chang did not specifically mention *ch'i*, judging from the context, the case of *ch'i* seems to have relevance both to "difference" and to "response."

saying, "It is like influence (*ying-hsiang*), [but] no priority is applicable to them [e.g. which dominates influence]; any motion, of necessity, results in attraction."²¹ He does not, however, regard *ch'i* as sentient or animate. He notes that "when there are the two, there is, of necessity, attraction. Does Heaven think in its attraction? Certainly; it is natural."²² Chang Tsai regards this natural property as something which makes *ch'i* ineffable (*shen*). He holds that "[as for] the motions in the world, the ineffable causes them. The ineffable is in charge of the motions; therefore, [it can be said that] the ineffable is responsible for the motions in the world."²³

Let us pay attention to the word "instructive" in the last line of the passage above. The general import of the passage is that the yin-yang *ch'i*, upon attracting each other, produce things. Since the myriad things are the embodiment of the noumenal *ch'i*, one can trace from each mode of being vestiges of noumenon. In this sense, things are pointing "fingers" indicating noumenon, or the power of noumenon. This touches on another characteristic of *ch'i* in Chang Tsai's thought. What makes *ch'i* nouminous? Or, what is the fundamental characteristic of *ch'i*?

The essence of *ch'i* in Chang Tsai's thought is found in morality, or principle (*li*). He says that "The Void is the

²¹. *Ibid.*

²². "kuan-kua," *ibid.*, 9.26a.

²³. "Hsi-ts'u A," *ibid.*, 11.15a.

origin of humanity. Loyalty and empathy (*chung-shu*) are born together with humanity....If there is the Void, then humanity is born; humanity accomplishes itself by abiding in principle."²⁴ In *Chang Tsai chi* (Collected works of Chang Tsai),²⁵ he explains: "Heaven-Earth makes the Void its virtue (*te*); the extremely good (*chih-shan*) is the Void."²⁶ Underlying this statement is his unexpressed idea that *ch'i* could be conceived of as sharing the characteristic of principle. In this context, he holds that "humanity accomplishes itself by abiding in principle."

Although *ch'i* in the universe integrates and disintegrates, and attracts and repulses in a hundred ways, nevertheless the principle (*li*) according to which it operates has an order and is unerring. As an entity, *ch'i* simply reverts to its original substance when it disintegrates and becomes formless. When it integrates and assumes form, it does not lose the eternal principle.²⁷

This passage recalls the rational approach to *ch'i* found in *Kuan-tzu* and the writings of Han K'ang-po. Chang Tsai makes use of this rational idea to posit a foundation for morality in *ch'i*. He appears to think that principle, residing in the motion of *ch'i* itself, guarantees the orderly and unerring movement of *ch'i*, and, at the same time, becomes the eternal

²⁴. "Yü-lu B," *CTYL* (Chang-tzu yü-lu) 11b.

²⁵. Peking: Chung-hua shu-chü, 1978.

²⁶. "Yü-lu B," *CTC* 12b.

²⁷. Modified from Chan, *ibid.*, 501.

principle for man.²⁸ In other words, he sees *ch'i* as the "vessel" which contains principle, and the movement of *ch'i* as the medium through which this principle is disseminated into the myriad things. For this reason, Chang Tsai says that *ch'i*, even after assuming form, does not lose this eternal principle, or morality. Given this, it is obvious that principle in his mind constitutes the essence of *ch'i*. It is in this context that Chang Tsai identifies *ch'i* with the Great Ultimate (*t'ai-chi*).²⁹ This holistic *ch'i*, upon its individuation, transforms itself into nature. And the individuation is occasioned by the attractive power of *ch'i*, which constitutes the mysterious/ineffable characteristic of *ch'i*. Chang Tsai says:

Attraction (*kan*) is what constitutes the ineffable (*shen*) of nature, and nature is what constitutes the substance (*t'i*) of the attraction. They (attraction and nature) only refer to the attributes (*neng*) of contraction and expansion, motion and rest, and completion and initiation; they are, in fact, one. Therefore, that through which the myriad things are made subtle is called the ineffable; that through which the myriad things are united is called Tao; and that through which the myriad things are embodied is called nature.³⁰

This passage shows that Chang Tsai's concept of *ch'i* includes the characteristics of Tao, the ineffable, attrac-

²⁸. For a detailed discussion about the process in which the concept of *li* evolves from orderliness (*t'iao-li*) into morality, see Wing-tsit Chan, "The Evolution of the Neo-Confucian Concept *Li* as principle," *The Tsing-hua Journal of Chinese Studies*, 2 (1964), 123-133.

²⁹. "Shuo-kua," *ibid.*, 11.28b, 29b.

³⁰. "Ch'ien-ch'eng," *ibid.*, 3.22a.

tion, and nature in itself. To sum up this idea, he says that "the ineffable signifies the Power of Heaven (*t'ien-te*), and transformation (*hua*) means the Tao of Heaven. Power refers to its substance (*ch'i*), and Tao refers to its function. [But] they are one in *ch'i*."³¹ In addition he thinks that "Morality and being (*tao-te*, *hsing-ming*) originate in them (Tao and Power), which are immortal; [though] man is mortal, they last forever."³² In short, with *ch'i* Chang Tsai envisions a universe in which the Power of noumenon is fully manifest in terms of morality through every form of the myriad beings. The "Western Inscription" demonstrates Chang's conception of an ideal world:

Heaven is my father and Earth is my mother, and even such a small creature as I find an intimate place in their midst. Therefore that which fills the universe I regard as my body and that which directs the universe I consider as my nature. All people are my brothers and sisters, and all things are my companions. The great ruler is the eldest son of my parents (Heaven and Earth), and the great ministers are his stewards. Respect the aged--this is the way to treat them as elders should be treated. Show deep love toward the orphaned and the weak--this is the way to treat them as the young should be treated. The sage identifies his character with that of Heaven and Earth, and the worthy is the most outstanding man. Even those who are tired, infirm, crippled, or sick; those who have no brothers or children, wives or husbands, are all my brothers who are in distress and have no one to

³¹. "Shen-hua," *ibid.*, 2.13a. Remember that traditionally Tao is referred to as the substance of *ch'i*, while Power is called the function of *ch'i*. It is noticeable in this passage that Chang Tsai reverses these.

³². "I-li" (*li-k'u*), *ibid.*, 6.2b.

turn to.³³

Despite this lofty conception of the ideal world, the virtue of Heaven and Earth, in actuality, does not realize itself as it is in the human world. Chang Tsai thinks that there is an unbridgeable gap between noumenon and phenomenon. As expressed above, the Void, which is also the ineffable, is the extremely good. On a different occasion he holds that "the forms and appearances of the myriad things are dregs of the ineffable."³⁴ This shows that phenomena for him are nothing but the shadows of noumena. This rupture is directly related to the issue of evil in his philosophy.

Ironically, the cause of rupture between Heaven and man seems to begin in the holistic noumenal *ch'i*, through which they are supposed to form a continuity. One problem in dealing with this issue of evil in Chang Tsai's thought is the lack of a consistent theory about it, which forces one to resort to piecing together clues from various places to decipher his ideas about evil in the noumenal *ch'i*. At one point he states:

Stillness and purity characterize the original state of *ch'i*. Attack and seizure characterize its desire....With the existence of physical form, there exists physical nature. If one skillfully returns to the original nature endowed by Heaven and Earth, then it will be preserved.³⁵

And:

³³. Chan, *ibid.*, 497.

³⁴. "T'ai-ho," *CTCS* 2.5b.

³⁵. Modified from Chan, *ibid.*, 510.

In the unity of the Void and *ch'i*, there is the nature (of man and things). And in the unity of the nature and consciousness, there is the mind.³⁶

The first half of the first passage above describes the Great Harmony from a different perspective, one which perhaps may be of help in identifying the source of impurity which can account for evil as it concerns Chang Tsai's concept of *ch'i*. Remember that Chang Tsai had represented the function of *ch'i* based on the mutual attractive power (*kan*) it possessed as the Great Harmony, but here "attack and seizure" is a negative description of the attraction and ensuing response. It would not be far-fetched to propose that "attack and seizure" characterizing desire, which results in the production of individual forms, could disrupt its original state of stillness and purity, thereby causing *ch'i* to become impure. Chang Tsai appears to imply that the motion of *ch'i* adulterates its purity. In other words he sees the process of individuation of holistic *ch'i* as identical with the process through which evil is brought into being.

This description of the motion of *ch'i* sheds light on Chang Tsai's explanation about human nature in the second quotation above, which has caused a vexing debate among scholars.³⁷ He assumes that nature, the embodiment of holistic

³⁶. Modified from Chan, *ibid.*, 504.

³⁷. Three kinds of positive responses are available to Chang's account of nature that "in the unity of the Great Void and *ch'i*," there is nature." Fung Yu-lan, *History* 1.489, holds that the line is tautological; Mou Tzung-san, *Hsin-t'i yü hsing-t'i*, 1.495-6, says that it is obstructive; Kasoff, *Chang Tsai*, 76, argues that it

ch'i, inherits both purity and impurity, representing the original state and the disturbed state of *ch'i*, caused by "desire" and ensuing "attack." This approach makes sense of the troublesome line: "In the unity of the Great Void and *ch'i*, there is nature." Chang Tsai seems to assume that human nature consists of the Great Void--representing ineffability, involving purity and good--and *ch'i*, symbolizing effability, involving impurity and evil. Considered in this light, it is likely that he believes "the original nature" reflects the aspect of the Great Void, while "the physical nature" signifies the aspect of impure *ch'i* in human nature. Why then does he fail to make this idea understood, instead making an argument that is seemingly tautological or incomplete? This question deserves analysis.

The above discussion of Chang Tsai's concept of *ch'i* suggests that it is possible to construct a multiple equation involving the Great Void, the Great Harmony, Heaven,³⁸ the Great Ultimate, Tao, the ineffable (*shen*), principle, and nature in his thought, with each of them referring to a particular characteristic of *ch'i*. Put differently, the sum total of them constitutes the character of Chang Tsai's concept of *ch'i*, which he divides into the Great Void and the Great

refers to "Ch'i plus *ch'i* makes nature."

³⁸. Heaven is another name for *ch'i* in Chang Tsai's thought. In "T'ien-tao," *ibid.*, 2.12a., he says that "The incomprehensibility of Heaven constitutes the ineffable; though ineffable but having constancy, so it claims to be Heaven (*t'ien chih pu-ts'e wei shen, shen erh yu-ch'ang wei t'ien*)."

Harmony.³⁹

As indicated above, however, Chang Tsai confuses these different categories of *ch'i*. His determination to avoid unnecessary confusion and association with the heretical Taoist concept of *wu*, the traditional term for the substance of *ch'i*, prompts him to define it as *yu*. In doing so he unknowingly relegates the substance of *ch'i* to the functional level, thereby blurring the conceptual demarcation between substance and function. In other words, he identifies the ineffable with the effable. Initially, this misidentification is responsible for his failure to communicate his concept of the Void.

What is worse, Chang Tsai, never realizing that there is a conflict, devotes considerable energy to justifying his idea. In explaining the ineffable substance of *ch'i*, or the Void, he subscribes to the representational approach to *ch'i* initiated by Wang Ch'ung. In the same way he did, Chang Tsai posits a "bridge" called *hsiang* (configurational image of things) in the process of production spanning "above form" and "below form."

Anything that can have a physical form (*chuang*) is [composed of] *ch'i*. Every being (*yu*) is [composed

³⁹. Chang Tsai's use of the concept of the ineffable (*shen*) might be described as the epitome of the holistic but divisional reality of *ch'i*. This is the case when he observes in *ibid.*, 2.13a. that "the motions of the world are caused by the ineffable" (*t'ien-hsia chih tung, shen ku chih yeh*). In this passage, "the motions of the world" refers to the functional aspect, while "the ineffable" means the substantial one of *ch'i*. But they form an inseparable whole.

of] *hsiang*. Every *hsiang* is [composed of] *ch'i*.⁴⁰

Chang thinks that physical form derives from *ch'i*; however, in order for *ch'i* to be formed, it must go through a preliminary stage called *hsiang*, the configurational image of a thing. *Hsiang* is therefore the "bridge" relating *ch'i* to form, and vice versa. As a result, epistemologically, *hsiang* serves as a "springboard" to the understanding of *ch'i*. Chang argues:

[As for] that which is "above form," if one has its concept (*i*), then one has its name (*ming*); if one has its name, then one has its configurational image (*hsiang*); without its name, there is no configurational image. Therefore, in explaining Tao, if one is confronted with a situation in which the configurational image is depleted, then one can explain it with [another] name^{41,42}

This passage sheds new light on Chang's concept of *ch'i*, the hallmarks of which are the Great Void and the Great Harmony. Chang knows that there is no direct access to *ch'i* except the knowledge that it is "above form." Ineffable as it is, "above form" can be conceptualized by the human mind, and therefore can be named. Its concept and name then enable one to have a certain "image" of its picture or shape. Chang Tsai's understanding of the meaning of the term *hsiang* (configurational image) seems to have come into being in this way. If a certain *hsiang* is not available, he holds that one can go back to another name, and it will enable one to have another

⁴⁰. "Ch'ien-ch'eng," *CTCS* 3.21b.

⁴¹. Remember the multi-equation in Chang's concept of *ch'i*.

⁴². "T'ien-tao," *ibid.*, 2.13a.

hsiang. His explication of this idea follows:

Therefore, [as for] that which is 'above form,' if one has its explanation (*ts'u*, language), then one can have its configurational image. The fact that one can arrange an explanation in the situation in which no concrete form is given means that one already has a configurational image which can be described....If one seeks principle only by perception (ear and eye), how can it be exhausted? If one describes *ch'i* as quiescent and clear, then, there must be matching configurational images.⁴³

The above passage offers valuable information about the role of language in Chang Tsai's metaphysics. He fully trusts in the imaginative power of language. He knows that principle, the substance of *ch'i*, or whatever shares the characteristic of ineffability, cannot be grasped through perception, but he believes that language enables one to have access to it. In other words, he is convinced that a concept can be visualized and the ensuing configurational image or images can define noumenon. His description of *ch'i* as "pure, void, one, and great" seems to have been born this way, and they are none other than his configurational images of the Great Void and the Great Harmony. Thus his initial inconsistency in describing *ch'i* can be explained by an attitude toward language which is not so much philosophical as poetic. It is likely that eventually this naiveté on his part is responsible for other logical problems in his philosophy.

Another inconsistency in Chang Tsai's thought is felt in a fundamental rupture between nature and the mind. As Chang

⁴³. "Hsi-ts'u B," *ibid.*, 11.27b.

explains, for him the mind is larger than nature in its capacity. This is expressed when he says that "the mind presides over nature and emotions," and that "the mind can give full realization to nature...Nature does not know how to regulate the mind."⁴⁴ Contrary to this idea, the mind for him is merely a nominal substance.⁴⁵ The effect of this discrepancy is felt in two ways.

First, nature occupies the central place over the mind in Chang Tsai's idea of moral cultivation. "If one skillfully returns [from physical nature] to original nature," he says, "then it [the original nature] will be preserved." He assumes that, though the original nature is adulterated, if the physical nature is eliminated, then Heaven and man can be unified, since "the nature endowed by Heaven completely permeates Tao; it can not be obscured by *ch'i*, whether it is clear or dark."⁴⁶ He bases this unification on "the realization of the nature to

⁴⁴. "Ch'eng-ming," *ibid.*, 2.18b.

⁴⁵. However, in "Enlarging the mind" (*ta-hsin*), Chang Tsai fully appreciates the place of the mind in moral cultivation. This also shows a contradiction in his thought. As for other inconsistencies, two cases can be cited. He has contradictory ideas about the relationship between Heaven and man; In "Hsi-ts'u" A, *ibid.*, 11.6b, he says that "man cannot be confused with Heaven"; On the other hand, in "Hsi-ts'u" B, *ibid.*, 11.28a, he contradicts that by saying "Heaven and man should not be forcibly separated... because they are one body." Finally, he has different views about principle; In "Yü-lu," *ibid.*, 12.4b, he holds that "[in phenomena] endowed Tao is identical, but endowed principle is different." On the other hand, in CTYL (Chang-tzu yü-lu) A.9a, he says that "the principle is not bestowed in man, but rather bestowed in things."

⁴⁶. Modified from Chan, *ibid.*, 508.

its full extent (*chin-hsing*)."⁴⁷

Second, as a result, regarding his basic approach to moral cultivation, Chang Tsai prefers the model in "Discussion of the Trigrams" (*shuo-kua chuan*), which emphasizes an objective standard rather than the Mencian subjective one. In other words, "the realization of the nature to its full extent" is conditioned by "the investigation of principle to the utmost" (*ch'iung-li*). According to him, "the realization of the nature" is to know Heaven (*chih-t'ien*) through knowing [the substance of] man (*chih-jen*), and so he considers the idea of the full investigation of the principle in objective things as the proper way to arrive at unity. This is what he calls "sincerity resulting from enlightenment (*tzu ming ch'eng*)."⁴⁸

Thus far, we have discussed logical inconsistencies in Chang Tsai's thought which have significance for his concept

⁴⁷. For example, Chang Tsai says that "only one who realizes nature to its full extent can unify phenomenon (*k'o-kan*, *k'o-hsing*) and noumenon (*wu-kan*, *wu-hsing*).⁴⁷" See "T'ai-ho," *ibid.*, 2.2a. And "chin-hsing" in his writing is otherwise called sincerity (*ch'eng*), which refers to "the unity of nature and Heavenly Tao." See "Ch'eng-ming," *ibid.*, 2.17a.

Despite his vehement opposition to Buddhism, Chang Tsai calls this unified state which is conditioned by moral cultivation "no-self (*wu-wo*)," clearly a Buddhist term. The term no-self appears 7 times in Chang-tzu *chüan-shu*: "Shen-hua" 2.14b; 2.15b, "Chih-tang" 3.1b; 3.2a, "Hsüeh ta-yüan A" 6.7a; "Hsüeh ta-yüan B" 7.4a, and "Hsing-li shih-i" 14.2b. Unlike Buddhism, however, with no-self he refers to no-selfishness (*wu-szu*) and the enlarged self (*ta-wo*); As to the meaning of no-self, he holds that "no-self results in the enlarged self" (*wu-wo erh-hou ta*: "Shen-hua" 2.14b); For anybody who realized no-self, he asserts, "there is nothing which is not self" (*t'ien-hsia wu i-wu fei wo*: "Ta-hsin" 2.21a). Summing up, he says that "[the essence of] a sage lies in no-selfishness and no-self" (*sheng-jen wu-szu wu-wo*, "Hsing-li shih-i" 14.2b.).

⁴⁸. For detail, see *CTYL C*, 6b.

of *ch'i*. As we have seen, his concept of *ch'i* embraces both "above form" and "below form," or ineffability and effability, and his fundamental problem lies in his *naiveté* in trusting that what is said to be ineffable can be readily explained. As mentioned, his insistence on maintaining his Confucian identity contributed to the problem. Put differently, his original substitution of the Taoist concept of *wu* with subtle being (*miao-yu*) resulted in *ch'i* being defined as a concrete thing (*shih-yu*). From still a different perspective, Chang Tsai's problem could be attributed to the limitations of the representational approach to *ch'i* revealed when it was exposed to a new philosophical context, Neo-Confucianism, in which distinguishing a Confucian identity was of paramount importance.

Remember that, as discussed in the previous chapter, Han K'ang-po and K'ung Ying-ta, despite apparent agreement that the concept of *ch'i* was inclusive of substance and function, represented only substance, or ineffability as *ch'i*. Remember that Han K'ang-po posited the nature of the ineffability of the substantial *ch'i* in its being principle (orderliness), while K'ung Ying-ta directly identified the substantial *ch'i* with principle. Remember also that K'ung Ying-ta classified human nature in the category of the substantial *ch'i*, or of ineffability. In other words, he implied that the substantial *ch'i* constitutes the ineffable aspect of human nature.

Chang Tsai's concept of *ch'i* was influenced by these ideas; in fact he blended Han K'ang-po's idea into K'ung Ying-

ta's. First of all, Chang Tsai, like Han K'ang-po, posited the essential nature of *ch'i* as substance in its being principle (*li*). But the difference is that Chang Tsai, unlike Han K'ang-po, found the essential characteristic of principle in the source of morality, as K'ung Ying-ta had. It is in this context that Chang Tsai posited goodness as being in the Void, the substantial *ch'i*. As already mentioned above, the problem at issue here is that whether the Void should be described as effable. Chang Tsai, for the reason discussed above, decided that it should be, thereby making the ineffable source of morality effable. Obviously, K'ung Ying-ta's identification of *ch'i* with principle was assumed here, in that Chang Tsai found the essential characteristic of the Void in its being principle.

In short, Chang Tsai's problem, in the final analysis, originated from the apparent limitations of the representational idea of *ch'i* which, representing substance as *ch'i*, renders substance, the Ultimate reality, susceptible to effability. This limitation was crystalized in his failure to convey his idea of individuation, that the Void plus *ch'i* constitutes human nature. His failure clearly attests to the limitation of *ch'i-i fen-shu* (unity of *ch'i* and its diverse particularization), though he came short of conceptualizing the phrase. Ch'eng I's recasting of Chang Tsai's idea into *li-i fen-shu* (unity of principle and its diverse particulariza-

tion)⁴⁹ is suggestive of this limitation and of the affinity, as implied by Chu Hsi, between Chang Tsai's idea and Ch'eng I's idea, which conventionally have been conceived to be diametrically opposed to each other. As to the imputation to Chang Tsai of dogged materialism, this impression, as has been analysed, ultimately stems from his mistakes in logic, first in clumsily positing Ultimate reality in the Great Void and, secondly, in unknowingly relegating it to "below form" by describing it as effable. In this sense, it can safely be said that Chang Tsai's thought is not so much materialistic as flawed.

2. Ch'eng I: Principle (li)

Formerly, [Heng-]ch'ü talked about "pure, void, one, and great"; however, that was criticized by I-ch'uan....Originally, Ch'ü wanted to talk about "above form" [with them]; but they ended up becoming "below form."⁵⁰

And:

Substance and function share the same origin; manifestation and obscurity are inseparable.⁵¹

In the first passage above, Chu Hsi speaks about what Ch'eng I thinks of the fundamental problem in Chang's philoso-

⁴⁹. This phrase appears in Chu Hsi's exposition of Chang's "Western Inscription." See *CTCS* 1.3b. For the translation, see De Bary, *Orthodoxy*, 144.

⁵⁰. *CTYL* 99.2583. Although Mou Tzung-san in his *Hsin-t'i* 1.455. criticizes Chu Hsi, as will be shown below, there are a number of reasons why this criticism is not valid.

⁵¹. "Chou-i Ch'eng-tzu-chuan hsü" 3a., *ECCS* vol.2.

phy. According to Ch'eng I, the reason why "above form" ended up "below form" is attributable to the lack of distinction between the effable and the ineffable. Ch'eng I believes that the substance of *ch'i*, or the Ultimate reality, must be posited as ineffable, and thereby be differentiated from the effable. Put differently, Ch'eng I, through Chu Hsi, implies that Chang's theoretical problem is the limitation of the representational definition of *ch'i*, in which the concept of substance is susceptible of being interpreted as matter.

Ch'eng I in his work develops in an important way the theme of individuation which Chang Tsai failed to articulate fully.⁵² He shares with Chang Tsai the traditional idea that the substance and the function of *ch'i* are differentiated but inseparable,⁵³ but he takes issue with him on the following three points. First, in order to overcome Chang Tsai's failure to posit a theory to explain the ineffability of the substance of *ch'i*, Ch'eng I chooses to follow the ideational approach to *ch'i*, a tenet of which defines the essential aspect of *ch'i* as principle (*li*) and the functional reality of *ch'i* as *ch'i*, thereby assigning to *ch'i* all the attributes of effability, or "below form." Second, he refutes Chang Tsai's idea that *ch'i*

⁵². Ch'eng I, as will be seen, shares Chang's fundamental framework of thought, which basically addresses original and physical natures, moral and experiential knowledge, the transformation of physical nature, and most importantly, the use of deductive logic.

⁵³. Chang Tsai, however, as discussed earlier, failed to put substance and function in a differentiated relationship.

is cyclical,⁵⁴ postulating instead that *ch'i* involves a mechanism for change. Finally, rejecting his idea that "the mind presides over nature and the emotions" (*hsin t'ung hsing-ch'ing*), Ch'eng I proposes that "nature is big, but the mind is small" (*hsing-ta, hsin-hsiao*).

In Ch'eng I's explanation of the individuation of *ch'i*, he recasts the above issues into the frameworks of *li-ch'i* and *hsing* (nature)-*ch'i*. In other words, he is concerned with accounting for the differentiated-but-inseparable relationship between *li-ch'i* in realms such as Nature and nature, or outer and inner. An understanding of this idiosyncratic relationship, as will be discussed, involves the issue of whether *li-ch'i* is a unity or duality, a question inherent in the concept of *ch'i*, or pan-*ch'i*ism, ever since Kuan-tzu. In morality-oriented Neo-Confucianism, this old issue is eventually recast as the problem of evil, first brought to the fore by Chang Tsai.

In his approach to philosophical questions Ch'eng I opts for deductive logic, or intellectual analysis, as the following passage illustrates, to bridge the gap between Nature and nature:

For example, if one wants to make a trip to the capital city, after knowing which gate and road to take, one can set out on the trip. If one, though having an intention to go, does not have any information about the trip, one can go nowhere. One

⁵⁴. Chang Tsai's cyclical idea of *ch'i* is well expressed in his simile of ice and water, and images of freezing and melting. See p. 61.

should be guided by "the investigation of principle to the utmost" here.⁵⁵

Ch'eng I's idea of individuation is centered around the paired frameworks of *Tao-ch'i*, *li-ch'i*, or *hsing* (nature)-*ch'i*. Remember that Chang Tsai deduced his philosophical system from the Void. Ch'eng I, in the same manner, tries to draw his philosophical first principle from the first of each of these paired terms. Thus it is obvious that Ch'eng I's idea is a continuation of Chang Tsai's confusing formulation, *hsü-ch'i*.⁵⁶ The only difference is that Ch'eng I is a more meticulous logician, which the above passage makes clear. In trying to overcome Chang Tsai's limitations, Ch'eng I looks back to Wang Pi, who first implemented the ideational approach, for help with the idealistic interpretation of *ch'i*. However, unlike Wang Pi, who appropriated the Taoist framework of *wu-yu*, Ch'eng I prefers to use the term *Tao-ch'i*. Ch'eng I says:

Yin-yang is *ch'i*. *Ch'i* is "below form," Tao is "above form." "Above form" is hidden.⁵⁷

⁵⁵. "I-shu" 18.4a., *ECCS* vol.1.

⁵⁶. Chang Tsai posited the essence of the Void (*hsü*), or the substance of *ch'i*, in its being principle, and also identified the Void with Tao or nature. Taking this into account, it is obvious that Ch'eng's formulas of *li-ch'i*, *Tao-ch'i*, and *hsing-ch'i* follow Chang Tsai's *hsü-ch'i* framework. And Chu Hsi's interpretation of Chang Tsai's *t'ai-hsü* and *t'ai-ho* as *li* and *ch'i* can be understood in this light.

⁵⁷. *Ibid.*, 15.14b. Ch'eng I's idea of yin-yang *ch'i* makes a striking contrast to K'ung Ying-ta's, which identified yin-yang *ch'i* with Tao. They serve as a good illustration of how the representational approach is different from the ideational approach in terms of the interpretation of *ch'i*, or pan-*ch'i*ism.

Based on the framework of Tao-*ch'i*, Ch'eng replaces Chang Tsai's realistic triad of *ch'i*, *hsiang* (configurational image of things), and form (phenomena) with Wang's idealistic triad of "meaning" (*i*), "explanation" [of the trigram and hexagram] (*ts'u*), and "phenomena," or configuration of things (*hsiang*). This replacement reflects Ch'eng I's intention of translating pan-*ch'i*istic reality into concepts, and positing the ineffability of the substance of *ch'i*, or Tao thereby. Ch'eng I says:

Chün-tzu, upon staying, observes "phenomena" and mulls over its "explanation"; upon moving around, observes Change and ponders divination. It is possible to have the "explanation" without reaching its "meaning"; [however] it is impossible to reach the "meaning" without having the "explanation." The extremely obscure is "principle"; the extremely manifest are "phenomena."⁵⁸

As implied by "hidden," Tao for Ch'eng I is not a perceptual object. He observes that "the extremely obscure is principle" and, on another occasion, that Tao nullifies any effort to express or explain it.⁵⁹ It seems that Ch'eng I made these statements with Chang Tsai's failure in mind. Though hidden and so ineffable, Tao, he argues, is neither non-being (*wu*) nor the Great Void (*t'ai-hsü*); he contends that there is nothing more substantial than principle.⁶⁰ Ch'eng I explains:

⁵⁸. "Chou-i Ch'eng-tzu-chuan *hsü*" 3a.

⁵⁹. *Shuo tse wu-k'o shuo*, "I-shu" 15.13b.

⁶⁰. *Ibid.*, 3.5b. It is clear that Ch'eng I misunderstood Chang Tsai's concept of *t'ai-hsü* from his criticism of its vacuity, because in using the term *t'ai-hsü*, as discussed before, Chang Tsai referred not so much to non-being as to substantiality.

As to its greatness, [Tao] is tantamount to the height and depth of Heaven and Earth; as to its minuteness, Tao even constitutes a single thing's reason for being. All students should understand (*li-hui*) this.⁶¹

Tao is beyond the reach of human senses and therefore it is beyond the capability of human language to describe it. But Tao is apparently out there. Ch'eng I urges one to understand this ineffable Tao not by using the heart (*t'i-hui*), but by using the brain (*li-hui*). This vividly illustrates Ch'eng I's preference for intellectualization, which leads him to rely on deductive reasoning, as evidenced in the independence or transcendence with which Ch'eng I endows Tao.

Moreover, as to the nature [endowed in things], why one has to wait for a thing to indicate the nature? The nature is independent (*tzu-tsai*)....What I say I saw is principle.⁶²

This passage attests to the independence Ch'eng I associates with Tao, or principle. He compares the independent nature of Tao to form without shadow or water without waves. Just as the lack of shadow and wave do not disqualify form and water from being what they are, so Tao does not necessarily need *ch'i* in order to be Tao.⁶³ In other words, in Ch'eng I's opinion, "Tao does not lack anything (*ch'iuung*); the exemplary moral man Yao cannot add an iota to its being; by the same token, the most heinous man Chieh cannot harm an iota of its

⁶¹. *Ibid.*, 18.8b.

⁶². *Ibid.*, 18.3a.

⁶³. *Ibid.*, 6.7b.

being."⁶⁴ Given this description of the transcendental nature of Tao, it would not be far-fetched to surmise that Ch'eng I had actually identified Tao with *t'ai-chi*, the Great Ultimate.

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On another occasion, Ch'eng I, contrary to his remark about the independence of Tao, holds that "there is no Tao independent of yin-yang."⁶⁶ What kind of connection does Ch'eng I envision between Tao and yin-yang, or substance and function? He constructs his theory concerning this issue by innovatively reinterpreting a passage concerning yin-yang and Tao from *I Chuan*. Here, one can see the recurrence of Kuan-tzu's rationalistic concept of *ch'i*, the impact of which was

⁶⁴. *Ibid.*, 2A.13b. Although this was originally said by Ch'eng Hao, Ch'eng I would agree with his elder brother about the transcendental nature of Tao. However, there is a salient difference between the Ch'engs concerning the character of transcendence. Ch'eng I advocates the transcendental immanence of Tao, while Ch'eng Hao, as will be seen, advocates the immanent transcendence of Tao.

⁶⁵. "I-hsü" 4a., *ECCS* vol.2. Ch'eng I's authorship of "I-hsü" and "Shang-hsia-p'ien i," which are appended to *Ch'eng-shih I Chuan*, is disputed, for the reason that Chu Hsi, the compiler of the Ch'eng's works, never mentioned these two works. Three persons have been mentioned as possible authors: Ch'eng I, Chu Hsi, and Chou Hsing-chi, a disciple of Ch'eng I. Chu Po-k'un regards the two works as Ch'eng's surviving works. As to the reason why the term *t'ai-chi*, together with *wu-chi*, does not appear in any other of Ch'eng's works except in "I-hsü," Chu, following Chu Hsi's account, attributes this to Ch'eng I's intention of not misleading people, since Chang Tsai identified *t'ai-chi* with *ch'i*. I follow Chu's suggestion. For Chu's detailed argument, see *I-hsüeh* 2.185-7. For Chu Hsi's account of the reason why the Ch'engs did not mention *t'ai-chi*, see *CTYL* 93.2358. For the argument that the preface is a forgery, see Chan, "Patterns for Neo-Confucianism: Why Chu Hsi differed from Ch'eng I," *Journal of Chinese Philosophy*, 5 (1978), 108-9.

⁶⁶. "I-shu" 15.14b.

felt by Han K'ang-po, K'ung Ying-ta, and Chang Tsai. According to Ch'eng I's interpretation:

The successive movement of yin and yang is called Tao. This principle is profound; therefore, it is beyond effability (shuo tse wu-k'o shuo). That through which yin-yang operates is Tao.⁶⁷

As discussed in the previous chapter, the first line in the above passage is a reinterpretation of "once yin and once yang is called Tao," which originally refers to a method of divination.⁶⁸ Ch'eng I appropriates it in his work, on the one hand to define the character of Tao, and on the other hand to account for the relationship between the substantial Tao and the functional *ch'i*. He thinks that although yin-yang is *ch'i*, which is effable, the ineffable Tao lies in the very movement of yin-yang. In this context he observes that "going and coming, and expansion and contraction [of *ch'i*] are but principle."⁶⁹ Ch'eng I reiterates this idea, saying "that through which yin-yang operates is Tao." In other words, for Ch'eng I, Tao is the principle underlying the ever-moving reality of *ch'i*.

This idea of Tao-*ch'i* shows that by using the ideational definition of the substance of *ch'i*, Ch'eng does not mean to deviate from the traditional view of the world-structure which values a differentiated-but-inseparable relationship between

⁶⁷. *Ibid.*, 15.13b.

⁶⁸. See chapter one, 24, footnote # 59.

⁶⁹. Modified from Chan, *Source book*, 553.

substance and function, or "above form" and "below form." Ch'eng I's dialectic concerning the relationship between Tao and *ch'i* illustrates his effort, on the one hand, to offset the impression of rupture between them which the ideational definition could cause, and, on the other hand, to keep them differentiated (priority).⁷⁰ Summing up this idea, Ch'eng I observes that "Substance and function share the same origin; manifestation and obscurity are inseparable."

What then is the fundamental characteristic of Ch'eng I's concept of Tao (principle)? By being associated with a quality such as independence or transcendence, principle is susceptible of being regarded as an abstract concept. This is the single most important danger to be guarded against in understanding Ch'eng I's concept of principle. Ever since Kuan-tzu the substance of *ch'i* had been credited with responsibility for the production of things.⁷¹ Ch'eng I follows this line of thought in that he attributes production to principle, or the substance of *ch'i*. Put differently, he posits the substantial

⁷⁰. In addition to "independence (transcendence)," and "dependence," Ch'eng I uses "priority" to explain the relationship between Tao and *ch'i*. For example, Ch'eng I in "Ching-shuo" 1.3a. in *ECCS* vol.3. says that "Principle is prior to *ch'i* (*yu-li tse yu-ch'i*)" and in "I-shu" 21A.4a. says that "Principle is prior to "phenomena (*hsiang*)." As to another example of dependence of Tao, Ch'eng in "I-shu" 22A.3a. contends that "Tao of Heaven and Earth cannot be self-realized (*tzu-ch'eng*); the sage should complement it."

⁷¹. For example, *ching*, or Tao (Kuan-tzu); the Great One (*LSCC*); the Formless, or Tao (Huai-nan-tzu); the Great One (*The Apocrypha*); *hsüan* (Yang Hsiung); *wu* (Wei-Chin metaphysics); the Great Void (Chang Tsai).

characteristic of principle in production, or life (*sheng*).

When there is yin, there is yang; when there is yang, there is yin. When there is one, there is two; when there are one and two, there is the in-between of one and two, which is three. As to the past, this process is much more limitless. Lao-tzu also said that "three begets the myriad things." This is what "production and reproduction are called Change." Principle is of itself like this. [This is praised in *the Book of Odes*]: "The Mandate of Heaven, how beautiful and unceasing!" Principle, which is of itself responsible for production, continues one job after another unceasingly; man cannot claim anything from this.⁷²

Ch'eng I sees principle, the source of life, as the Mandate of Heaven, and praises "how beautiful and unceasing" it is. "Unceasing" here refers to the substantial on-going life activity, of which principle and *ch'i* constitute substance and function respectively. This shows that principle for Ch'eng I is not a conceptual form. What is more, he observes that "the fundamental characteristic of production lies in humanity."⁷³ In other words, Ch'eng I, as Chang Tsai did, finds the origin of life and morality in the same source, namely, principle. Given this, it can be said that for Ch'eng I principle serves as a "door" through which one can enter the ineffable world, Ch'eng I's source of spirituality, which life and morality represent. His assertion of the ineffability and substantiality of principle can be understood in this context. And principle, production, and spirituality become reference points for one another in Ch'eng I's thought.

⁷². "I-shu" 18.32b.

⁷³. *Ibid.*, 18.2a.

Let's think about how principle manifests itself. It is concerned with the function of *ch'i*, which Ch'eng I calls the transformation of *ch'i* (*ch'i-hua*).⁷⁴ Before exploring the notion of *ch'i-hua*, a close look at the difference between Chang Tsai and Ch'eng I in terms of the concept of *ch'i* is in order.

A fundamental disagreement between Ch'eng I and Chang Tsai concerns whether *ch'i* is cyclical. Remember that Chang Tsai assumed that after the forms of the myriad things disintegrate, their *ch'i* return to the long-lasting Great Void, which is the origin of phenomena. For him the Great Void and phenomena are in a cyclical relationship, where phenomena are only "temporary forms" (*k'o-hsing*). Ch'eng I criticizes this cyclical view of *ch'i*:

When a thing disintegrates, its *ch'i* is forthwith exhausted. There is no such thing as *ch'i* returning to its source. The universe is like a vast furnace. Even living things will be burned to the last and no more. How can *ch'i* that is already disintegrated still exist? Furthermore, what is the need of such a disintegrated *ch'i* in the creative process of the universe? It goes without saying that *ch'i* used in creation is vital and fresh.⁷⁵

This cyclical view of *ch'i* might have reminded Ch'eng I of the Buddhist idea of transmigration. He argues that "there is no such thing as *ch'i* returning to its source," and envisions a continuous and ever-renewing process of production in

⁷⁴. It is interesting to note that although he replaces Chang Tsai's *ch'i-i fen-shu* with *li-i fen-shu*, Ch'eng I calls the latter *ch'i-hua*, instead of *li-hua*. It seems that *li-i fen-shu* is an approach to individuation from the substantial point of view, while *ch'i-hua* is a functional description of individuation.

⁷⁵. Modified from Chan, *ibid.*, 558.

ch'i. And in accounting for the production of *ch'i*, he differentiates the *ch'i* of Nature (*t'ien chih ch'i*) from that of humans (*jen chih ch'i*). Though criticizing Lao-tzu for his idea that *ch'i* is born of the Void,⁷⁶ Ch'eng I posits the source of human *ch'i* in the "true origin" (*chen-yüan*), a Taoist term.⁷⁷

It was in *Kuan-tzu* that *ch'i* was first described as being of lesser quality, coarse and turbulent, implied in the positing of the substantial aspects of rarefaction (*ching*) and orderliness (*li*) within *ch'i* in its functional role. It was also in *Kuan-tzu* that it was postulated that the substance of *ch'i*, that is, *ching* or *li*, the essence of *ch'i*, is concerned with individuation (production). The implication involved here seems to be that there is a qualitative difference between basically inseparable substance and function. It is likely that the difference in status between them reflects this

⁷⁶. "I-shu" 15.13b.

⁷⁷. *Ibid.*, 15.4b. The term *chen-yüan* derives from the Taoist cultivation of *ch'i* (*hsing-ch'i*), which aims at nurturing the inborn inner *ch'i* with the universal outer *ch'i* through breathing. Taoists call the inner *ch'i* either *yüan-ch'i* (original *ch'i*) or *chen-ch'i* (true *ch'i*). See, Hu Fu-ch'en, *Wei-chin shen-hsien tao-chiao*, 292.

In attributing the source of human *ch'i* to *chen-yüan*, Ch'eng I apparently subscribes to the Taoist concept of the cultivation of *ch'i*. He holds in *ibid.*, 15.17b. that *ch'i* of the true origin does not mix up with the outer *ch'i* but, the former is cultivated by the latter. Considering the fact that Ch'eng I's basic orientation toward the concept of *ch'i* is predicated on the Mencian concept of flood-like *ch'i*, which is dependent on moral cultivation (*ibid* 1.8a.), we can see syncretism between the Mencian idea and Taoism in Ch'eng I's concept of *ch'i*.

qualitative difference.⁷⁸

Chang Tsai's idea of individuation seems to be predicated on this tradition, in that he tries to explain individuation through the association of substance and function. In other words, he is attempting to explain the inevitable adulteration of substance in the process of individuation by positing the functional aspect of *ch'i*. This is what he was speaking of when he said that "the Void plus *ch'i* makes nature." He represented the former as "original nature" and the latter as "physical nature." Taking this into account, it can be said that Chang Tsai's idea of individuation is identical to the concept of adulteration of substance, and that this adulteration, which is linked to the concept of evil, provides the cause of moral cultivation for an adulterated reality.⁷⁹ This could perhaps be described as a new meaning with which he tried to invest the old definition of *ch'i*. However, he failed to account for the diversity of forms in adulterated reality.⁸⁰

Ch'eng I accepts this idea of individuation but with a modification. As has been discussed, he agrees with the idea

⁷⁸. The association of an unhealthy mentality with the evil-*ch'i* in *Huai-nan-tzu* could also be understood in this context in which functional *ch'i* is regarded as qualitatively the lesser one. See chapter one, 31-32.

⁷⁹. For example, Chang Tsai asserts that what is important for adulterated reality is whether one skillfully restores the original value or not (*shan-fan pu-shan-fan*). See "Ch'eng-ming," *CTCS* 2.18b.

⁸⁰. Even though Chang Tsai's "Western Inscription" inspired Ch'eng I to declare the "Unity of principle and its diverse particularization," Chang Tsai failed to account for particularization.

that principle, the substance of *ch'i*, abides in the functional reality of *ch'i*, and says that "going and coming, and expansion and contraction, are but principle." He also endorses the idea that principle, whose substance lies in morality, is concerned with individuation (production). Based on this, Ch'eng I recapitulates his idea of individuation, with an emphasis on the clarification of the disuniformity of things:

The alternation of yin-yang in Heaven and Earth can be compared to the [edges of] two fans being ground together. Yin-yang's rising and falling, waxing and waning, and hardening and softening, has never stopped once. Yang is to replenish, while yin is to deplete; therefore, disparity comes into being. For example, it is like grinding fans of uneven surfaces. Since the surfaces are uneven, things produced from them have a lot of variety. Therefore, disuniformity is the fact of things.⁸¹

The alternation of *ch'i*, which is supposed to abide by principle (orderliness), is depicted here as the "grinding of two fans." This is Ch'eng I's version of an explanation for the unrefined quality of *ch'i* in its functional aspect. With the use of the grinding simile suggesting a mechanism for adulteration, or evil, he theorizes that the qualitative state of endowed *ch'i*, brought about by the grinding, determines not only the diversity of forms, but also the condition, or capacity and quality (*ts'ai-chih*) of an individuated form.⁸² Therefore, he thinks that the endowed *ch'i* is not necessarily bad;

⁸¹. "I-shu" 2A.14b.

⁸². *Ping-ch'i yu ch'ing-cho, ku ch'i ts'ai-chih yu hou-po*, *ibid.*, 24.2a.

it can be either good or bad.⁸³ Except for the sages, who are endowed with exceptional quality, each individuated form is subject to moral cultivation, and he believes that the evil brought about by endowed *ch'i* can be taken care of by nurturing *ch'i* (*yang-ch'i*).⁸⁴ This shows that Ch'eng I regards the presence of *ch'i* in moral reality as integral, but secondary. Summing up, he observes, "It would be incomplete to talk about the nature of man and things without including *ch'i*, and unintelligible to talk about *ch'i* without including nature. It would be wrong to consider them as two."⁸⁵

As the above passage shows, the idea of individuation is predicated on a unique logic which explains the momentum of duality in the framework of unity. There is no doubt that this logic is indebted to the concept of the differentiated-but-inseparable relationship of substance and function in *ch'i*, or pan-*ch'i*ism. In Ch'eng I's thought this logic is transformed into the relationship between nature and *ch'i*, and thereby continues in the self. Credit for the insight behind this idea of individuation must be given to Ch'eng I and not Chang Tsai, and in the final analysis the contribution of the ideational approach to *ch'i* must itself be acknowledged.

According to Ch'eng I, principle, or the Mandate of

⁸³. *Ch'i yu shan pu-shan*, *ibid.*, 21B.1b.

⁸⁴. *Ibid.*, 21B.1b.

⁸⁵. Modified from Chan, *ibid.*, 536. Mou Tzung-san observes that the passage is a shared idea not only of the Ch'engs, but also of the whole of Sung-Ming Neo-Confucianism. See *Hsin-t'i*, 2.308.

Heaven, represents the state in which subject and object maintain unity.⁸⁶ As discussed before, Ch'eng I describes this immanent noumenon as humanity (*jen*). He contends that the principle of humanity is unselfishness (*kung*), which aims at impartiality (*chien-chao*) between subject and object, while the function, or the outer expression of humanity is love (*ai*).⁸⁷ He thus implies that when one abides by the principle of humanity, one can transcend the physical boundary of the self, and can treat others as equals and love them.

Just as Ch'eng I's transcendental principle is not abstract, neither is humanity, the immanent principle. It refers specifically to the primordial consciousness, which precedes the split of subject and object. His definition of principle as the primordial consciousness is based on two other concepts, sincerity (*ch'eng*) and seriousness (*ching*). Moral cultivation consists in one's effort to maintain the Heavenly value which manifests itself in the unity of subject and object. He differentiates this state of unity from the subjective effort to achieve unity. He calls the former sincerity (*ch'eng*) and calls the latter seriousness (*ching*).⁸⁸ Though he does not offer a detailed explanation of the way

⁸⁶. *Wu-wo i-li, ts'ai ming pi, chi hsiao tz'u, ho nei-wai chih tao yeh*, "I-shu" 18.8b.

⁸⁷. *Kung chih shih jen chih li...ai tse jen chih yung yeh*, *ibid.*, 15.8b.

⁸⁸. *Ibid.*, 24.4a. As to the meaning of sincerity, Ch'eng I holds that it is "to unite what is acquired from the inner with the outer." See *ibid.*, 25.2a.

humanity, sincerity, and seriousness are related, it is indubitable that each of them represents a certain aspect or characteristic of principle. Humanity refers to the moral value of principle, sincerity refers to the unity of subject and object which principle represents, and seriousness refers to the subjective effort to preserve principle.

This seriousness for Ch'eng I involves neither absent-mindedness (*wang*) nor calm (*ching*).⁸⁹ Rather, its substance refers to primordial consciousness. In this sense he contends that one should hold on to "some thing" (*yu wu*), or substance in the state of seriousness.⁹⁰ In fact, Ch'eng I raises the issue of substance in seriousness in order to distinguish it from the Buddhist notion of the Quiet-Sitting. With substance, he seems to imply that although the concept of seriousness, which aims at preserving humanity, superficially might seem to involve the same calmness of mind implied in the Buddhism term, it does not entail the negation of the self, that is, the Buddhist concept of no-self.⁹¹ To the contrary, in the state of Confucian seriousness, this effort will lead to an

⁸⁹. *Ibid.*, 18.6b.

⁹⁰. *Ibid.*, 18.15a.

⁹¹. However, Ch'eng I, like Chang Tsai, does appropriate the concept of no-self (*wu-wo*) in his thought. With it, he refers to the state of humanity, or unity of subject and object. See *ibid.*, 21B.2b. The consensus between them on the concept of *wu-wo* seems to be represented by *ta-wo*, the enlarged self, the prerequisite for which is *wu-szu*, no-selfishness. As will be seen, this was also generally accepted among the Neo-Confucians, particularly Ch'eng Hao and Chu Hsi.

awareness of "some thing" which bolsters the identity of the self. Seen in this light, it can be said that "some thing," or substance, refers to the primordial consciousness which is the storage place of humanity as well.

From the above discussion about the characteristics of the immanent principle, it seems that Ch'eng I identifies nature with the mind, since humanity, namely, nature, refers to the mental aspect of consciousness. This might be grounds for translating "original nature" as "moral mind" in the state of unity, which is also characterized by *wei-fa*, the state before emotions are aroused. However, this identification is lost when he tries to explain the split in the state of unity, which for Ch'eng I is the reality of evil. As he observes:

Thinking (*ssu*) refers to *i-fa*, or the aroused state of emotions. Thinking is identical to emotions such as pleasure, anger, sorrow, and joy.⁹²

This passage clearly shows that for Ch'eng I, "thinking" means emotions, or the aroused state of emotions (*i-fa*). According to him emotions "arise from within under external influence."⁹³ Here, "arise from within" refers to thinking (*ssu*), and "external influence" means sensory disturbances. In other words, for him emotions are the expression of thinking which is activated upon the stimulation of external factors. It is implied here that "thinking" itself presupposes a sepa-

⁹². "I-shu" 18.14b.

⁹³. Chan, *ibid.*, 567.

ration of inner from outer, or subject from object, represented by "within" and "external influence."

Remember that the concept of *ch'i* in individuation, that is, *ch'i* in its functional aspect, symbolizes the adulteration of noumenon, which makes possible a split between Heaven and man, and a split in the nature and the mind.⁹⁴ These divisions represent the reality of evil, to which Ch'eng I adds another split between subject and object. He appears to think that if *ch'i*, functional *ch'i*, accounts for the potentiality of evil, the reality of evil, or divisions in human reality could be occasioned by "thinking," which involves a subject-object separation. However, "thinking," or the subject-object split, does not necessarily mean evil, since one should and can make the aroused emotions comport with decorum in each given situation, which is called Harmony (*ho*). In other words, Ch'eng I believes that morality can transform the split reality of subject versus object into Harmony, which for him is another way of achieving the unity of subject and object. Therefore, what should be guarded against is the case in which "thinking" and ensuing emotions are not under control, so that there is no possibility of Harmony at all. From this, one can sense the pivotal position of "thinking" in Ch'eng I's concept of moral cultivation.

Ch'eng I's idea about "thinking" provides a way of look-

⁹⁴. For example, original and physical natures, and moral and human minds.

ing into his concept of the mind. By identifying emotions, which "arise through external influence," with "thinking," Ch'eng seems to confine the character of the mind to *i-fa* and to basic cognitive function.⁹⁵ This impression is supported by Ch'eng Hao's criticism of Ch'eng I's parochialism in excluding experience as a factor in speaking of the mind. Ch'eng Hao claims that this narrow view led his brother to argue that "nature is big, but the mind is small."⁹⁶

It is quite unnecessary for Ch'eng I to argue for the compatibility of nature with the mind because, as illustrated above, he made it clear that the substance of the primordial consciousness lies in humanity, which belongs to nature. In fact, it is his idea to see an unobstructed pathway from noumenon to phenomena in individuation. In this vein, he expounds upon the idea of individuation, saying that "in terms of principle, it is called Heaven; in terms of what is endowed in each being, it is called nature; in terms of what is preserved in man, it is called the mind."⁹⁷

Yet, contrary to this idea, Ch'eng I speaks of priority, or a sequential order in individuation involving nature and the mind. This is also congruent with the idea of the first

⁹⁵. Though having strong reservations about confining the mind to *i-fa* ("Wen-chi" 5.12a., *ECCS* vol.2.), Ch'eng I, in fact, represents *wei-fa* as nature and *i-fa* as the mind by defining the fundamental nature of thinking (mind) as emotions.

⁹⁶. "I-shu" 2A.7a. According to Chu Hsi, that line: *hsin-hsiao*, *hsing-ta* originated with Chang Tsai. See *CTYL* 97.2502.

⁹⁷. "I-shu" 22A.14b.

principle in his philosophy, that is, deductive logic. He eviscerates the notion of individuation with the concepts of principle and the nature. "[As to] this principle, it, upon being completed in man, becomes nature. Human mind preserves that which constitutes the essence of principle, namely, the gate of morality"⁹⁸ and "[as to] nature, its substance is called the Mandate; its natural way is called Heaven; its form is called the mind; its motion is called emotions; they are one."⁹⁹

From this, one can see that Ch'eng I, though emphasizing unity, places nature before the mind. In other words he wants to deduce the definition of the mind from nature, or principle; he appears to think that principle makes nature what it is, and nature makes the mind what it is. This seems to be the import behind his statement that "nature is the extremely great"¹⁰⁰ and that "nature is principle."¹⁰¹

This preference for intellectual analysis also affects Ch'eng I's objectively-oriented idea of moral cultivation. There are two ways to attain moral cultivation in Confucianism. The first is the Mencian ideal which aims at "knowing Heaven" by "a full realization of the mind," which then results in "knowing one's nature." The second way, discussed

⁹⁸. "Ching-shuo" 1.2b.

⁹⁹. "I-shu" 25.2b.

¹⁰⁰. *Ibid.*, 25.5b.

¹⁰¹. *Ibid.*, 18.17b.

in *I Chuan*, "shuo-kua," is directed toward "fulfilling one's Mandate" through "the investigation of principle to the utmost," which then results in "a full development of one's nature." Ch'eng I follows the definition in *I Chuan* and describes the process as the objective implementation of the Mencian subjective path to moral cultivation. He observes:

A full realization of the mind refers to a full realization of one's mind by oneself. If one is able to give one's own mind full realization, then one is able to know one's nature and eventually to know Heaven. In terms of sequence, this can be put this way: 'investigation of principle to the utmost, and thereafter a full development of one's nature until the Mandate is fulfilled.' This is inevitable. In fact, only if one is able to investigate principle to the utmost, is one able to give one's mind a full realization, and to fulfill one's Mandate.¹⁰²

In Ch'eng I's philosophy, noumenon manifests itself in every mode of being. He assumes that introspection is not the only way to apprehend the presence of the nouminous, and believes that the Mencian subjective approach, which values experience, needs to be complemented by the objective definition outlined in *I Chuan*. In actuality, however, Ch'eng I prefers the objective way to the subjective way. The last line in the passage sheds light in this regard.¹⁰³ Ch'eng I's preference for objective clear-cut standards might be interpreted as being influenced by his determination to avoid any element redolent of Buddhism in his philosophy.

¹⁰². *Ibid.*, 22A.11b.

¹⁰³. See also *ibid.*, 10.5a; *chih ch'iung-li, pien shih chih yü ming*.

Ch'eng I also suggests that there is a sequential order involved in the process of moral cultivation. He believes that "a full realization of one's mind" can first be achieved through "the investigation of principle to the utmost," and this investigation will result in "a full development of one's nature" and "the fulfillment of one's Mandate." Although basically for him these three steps are all one thing (*i-shih*),¹⁰⁴ he declares in the above passage that their sequence is "inevitable."

As my analysis thus far has shown, Ch'eng I, inspired by Chang Tsai's naive metaphysical construct, accepted his idea of deductive individuation, but deciding that the source of Chang Tsai's difficulty was his treating the substance of *ch'i* as an entity having material form, he replaces it with an ideational one. In making use of Chang Tsai's incomplete idea, he applies meticulous deductive logic to connect Nature and nature, and nature and *ch'i*.

Ch'eng I's meticulousness, however, fails him when he is making the following four points. First, despite his basic idea that "substance and function share the same origin," in his letter to Lü Ta-lin he contradicts himself by observing that "Substance and function are different of themselves; how can they not be a duality?"¹⁰⁵ Second, although he had stressed the unity of the mind and nature, Ch'eng I divides

¹⁰⁴. "I-shu" 18.9a.

¹⁰⁵. "Wen-chi" 5.12a.

them, thereby representing *wei-fa* as nature and *i-fa* as mind. Third, accordingly, bifurcation or split becomes a dominant characteristic of Ch'eng I's philosophy. Fourth, as a result, Ch'eng I's idea of moral cultivation is not consistent. Despite apparent recognition that the subjective effort to monitor emotions that arise is an integral part of moral cultivation, Ch'eng I emphasizes objective standards over subjective effort. With these problems in mind, let us see how Ch'eng Hao considers Ch'eng I's intellectual approach and use of deductive logic.

3. Ch'eng Hao: Mind (*hsin*)

"Above form is called Tao; below form is called a concrete thing." If anyone, just as someone did, regards "pure, void, one, and great" as the Tao of Heaven, one is referring to concrete things and not to Tao.¹⁰⁶

And:

If anyone, in the way someone did, with independent Heaven out there, says that man can not embrace Heaven...this refers to dualism (*erh-pen*).¹⁰⁷

Remember that Ch'eng I believed the *locus problematik* in Chang Tsai's thought to be his failure to account for the ineffability of Ultimate reality, which Chang Tsai posited in the Great Void (*ch'i*). Assuming that the lack of a way to differentiate between of substance and function in Chang Tsai's concept of *ch'i* was ultimately responsible for the

¹⁰⁶. "I-shu" 11.1b.

¹⁰⁷. *Ibid.*, 11.3b.

problem, Ch'eng I decided to use the ideational approach to *ch'i*. In order to correct the impression created of rupture between *li-ch'i*--the ideational version of substance and function--Ch'eng I resorted to a dialectic involving "independence," "dependence," and "priority."

Ch'eng Hao agrees with his younger brother that Chang Tsai's fundamental problem was that he failed to posit the ineffability of Ultimate reality, but he disagrees with him concerning the nature of Ultimate reality and the way to account for it. As he implies in criticizing dualism¹⁰⁸ in the above passage, Ch'eng Hao opposes deductive logic between substance and function, or Tao and *ch'i*, and instead proposes a complete identity between them. This logic leads Ch'eng Hao to find the Ultimate reality in the human mind. It is in this sense that Ch'eng Hao emphasizes experience (*t'i-hui*), or silent realization (*mo-chih*) as a guiding principle in his philosophy.

Ch'eng Hao's basic philosophy can be reduced to four points. First, he does not allow any gap between substance and function, or noumenon and phenomenon, saying "Tao is a con-

¹⁰⁸. It is questionable whether the idiosyncrasy involved in the relation between substance and function is definable through either monism or dualism in the Western sense. As has been emphasized throughout first and second chapter, the relationship between them is differentiated, but inseparable, or duality in unity and unity in duality. If one focuses on the underlying *ch'i* (pan-*ch'i*ism), which bolsters inseparability, the use of monism is justified; if differentiability is considered, the use of dualism is justified. However, neither monism nor dualism is inclusive enough to account for the idiosyncrasy. My use of the term dualism, for lack of a better term, is based on this reflection.

crete thing and vice versa." Second, he also denies a split in the self, and thereby implies an identity between the nature and the mind. This idea is expressed in his debate with Chang Tsai about the issue of the calm nature (*ting-hsing*). Third, Ch'eng Hao's above ideas are crystalized in the issue of moral cultivation. Ch'eng I viewed the split between inner and outer as the potential source of evil and stressed the effort necessary to watch over the arising of emotions, that is, "thinking," which presupposes a subject-object split. Ch'eng Hao contends that the recognition of principle renders such vigilance unnecessary, since originally there was no split at all. Fourth, while Chang Tsai and Ch'eng I saw a sequential order in the program of moral cultivation consisting of "the investigation of principle to the utmost," "a full realization of the nature," and "the fulfillment of the mandate," Ch'eng Hao holds that these occurrences are simultaneous.

What Ch'eng Hao means by dualism (*erh-pen*) is intellectualization which seeks the Ultimate reality outside of human existence, or human mind. In this so-called dualism, the connection between noumenon and phenomenon is supposed to be made by deductive reasoning. Ch'eng Hao explains the characteristic of dualism figuratively:

Formerly Heng-ch'ü used to compare "the Mandate" to a source, and compare "the investigation of principle to the utmost" and "a full realization of the nature" to diverting a source by ditching (*ch'uan-ch'ü yin-yüan*). Such being the case, the ditch and

the source become two separate things.¹⁰⁹

Ch'eng Hao appears to think that the fundamental characteristic of dualism lies in the inevitable dependency on "ditching," which stands for human intellectual effort, or deductive logic, to connect the source with man. Ch'eng Hao opposes this kind of intellectual effort. He believes firmly that man, or more specifically the human mind, is the sole source and authority to be relied on. This kind of idea is well expressed in the following passage which shows the difference between the Ch'engs in personality and in their philosophical approach. Ch'eng Hao argues:

Let me explain 'knowing Heaven with one's mind' by comparing it to going to Ch'ang-an while staying in the capital city. Knowing only that getting to Ch'ang-an is possible by leaving the West Gate is identical to making the trip a matter of two places. If one is really serious, one can get to Ch'ang-an by just staying in the capital city; there is no need to seek Ch'ang-an separately. Only the mind is Heaven. A full realization of one's mind results in knowing one's nature. Knowing one's nature results in knowing Heaven. One should understand this in any given situation. One should not seek them outside.¹¹⁰

Remember that Ch'eng I in the same situation urged one to map out a plan. Unlike his brother, the elder Ch'eng underscores the futility of planning, or intellect. As implied in "the mind is Heaven," Ch'eng Hao subscribes to the Mencian belief in man's inborn capacity, that man has within him the principle of the myriad things. This idea leads him to assert

¹⁰⁹. "I-shu" 2A.11a.

¹¹⁰. *Ibid.*, 2A.2b.

that one need not look beyond one's own mind for principle and authority. It is obvious that for Ch'eng Hao tacit realization (*mo-chih*)¹¹¹ is directed toward what is already complete in one's mind. Then, what is the substance of that which is complete in the mind? Or, why is the human mind tantamount to Heaven for the elder Ch'eng?

Ch'eng Hao subscribes to the Neo-Confucian belief that Heaven, a symbol of noumenon, is the source of being and morality. In pan-ch'iism, Heaven, represented as Change, is conceived of as being divided into substance and function, and substance and function are held to represent the ineffable and the effable, respectively. Although endorsing pan-ch'iism, Ch'eng Hao has a quite different orientation toward it. He says:

The operations of Heaven have neither sound nor smell." Their substance is called Change; their principle is called Tao; and their function is called the ineffable (*shen*). What Heaven imparts to man is called the nature. To follow the law of our nature is called Tao. Cultivation according to Tao is called instruction.¹¹²

Ch'eng Hao's concept of *ch'i*, illustrated in the passage, can be fully appreciated when it is compared to that of Ch'eng I. Ch'eng I divided holistic *ch'i* into the ideational framework of substance and function, or Tao (principle) and *ch'i*. He referred to substance as ineffable (above form), while crediting *ch'i* in its functional role with effability (below

¹¹¹. *Ibid.*, 11.1b.

¹¹². Modified from Chan, *ibid.*, 527.

form).

Ch'eng Hao wants to regard *ch'i* in a holistic and implicit way. As implied by "Change" and "operations," he does not want to reduce the concept of *ch'i* to a configuration of different and distinct abstract entities, but prefers to define its substantiality and activity in a single concept. Accordingly, he opposes the traditional division of holistic *ch'i* into substance and function, and refers instead to the functional aspect of *ch'i* (the operations of Heaven) as the ineffable, a description traditionally was reserved for the substance of *ch'i*. This shows that he intends to reject the conventional conception of *ch'i*. For the elder Ch'eng, it does not make any sense to distinguish substance from function in the concept of *ch'i*, since, *ch'i* in its entirety, he thinks, is the habitat of Tao. Therefore, to the extent that his purpose is to acquire Tao, there is no need for Ch'eng Hao to distinguish substance from function. In other words, for him the term *ch'i* is inclusive of function and substance, "above form" and "below form," and ineffable and effable.¹¹³ They are simply undifferentiable in Ch'eng's holistic concept of *ch'i*. This radical monism is well expressed in the following passage:

¹¹³. Ch'eng Hao criticizes Chang Tsai for his separation of the ineffable substance (*shen*) from the functional *ch'i*, and holds that "there is no the ineffable outside of *ch'i* and there is no *ch'i* outside of the ineffable. If it is said that the pure is the ineffable, does it mean that the turbid is not the ineffable?" Modified from Chan, *ibid.*, 540.

Concrete things are Tao, and Tao is concrete things. So long as Tao obtains, it does not matter whether it is present or future, or whether it is the self or others.¹¹⁴

What does Ch'eng Hao's Tao refer to here, and what is his purpose in defining *ch'i* in its entire scope of activity? What is the substance of his holistic concept of *ch'i*, which is represented by Change? Ch'eng posits the characteristics of Change in the essence of human mind. In other words, he wants to interpret the character of Change as subjectivity. Ch'eng Hao contends:

"Heaven and Earth have their fixed positions and yet the system of change operates in them." Why not say man operates in them? Because man is also a thing. If we say spirit (*shen*) operates in them, people would look for it only in spiritual beings. It is also all right to say principle or sincerity operates in them. Change is purposely mentioned in order that people may silently remember it and realize for themselves.¹¹⁵

Here Ch'eng Hao uses the term Change implicitly, and suggests three aspects of Change. First, Change is something intimate in which spiritual beings do not participate, and is something unfathomable which goes beyond the realm of a concrete thing. Second, it is something which shares the characteristics of principle and sincerity. Third, it is something to be found in each human being through silent realization. What does Change symbolize for Ch'eng Hao?

¹¹⁴. Chan, *ibid.*, 527. Ch'eng Hao appropriates "the successive movement of yin-yang constitutes Tao" in his monism as well. The elder Ch'eng argues that "yin-yang is 'below form,' and yet here it is called Tao." See "I-shu" 11.1b.

¹¹⁵. Chan, *ibid.*, 537.

What Ch'eng Hao has in mind with these three aspects of Change is the spirit of life, which comprises the substance of human mind. The spirit of life is neither a supernatural being nor a concrete thing. If conceptualized, the spirit of life can be described as having the characteristics of principle and sincerity. However, he believes that the spirit of life is more intimate, to the extent that it can even be felt in pulsation. This is the reason why he gives his reserved consent of "all right," in the passage above, to speaking of principle and sincerity as operating in it. Therefore, for Ch'eng Hao, the spirit of life is a comprehensive and inscrutable substance, which can only be grasped introspectively. In this context, he appears to think that there is no better way to depict the spirit of life than to call it Change, the meaning of which itself stands for ineffability. Ch'eng Hao says:

"The great characteristic of Heaven and Earth is to produce." "In the fusion and intermingling of Heaven and Earth, the myriad things are transformed and attain their purity." What is inborn is called one's nature. The most impressive aspect of things is their spirit of life. This is what is meant by origination being the chief quality of goodness. This is humanity. Man and Heaven-Earth are one thing. Why should man purposefully belittle himself?¹¹⁶

Ch'eng Hao appears to think that, though ineffable, the spirit of life, which Change symbolizes, can best be characterized through the concept of humanity. He seems to have been influenced by contemporary medical science, which was predi-

¹¹⁶. Modified from Chan, *ibid.*, 539.

cated on a belief in the combination of the spirit of life and the unity of the human body.¹¹⁷ Ch'eng Hao thinks that this concept of humanity serves the exact meaning he intends to convey with Change (*ch'i*). Humanity symbolizes a comprehensive value which embraces the characters of Heaven, principle, Tao, and sincerity in it. Therefore, humanity is the substance which enables man to claim an identity with Heaven. His assertion that "principle and the mind form unity"¹¹⁸ seems to reflect this consideration.

Based on this understanding of humanity, which has its origin in Change, Ch'eng Hao implicitly criticizes Chang Tsai and Ch'eng I for their ignorance about the meaning of Change, contending that their ignorance led them to belittle man by seeking the Ultimate reality outside of man, and thereby separated man from Heaven. "Ultimately," he says, "Change is that by which the sage cleans his mind, and by which he retires to the hidden; here the sage's idea of Change becomes unfathomable but quite clear. Nobody understands the true meaning of Change."¹¹⁹

Humanity, understood in this way, stands for a complete identity of noumenon and phenomenon, for Ch'eng Hao. In this context he asserts that "even sprinkling water, sweeping, and

¹¹⁷. "A book on medicine describes paralysis of the four limbs as absence of *jen* (humanity)." See "I-shu" 2A.2a.

¹¹⁸. *Ibid.*, 2.23a.

¹¹⁹. *Ibid.*, 12.2a.

answering questions are [the expressions of] noumenon; because, principle does not favor small things over big things."

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As shown so far, Ch'eng Hao's denial of "ditching," deductive logic, between noumenon and phenomenon is what results in the elimination of any possible duality at the foundation of his thought. He represents this spirit of holistic unity as humanity. Let us further explore Ch'eng Hao's idea of humanity in terms of its implication for the unity of the self and the non-self. The "Treatise on humanity," and Ch'eng's "Reply to Heng-ch'ü regarding calming human nature" will give us access to Ch'eng Hao's thinking in this regard:

The student must first of all understand the nature of humanity. The man of humanity forms one body with all things without any differentiation. Righteousness, propriety, wisdom, and faithfulness are all [expressions of] humanity.

[One's duty] is to understand this principle (li) and preserve humanity with sincerity and seriousness, that is all. There is no need for caution and control. Nor is there any need for exhaustive search. Caution is necessary when one is mentally negligent, but if one is not negligent, what is the necessity for caution? Exhaustive search is necessary when one has not understood principle, but if one preserves humanity long enough, it will automatically dawn on him. Why should he have to depend on exhaustive search?

Nothing can be equal to this Tao (humanity). It is so vast that nothing can adequately explain it. All operations of the universe are our operations. Mencius said that "all things are already complete in oneself" and that one must "examine oneself and be sincere (or absolutely real)" and only then will there be great joy. If one examines himself and finds himself not yet sincere, it means there is still an opposition between the two (the

¹²⁰. *Ibid.*, 13.1b.

self and the non-self). Even if one tries to identify the self with the non-self, one still does not achieve unity. How can one have joy?

The purpose of "Western Inscription" is to explain this substance (of complete unity) fully. If one preserves it (humanity) with this idea, what more is to be done? "Always be doing something without expectation. Let the mind not forget its objective, but let there be no artificial effort to help it grow." Not the slightest effort is expected! This is the way to preserve humanity. As humanity is preserved, the self and the other are then identified.

For our innate knowledge of good and innate ability to do good are originally not lost. However, because we have not gotten rid of the mind dominated by habits, we must preserve and exercise our original mind, and in time old habits will be overcome. This principle is extremely simple; the only danger is that people will not be able to hold on to it. But if we practice it and enjoy it, there need be no worry of our being unable to hold to it.¹²¹

In fact, as the above passage illustrates, duality could and does occur in Ch'eng Hao's thought, and it is also concerned with the problem of evil.¹²² Ch'eng Hao posits the cause of duality within the self. As "negligent" and "mind dominated by habit" imply, for Ch'eng Hao the eventual

¹²¹. Chan, *ibid.*, 523-4.

¹²². Ch'eng Hao's uniqueness in this regard also stands out in comparison to Ch'eng I. Ch'eng I's concept of evil presupposes the opposition between inner and outer. Ch'eng I identifies the primary character of the mind with "thinking." According to him, "thinking," triggered by sensory stimuli, results in emotions. In this sense, it can be said that a mutual reference is possible among "thinking," emotions, the mind, and *i-fa*, the state after emotions are aroused. This conception of the mind implies that Ch'eng I defines *wei-fa* as nature. In short, Ch'eng I divides the holistic mind which embraces *i-fa* and *wei-fa* into the nature and the mind. The split of inner and outer is reflected in Ch'eng I's moral cultivation, which is centered on the subjective effort of preserving unity by fending off external stimuli. On the other hand, Ch'eng I also insists on objective standards in moral cultivation.

momentum of duality is not so much triggered by objective conditions as by subjective ones. According to the elder Ch'eng, those subjective factors contribute to the opposition between the self and the non-self, and eventually, to the rupture between noumenon and phenomenon, by alienating the self from humanity inborn in the self. Ch'eng Hao thinks that, since the cause does not exist outside, there is no need for "caution" and "control," and no need for "exhaustive search" for the cause outside of the self. Reminding the forgetful mind of its innate humanity, and "preserving it with sincerity and seriousness, that is all."¹²³ In other words, for the person who understands the nature of humanity, there is no need to worry about what is outside, and still less need for an artificial effort to fend that off.¹²⁴ In this context, Ch'eng Hao says, "Both good and evil in the world are the principle

¹²³. Remember that Ch'eng I distinguished between sincerity and seriousness. Ch'eng Hao, possibly with his brother in mind, says that "sincerity is to be sincere to the principle of Heaven, and seriousness is to be serious about the principle of Heaven. It is not that there is sincerity by itself and there is further seriousness by itself." Modified from Chan, *ibid.*, 533.

¹²⁴. In addition to these differences, Ch'eng Hao differs from Ch'eng I in this approach to the steps to be followed in moral cultivation. Ch'eng I, admitting the unity (*i-shih*) of the steps involved, still advocates an inevitable order among them. Ch'eng Hao, in his criticism implicitly addressed to both Ch'eng I and Chang Tsai, asserts spontaneity (*i-shih*) of "the investigation of principle to the utmost," "a full realization of one's nature," and "a fulfillment of the Mandate." What is more, Ch'eng Hao, contrary to his brother, subjugates the objective program to subjective effort: "There is basically no time sequence among them. 'The investigation of principle to the utmost' should not be regarded merely as a matter of knowledge. If one really investigates principle to the utmost, even one's nature and Mandate can be fully fulfilled." Chan, *ibid.*, 531.

of Heaven. What is called evil is not original evil. It becomes evil only because of deviation from the Mean."¹²⁵

The following letter he wrote to Chang Tsai provides additional information about Ch'eng Hao's idea of evil as it relates to the concept of humanity. It contains his argument against seeking the origin of evil outside the self, which necessitates a division between inside and outside, and also obliquely suggests his notion of the identity of nature with the mind:

I have received your letter in which you said that nature in the state of calmness cannot be without activity and must still suffer from the influence of external things. This problem has been ardently pondered by a worthy [like you]. What need is there for a humble person like myself to say anything? However, I have gone over the matter in my mind, and dare present my ideas to you.

By calmness of nature we mean that one's nature is calm whether it is in a state of activity or in a state of tranquility. One does not lean forward or backward to accommodate things, nor does he make any distinction between the internal and external. To regard things outside the self as external, and force oneself to conform to them, is to regard one's nature as divided into the internal and the external. Furthermore, if one's nature is conceived to be following external things, then, while it is outside what is it that is within the self? To conceive one's nature thus is to have the intention of getting rid of external temptations, but to fail to realize that human nature does not possess the two aspects of internal and external. Since one holds that things internal and things external form two different bases, how can one hastily speak of the calmness of human nature?

The constant principle of Heaven and Earth is that their mind is in all things, and yet they have no mind of their own. The constant principle of the sage is that his feelings are in accord with all creation, and yet he has no feelings of his own.

¹²⁵. Chan, *ibid.*, 529.

Therefore, for the training of the superior man there is nothing better than to become broad and extremely impartial and to respond spontaneously to all things as they come. *The Book of Changes* says, 'Firm correctness brings good fortune and prevents all occasions for repentance. If he is hesitant in his movements, only his friends will follow his purpose.' If one merely attempts to remove external temptations, then no sooner do some disappear in the east than others will arise in the west. Not only is one's time limited, but the source of temptation is inexhaustible and therefore cannot be removed.

Everyone's nature is obscured in some way and as a consequence he can not follow Tao. In general the trouble lies in resorting to selfishness and the exercise of cunning. Being selfish, one can not take purposive action to respond to things, and being cunning, one cannot be at home with enlightenment. For a mind that hates external things to seek illumination in a mind where nothing exists, is to look for a reflection on the back of a mirror. *The Book of Changes* says, "Stop in the back of a thing. See not the person. Walk in the hall and do not see the people in it." Mencius also said, "What I dislike in your wise men is their forced reasoning."

Instead of looking upon the internal as right and the external as wrong, it is better to forget the distinction (*liang-wang*). When such a distinction is forgotten, the state of quietness and peace is attained. Peace leads to calmness and calmness leads to enlightenment. When one is enlightened, how can the response to things become an impediment? The sage is joyous because according to the nature of things before him he should be joyous, and he is angry because according to the nature of things before him he should be angry. Thus the joy and anger of the sage do not depend on his own mind but on things. Does not the sage in this way respond to things? Why should it be regarded wrong to follow external things and right to seek what is within? Compare the joy and anger of the selfish and cunning man to the correctness of joy and anger of the sage. What a difference! Among human emotions the easiest to arouse but the most difficult to control is anger. But if in time of anger one can immediately forget his anger and look at the right and wrong of the matter according to principle, he will see that external temptations need not be hated, and he has gone more than halfway toward

Tao.¹²⁶

This passage offers important information about Ch'eng Hao's understanding of the split of subject and object with regard to its relevancy to the issue of evil. What Ch'eng Hao refers to as nature is in fact the mind.¹²⁷ Put differently, it makes better sense if the concept of nature is replaced with that of the mind. The underlying meaning of this passage is that the mind, or the nature, embraces both inner and outer world. Ch'eng Hao thinks that the split into subject and object is derived from the idea that the source of evil must be found in the external. This idea, he believes, is based on a false assumption that the mind is split between inner and outer, and that the disturbance of inner calmness by outer agitation constitutes evil. With this, he indicates the fallacy which not only Chang Tsai, but also his brother, have about the mind.

Ch'eng Hao does not mean that the mind is immune to any split. He declares a split can exist, but the cause of the split lies not so much outside as inside the self. He implies that the split occurs through subjective causes such as selfish or cunning ideas, which rob the mind of its calmness. He advises Chang Tsai, and implicitly Ch'eng I as well, that it is better to forget the distinction between inner and outer

¹²⁶. Chan, *ibid.*, 525-6.

¹²⁷. In fact, it is Chu Hsi's idea to interpret this concept of nature as the mind: *tz'u hsing tzu, shih-ke hsin tzu i*. See CTYL 95.2441.

(*liang-wang*) than to have the mind split between them. Forgetting, Ch'eng Hao argues, will eventually lead one to enlightenment, thereby enabling one to respond to things without an impediment. This involves the issue of completion (*ch'eng*), which is another characteristic of humanity. Ch'eng Hao says:

"Heaven and Earth have their fixed positions and yet the system of Change operates in them." [The underlying message here is] only seriousness. If one can have seriousness, there is no gap [between the self and things]. That which enables one to embody things without anything missing is only sincerity and seriousness. Without sincerity, there is no thing [to be completed].¹²⁸

This passage is concerned with the spirituality of humanity which culminates in the completion of things, in Ch'eng Hao's philosophy. As seen in the previous passage, he believes that the unity of the self and things cannot be preserved by just enlarging the boundary of the self. Instead, unity is to be preserved by forgetting the self-imposed boundary which is caused by a selfish and cunning idea.¹²⁹ By doing away with the boundary, one can forget the distinction between things and the self (*liang-wang*). This conscious effort to erase the boundary constitutes the spirit of humanity, which is embodied in the characteristics of seriousness and sincerity. Through this effort, Ch'eng Hao thinks, both things and the self can be completed. Completing Heaven-endowed value, one can see

¹²⁸. "I-shu" 11.2a.

¹²⁹. Ch'eng Hao uses the term "no-self" (*wu-wo*) to describe this meaning. See *ibid* 11.6b. Ch'eng Hao's concept of no-self is identical to Ch'eng I's in that the goal is to attain the enlarged self (*ta-wo*) through no-selfishness (*wu-szu*).

things as they are, and thereby can transcend the boundary of the self and things. In short, in Ch'eng Hao's moral philosophy, understanding of the principle of humanity, which is an awakening to its immanent value, is also the transcendental momentum through which one apprehends the virtue of Heaven.

From the discussion thus far, one can derive a sense of the experiential holism which Ch'eng Hao gives expression to through his concept of humanity. For this reason, the understanding of humanity takes precedence over any other goal in the elder Ch'eng's philosophy. Obviously, he realizes the difficulty inherent in his experiential philosophy in terms of the articulation of his idea. Even in this situation, he has no other guide except belief in the mind. Ch'eng Hao exhorts one, in case of difficulty, to draw on the mind and its power of silent realization, and also, in case of problems in explanation, to hold on to a full realization of the mind, which would result in knowing nature and eventually knowing Heaven.¹³⁰

Chang Tsai's framework of *yu-yu*, a Neo-Confucian interpretation of the Taoist *wu-yu* concept, inspired Ch'eng I's notion of the *li-ch'i* framework, and led eventually to Ch'eng Hao's holistic concept of Change. The elder Ch'eng's concept of Change is a manifestation of his intention to oppose any differentiation of holistic *ch'i* into substance and function,

¹³⁰. *Ibid.*, 2A.18a.

on which the scheme of *wu-yu*, *yu-yu*, and *li-ch'i* are predicated. Taking this into account, it is clear that although they posited the Ultimate reality in different realms of *ch'i*, principle, and the mind, the Three Schools, which conventionally Chang Tsai and the Ch'eng brothers are held to represent, share the same notion of pan-ch'iism. In other words, seemingly disparate, the three realms, whose geneses were occasioned by a dispute about the nature of substance (between Chang Tsai and Ch'eng I) and about the relationship between substance and function (between the Ch'engs), in fact, embody homogeneous *ch'i*.

The fundamental difference between the Ch'engs' ideas is often characterized as "nature is principle" (*hsing chi li*) and "the mind is principle" (*hsin chi li*). While it is obvious that these two phrases illustrate the difference between the Ch'engs' ideas in terms of the Ultimate reality, upon a close look at them, one can see that the concepts of principle used in the lines are also different.

When Ch'eng I says "nature is principle," he means that, as discussed above, nature derives from principle, which is the substance of functional *ch'i*. As a result, Ch'eng I's concept of nature assumes the characteristic of the substantial aspect of holistic *ch'i*. Ch'eng I's rationale behind this idea is the differentiation of "above form" from "below form," and the consequent positing of the ineffability of the Ultimate reality in the former. However, this conceptualization,

which has the paradoxical objective of accounting for the effability of the ineffable, has prompted the misleading impression that it is dualistic.

Meanwhile, it is obvious that Ch'eng Hao's concept of principle expressed in "the mind is principle" is inclusive of substance and function, because the elder Ch'eng characterizes the mind as Change, which represents the holism of *ch'i*. This idea is the rationale behind Ch'eng Hao's total identification of "above form" and "below form." Certainly this idea must be given credit for explaining the holistic nature of *ch'i*, which is the basic characteristic of Ultimate reality for Ch'eng Hao. However, this idea brings to light an apparent limitation in accounting for the difference between "above form" and "below form." Ch'eng Hao's emphasis on experience obviates the need for intellectual effort to account for it. In other words, the ineffability of the Ultimate reality, Ch'eng Hao advocates, can be apprehended through silent realization, instead of developing a mental construct in an attempt to explain it.

From this, one can see that the discrepancy between the Ch'engs' ideas about Ultimate reality as they involve holistic *ch'i* can be reduced to effability, understood through the intellect (*li-hui*), and ineffability, understood through the experience (*t'i-hui*). However, emphasis on effability leads to a bifurcated definition of holistic *ch'i*, and when holistic *ch'i* is perceived to be ineffable, it is thereby very diffi-

cult to define. With this inevitable dilemma in mind, let us see how the Ch'engs' philosophical legacies are crystalized in Chu Hsi's idea of Ultimate reality, epitomized in the phrase "ineffable but still effable (*wu-chi erh t'ai-chi*)."

Part Two: Two Dimensions of the Ultimate Reality in Chu Hsi

"Ineffable but still effable (*wu-chi erh t'ai-chi*)"

Chapter Three: The Mind and its principle, Nature

It is extremely difficult to define names (*ming-i chih yü*) [such as nature and humanity].....Silent realization is the only way to grasp them thoroughly.¹

No sooner do you manage to speak it out, and manage to name it, than you can understand it clearly.²

Chu Hsi's pursuit of the Ultimate reality started with questions about the mind and nature. It was not until 1139 that Chu Hsi's decades-long study under masters in an attempt to account for the Ultimate reality finally bore fruit, and it was his realization of the holistic and active characteristics of *ch'i* which made it possible for him to formulate his ideas. Chu Hsi, whose approach to the question of the Ultimate reality has more in common with Ch'eng I's than Ch'eng Hao's,³

¹. *Ming-i chih yü chi nan hsia...tz'u-teng ch'ieh yao mo-chih hsin-t'ung*, CTYL 5.98.

². *Shuo-te ch'u, yu ming-te ch'u, fang-shih chien-te fen-ming*), " *ibid.*, 5.89. On another occasion, to the same effect, Chu Hsi holds that "If only you can manage to speak it out with language (*yü-yen*), you can understand it. Just observing a lot of things is no better than not even paying attention to them." Again he says: "But don't be ambiguous; you have to be mindful of the clear definition of a name (*ming-i cho-lo*)," *ibid.*, 4.64.

³. "In skeleton (*ta-ch'u*), my idea is congruous with I-ch'uan's but in detail (*hsiao-ch'u*), there are some discrepancies." See *ibid.*, 93.2359.

critically synthesized their ideas about it, which they sought in the realms of nature and the mind, deduction and holism, respectively. Therefore, his synthesis could be characterized as the incorporation of the ideational or dualistic interpretation of *ch'i*, represented by *li*, into holistic *ch'i*, represented by Change. In other words, Chu Hsi wants to accommodate *li*, nature, into the frame of the mind. The following is a summary of the main features of Chu Hsi's concept of the Ultimate reality in the comparison with that of the Ch'engs.

Chu Hsi agreed with Ch'eng I in his intellectual approach to the Ultimate reality, which was characterized by the use of deduction, the differentiation of *li* from *ch'i*, or substance from function, which resulted in an assertion of the primacy of nature over the mind. However, he disagreed with him concerning the dualism of *li* and *ch'i*, a notion which Ch'eng I's ideational approach to holistic *ch'i* tended to invite.

What Chu Hsi appreciated in Ch'eng Hao's thought was his emphasis on experience as the basis for knowledge about the Ultimate reality, an approach, as seen above, characterized by a belief in the primacy of the mind, and his holistic definition of *li* and *ch'i*. However, he saw the limitation of Ch'eng Hao's holistic idea in its failure to differentiate *li* from *ch'i*, "above form" from "below form," or substance from function.

Superficially, it seems that the nature of synthesis Chu Hsi created can basically be described as the accommodation of

nature into the mind, or *li* into the holistic *ch'i*. Substantially, however, Chu Hsi's effort at synthesis involves a fundamental conflict between effability and ineffability (undifferentiability), between intellect (*li-hui*) and experience (*t'i-hui*), or between dualism and holism of *li* and *ch'i*. And each of the conflicts involves nature-orientedness, or deduction, versus mind-orientedness, or holism, respectively.

Chu Hsi conceptualizes this synthesis of conflicting characteristics concerning nature and the mind into "duality in unity and unity in duality (*i erh erh, erh erh i*)."

In his opinion, nature and the mind form "duality in unity and unity in duality." By the same token, he thinks, so do *li* and *ch'i*. With this, he also implies that although the way nature and the mind are related can be grasped thoroughly only by experience, their relationship should still be capable of description in language, or effable. In other words, Chu Hsi assumes that the relationship between nature and the mind, or *li* and holistic *ch'i*, should be as much effable as ineffable. These conflicting characteristics are what is spoken of in the phrase, "ineffable but still effable (*wu-chi erh t'ai-chi*)."

In this chapter, which explores Chu Hsi's idea about the immanent Ultimate reality, I will treat the following topics. First, I will explain the process through which Chu Hsi begins his quest for the immanent Ultimate reality with the realization that "the mind commands and includes nature and emotions

(*hsin t'ung hsing-ch'ing*),⁴ which can also be expressed as "nature is the substance of the mind, and emotions are the function of the mind."⁵ This idea reflects Chu Hsi's realization of the limitations which Ch'eng I's dualism and Ch'eng Hao's holism have in explaining the Ultimate reality. Secondly, I will explain "duality in unity and unity in duality" between nature and the mind and between nature and emotions. This explanation will be based on Chu Hsi's characterization of the mind, holistic *ch'i*, as consciousness, which will be shown to be important for an understanding of his definition of humanity as "the character of the mind and the principle of love (*hsin-chih te, ai-chih li*). Finally, I will explain how these ideas about Ultimate reality are embodied in Chu Hsi's idea of moral cultivation: "exercising seriousness and the investigation of principle (*chü-ching, ch'iung-li*)."

Chu Hsi's thought is inevitably suffused with a tension which, as indicated above, stems from the conflict between duality and unity, effability and ineffability, and intellect and experience which, in the final analysis, can be reduced, I believe, to the conflict between deduction and holism. And it is to be expected that, if that tension is not maintained, an imbalanced or one-sided interpretation would be the result.

⁴. Chu Hsi has two interpretations of the meaning of the character *t'ung* in this line, which originated with Chang Tsai: *t'ung* as in *t'ung-ping* (to command army) and *chien* (to include). My translation is based on these. See *Ibid.*, 98.2513.

⁵. *Ibid.*, 119.2867.

And this is, I think, what actually happened to Chu Hsi's philosophy in the history of Confucian thought. The issue of what caused that tension to break is the main concern of this chapter and ultimately of this thesis.

Chu Hsi, who appears to have been exposed to the Ch'engs' ideas,⁶ had for the most part been influenced by Ch'eng I's idea of nature and the mind through the teaching of Li T'ung (1093-1163), until Li's death,⁷ after which he went to study with Chang Shih (1133-1180). Through these two teachers, Chu Hsi learned about two major doctrines of the mind, namely, *wei-fa* and *i-fa*, or before and after the emotions are aroused. It was not until the spring of 1139, in the year of *chi-ch'ou*, that Chu Hsi came to be convinced that there were problems with Ch'eng I's idea. It was the result of decades of hard work to grasp the fundamental truths of human existence, or the mysterious character of the mind, that led Chu Hsi to the breakthrough. Chu Hsi explains:

Formerly, I studied under Mr. Li Yen-p'ing (1093-1163). Upon receiving instruction in *The Centrality*

⁶. Though it has been understood that Yang Shih (1053-1135) represents Ch'eng I and Hsieh Shang-ts'ai (1050-1103) represents Ch'eng Hao, Yang Shih, to whose lineage Chu Hsi belongs, was appreciated by Ch'eng Hao for his deep understanding of Ch'eng Hao's experiential idea of *wei-fa*. See Ch'eng Lai, *Chu Hsi che-hsüeh yen-chiu*, 93-4.

⁷. This does not mean Ch'eng I was the sole Master in the formation of Chu Hsi's idea. For general information about persons influential on Chu Hsi's schooling, see Liu Shu-hsien, *Chu-tzu che-hsüeh ssu-hsiang ti fa-chan yü wan-ch'eng*, 2-49, 79-96.

and Commonality (*Chung-yung*), I tried to understand the meaning of *wei-fa*, or before the emotions such as joy, anger, sorrow, and happiness are aroused. Mr. Li passed away before I came to a full understanding of it. Personally, I felt a deep regret at my self being so slow in understanding, like a beggar with a sense of big restlessness.

Upon hearing that Chang Ching-fu (1133-1180) had inherited the teaching of Hu Heng-shan (1106-1161), I went to study under him. Ch'in-fu told me what he had learnt from Mr. Hu, but I didn't understand it. Withdrawing from him, I fell into serious thinking about it, almost forgetting to sleep and to eat.

One day, with a heavy sigh, I exclaimed that "Although there are personal differences in the activities such as speaking, quiet, movement, and stillness, most of man's life, from infancy until death, are engaged in *i-fa*, or after the emotions are aroused. As to that which is not aroused (*wei-fa*), it simply is not yet aroused [it is a matter of time before it is aroused]." From this time, I had no doubt about *wei-fa* and *i-fa* any more, thinking that this was exactly what *The Centrality and Commonality* intended to teach. Afterward, I had access to Mr. Hu's book, which included his discussion with Tseng Chi-fu (1084-1166) about *wei-fa*. I found the discussion agreed with my idea. This made me confident of Master Ch'eng's idea. Though there were some points which, I felt, were not congruous with Master Ch'eng's idea, I did not take them seriously, ascribing them to errors in communication. In the meantime, I made time to talk to people, but I never found anyone who had a deep understanding about this issue.

In the spring of *Chi-ch'ou*, which was in the reign of *Ch'ien-tao*, I talk to my friend Ts'ai Chit'ung (1135-1198) about this issue. In the course of argument with him, suddenly, I came to discredit this theory of Ch'eng I.⁸

As explained above, Chu Hsi studied under Li T'ung and Chang Shih, who represented the Schools of Tao-nan and Hsiang, respectively. What Chu Hsi was initiated into by Li T'ung was centered on the experience of *wei-fa* through

⁸. "Chung-ho chiu-shuo hsü," *CTTC* 9.75.22b-23a.

stillness (*ching*). This idea, which was based on *Chung-yung* had been the cardinal doctrine of the School ever since Yang Shih (1053-1135).⁹ Meanwhile, Chang Shih initiated Chu Hsi into such topics as the meaning of *wei-fa*, the subtlety of *t'ai-chi*, and stillness-movement (*tung-ching*) of Heaven-Earth (*ch'ien-k'un*). However, what impressed Chu Hsi so about Chang's doctrine was the examination of what is aroused (*i-fa*) before preserving the mind and nourishing nature (*hsien ch'a-shih, hou han-yang, or ch'a-shih tuan-erh*).¹⁰

As discussed above, what his two masters educated Chu Hsi in was *Chung-yung* and its cardinal idea about the active substance of the mind (*hsin-t'i liu-hsing*), which was differentiated into *wei-fa* and *i-fa*. While he realized Ch'eng I's idea was somewhat incongruous with theirs,¹¹ Chu Hsi still believed Ch'eng I's idea, which categorized nature as *wei-fa* and the mind as *i-fa*, to be a true exposition of *Chung-yung*. This is what is called the old theory of Equilibrium and Harmony. Chu Hsi explains:

Again, due to what master Ch'eng (Ch'eng I) said--
"Generally speaking, the mind always refers to *i-fa*, or after the emotions are aroused"--I came to

⁹. For Li T'ung's teaching (*ching-chung t'i-jen ta-pen wei-fa*), see "Reply to Ho Shu-ching," *CTTC* 5.40.8a. And for a detailed information about the genealogy of the Tao-nan School, see Ch'en Lai, *Chu Hsi che-hsueh yen-chiu*, 91. Li T'ung also initiated Chu Hsi into the essential point of the investigation of principle (*ch'iuung-li chih yao*) through preserving the mind (*ch'ang-ts'un tz'u-hsin*). See *CTYL* 18.398,422.

¹⁰. See, Ch'en Lai, *ibid.*, 106-7.

¹¹. For detail, see Ch'en Lai, *ibid.*, 98.

categorize that the mind as *i-fa*, or the state after the emotions are aroused, and nature as *wei-fa*, or the state before the emotions are aroused.¹²

This definition of the mind as *i-fa* and of nature as *wei-fa* highlights other troublesome features of Ch'eng I's philosophy, most notably, the dualism of nature and the mind, and the resulting characterization of the mind as cognitive function and as emotions. Not realizing these problems, Chu Hsi expected Ch'eng I's idea of the mind as *i-fa* to be a model explanation about the active substance of the mind. But, contrary to his expectation, Ch'eng I's model turned out to be a problem-ridden cognitive idea. This realization prompted him to disregard Ch'eng I's idea of the mind. It was, it seems, an idea concerning that active substance of the mind found in *Chung-yung* that provided Chu Hsi with a criterion for making that decision. Presumably, this was the issue involved in his discussion with Ts'ai Chi-t'ung. Chu Hsi observes:

In fact, what Master Ch'eng said--"Generally speaking, the mind always means *i-fa*"--was meant to refer to the active substance of the mind (*hsin-t'i liu-hsing*). It was not meant to refer to the encounter of thinking (*ssu-lü*) with things (*shih-wu*) [a cognitive process of subject-object separation]. [But, it turned out to be a cognitive idea]. It is really incongruous with the idea in *Chung-yung*. Therefore, I correct it again, thinking that it is inappropriate.¹³

What does Chu Hsi think went wrong with Ch'eng I's conception of the mind and nature, which turned out to be a

¹². "Yü hu-nan chu-kung lun chung-ho ti i-shu," *CTTC* 64.28b.

¹³. "I-fa wei-fa shuo," *ibid.*, 67.12a.

cognitive model? What is the teaching of *Chung-yung* regarding the active substance of the mind which enabled Chu Hsi to see Ch'eng I's limitations?

Remember that Ch'eng I was criticized by Ch'eng Hao for having a parochial idea of the mind, which was a way of saying that Ch'eng I valued nature over the mind. Ch'eng I's statement that "nature is bigger than the mind" implies this idea. His rationale behind this conception of nature and the mind can be analysed as follows.

First, Ch'eng I assumed that nature, or primordial consciousness, which referred to the state before subject-object separation, represented the Ultimate reality in man. Second, this assumption of the primacy of nature led Ch'eng I to relegate the status of the mind to cognitive function of subject-object separation, since he thought that the subject-object separation, which was caused by sensory stimuli and resulted in emotions, was the momentum whereby the Heavenly endowment, nature, could become adulterated. Third, as a result, Ch'eng I came to split the holistic mind into *wei-fa* and *i-fa*, and thereby defining the former as nature and the latter as the mind, forgetting that primordial consciousness, nature, belonged to the mind, too.¹⁴

What caused Ch'eng I to have this idea of putting nature first? In the final analysis, it could be attributed to his ideational approach to pan-ch'iism, holistic *ch'i*, which he

¹⁴. See chapter two, 96.

divides into *li* and *ch'i*, or substance and function, and values the former over the latter. As seen above, this idea led Ch'eng I to have a narrow view of man; he found the essential characteristic of human existence in *li*, nature. Put differently, Ch'eng I recognized only the fact that the essence of human beings, nature, is the manifestation of *li*; that is, the fundamental characteristic of human existence lies in its being the continuity of the Ultimate reality.

Chu Hsi appears to partially attribute the source of this idea to *Chung-yung* itself, especially the first line of the book. He argues that the major emphasis in *Chung-yung* is on the concept of the mind, the active substance, but that people, including Ch'eng I, were quick to misrepresent it as emphasizing the concept of nature. Chu Hsi argues:

What Heaven imparts to man is called human nature.
To follow our nature is called Tao.¹⁵

And:

In many cases, people mention nature ahead of the mind [nature is valued over the mind]. [However], it seems that the mind should be mentioned ahead [of nature].¹⁶

From this, it can safely be said that his ideational interpretation of holistic *ch'i*, coupled with a misrepresentation of *Chung-yung*, lead to Ch'eng I's giving primacy to

¹⁵. Modified from Chan, *Sourcebook*, 98. A similar idea is also seen in *The Great Treatise A*: "that which accomplishes it (Tao) is nature."

¹⁶. *Jen duo-shuo hsing, fang shuo hsin, k'an-lai tang hsien-shuo hsin*, "CTYL 5.91.

nature over mind and dividing the mind into *wei-fa* and *i-fa*, defining the former as nature and the latter as the mind, charged with only cognitive function.

Chu Hsi appears to think that the problems arising from this overemphasis on nature could be corrected by positing the active substance of the mind, which is perhaps the reason he proposes that mind take primacy over nature. Before exploring the notion of the active substance of the mind, a brief examination of Ch'eng Hao's idea of the mind, which might have influenced Chu Hsi both positively and negatively, is in order.

As discussed in the previous chapter, Ch'eng Hao offered quite a different view of man, posited upon holistic *ch'i*, or the active substance of the mind. He reduced the fundamental characteristic of human mind to Change, which he used to represent holistic *ch'i*, or the holistic combination of *li* and *ch'i*, and therein located the Ultimate reality. This idea of the mind did not allow any division between inner and outer, or nature and the mind. Moreover, according to this holistic idea of the mind, the outer world was instead dependent on human mind.¹⁷ And in keeping with this emphasis on the independence of the mind, he also opposed any conceptual division of holistic *ch'i* into *li* and *ch'i*, or "above form" and "below

¹⁷. For example, Ch'eng Hao holds that "Only man is the mind of Heaven-Earth. Upon its movement, this mind was divided [into Heaven and Earth], thereby Heaven settled above and Earth settled below (*chih-shih jen wei t'ien-ti hsin, shih-hsin chih tung tse, fen le, t'ien wei shang, ti wei hsia*).\" See \"I-shu\" 2B.5a.

form," and advocated a total identification of them.¹⁸

Chu Hsi does not deny that continuity from the Ultimate reality, which nature stands for, constitutes a characteristic of human existence, but he opposes representing it as the fundamental characteristic of human existence. By the same token, he does not deny that independence, which the mind stands for, is a defining characteristic of human existence. However, he disagrees with Ch'eng Hao's making even the existence of Heaven-Earth dependent upon human mind. Chu Hsi believes that the essence of man is still "derived from up there (*tzu-pi erh lai*)."¹⁹ In his opinion, human existence should be characterized by the combination of continuity and independence, or of nature and the mind. In other words, for him man is as much an independent unit of holistic *ch'i* as the manifestation of principle, or Tao, and he suggests this idea by using the notions of macrocosm and microcosm. He says:

Man is microcosm (*hsiao-pao*), while Heaven-Earth is macrocosm (*ta-pao*).²⁰

Ch'eng Hao has to be credited with positing the independence of human existence by locating its fundamental characteristic in the mind, Change, or the holistic *ch'i*. From Chu Hsi's point of view, however, his idea of the mind was flawed

¹⁸. For details, see chapter two, 107.

¹⁹. *CTYL* 60.1426.

²⁰. *Ibid.*, 53.1281. Chu Hsi also refers to Heaven as "big man (*ta-te jen*)," while referring to man as "small Heaven (*hsiao-te t'ien*).²⁰ See *ibid.*, 60.1426.

in that it misrepresented man as macrocosm, the Ultimate being. It is understandable that in Ch'eng Hao's view the Ultimate being, the mind, did not need any other condition for its being but itself. This independent and absolute characteristic of the mind could account for the total identification among the mind, nature, and emotions, between "above form" and "below form," and between substance and function in his philosophy.

Ch'eng I conceived of the same kind of relationship between macrocosm, Heaven, and microcosm, man, as Chu Hsi speaks of in the passage above. And Ch'eng I deserves credit for differentiating substance and function. According to Chu Hsi's analysis, however, Ch'eng I's concept of a microcosm was seriously flawed. His overemphasis on the idea of the continuity of human existence resulted in the active substance of the mind, the holistic *ch'i*, being divided into nature and the mind, substance and function, thereby relegating the mind to function, which was in charge of cognition and emotions. The absurdity of this idea is that by confining the mind to cognitive function, the self, the anchor of integrity and identity, that is, the subject of human existence, is lost to function.

In short, Chu Hsi seems to imply that both Ch'eng Hao's idea of mind-primacy and Ch'eng I's idea of nature-primacy are one-sided in that Ch'eng I neglected the fact that man is the small "Heaven," while Ch'eng Hao ignored the fact that Heaven is the "big" man. In other words, Chu Hsi seems to assume that

independence and continuity, which the Ch'engs' ideas of man represent respectively, should be incorporated in human existence, and that the agent through which it is incorporated should be the mind, the representative of the self. These considerations on his part are well reflected in the following passages, which constitute the core aspects of Chu Hsi's breakthrough. He says:

The mind includes these two (nature and emotions); nature is the substance of the mind, and emotions are the function of the mind.²¹

And:

The mind commands and includes nature and emotions.²²

From our discussion thus far, it would not be far-fetched to characterize Chu Hsi's breakthrough as the product of the marriage of the holistic and active mind, the holistic *ch'i* (Ch'eng Hao), with the possibility of differentiating it into nature and emotions, substance and function (Ch'eng I). With this in mind, let's explore how the mind, representing the characteristic of independence, accommodates nature, standing for the characteristic of continuity, within it, and how nature, *li*, associates itself with *ch'i*, emotions. Chu Hsi lays out the skeleton of his idea, taking advantage of Ch'eng

²¹. *Ibid.*, 119.2867.

²². In the passage, "commands" refers to the characteristic of the self as subject, the anchor of integrity and identity, and "includes" signifies the differentiation of the self, the mind, into nature and emotions, substance and function. This seems to be the underlying idea in Chu Hsi's interpretation of the character *t'ung* also as *chien* in his commentary on *hsin t'ung hsing-ch'ing*.

Hao's concept of Change, holistic *ch'i*:

"[As to the activity of Heaven (*shang-t'ien chih tsai*)], its entirety (*t'i*)²³ is Change; its principle is Tao; its function is the ineffable (*shen*)."
...Master interprets: "In terms of man, Change is tantamount to the mind, Tao is tantamount to nature, and the ineffable is tantamount to the emotions." The next day, Master was asked again: "Since you have explained Heaven in terms of man, I was wondering if, [the other way around], man could be explained in terms of Heaven-Earth?" Answer: "As for the activity (*liu-hsing*) of the Mandate of Heaven [which is principle], that through which the principle is commanded is tantamount to the mind; the principle is tantamount to nature. For example, nature is like the principle whereby the four seasons alternate; the maturation of the myriad things is tantamount to the emotions."²⁴

This passage seems to provide us with a synopsis of Chu Hsi's idea concerning the mind and nature. In it he describes the characteristics of human existence through the symmetry of macrocosm and microcosm, and he assumes that each macrocosm and microcosm is divided into three aspects: entirety, substance, and function. Macrocosm is characterized by Change (entirety), Tao (substance), and the ineffable (function).

²³. Chu Hsi has two interpretations of the meaning of the character *t'i*. In *CTYL* 120.2890., he interprets it as reality (*shih*) which, he thinks, includes both substance and function (*t'i-yung*). But, in *ibid.*, 5.84., he interprets the character as *t'i* of *t'i-chih*, or appearance. (In *ibid.*, 14.259., Chu Hsi interprets *chih* as *mo-yang*, appearance.). In short, with *t'i*, Chu Hsi seems to refer to a totality, *ch'üan-t'i*, which is inclusive of substance, function and appearance. My rendering of *t'i* as "entirety" is based on consideration of these ideas.

²⁴. *Ibid.*, 95.2423. By every indication, the first line in this passage, as it appears in "I-shu" 1.3a-b, seems to be Ch'eng Hao's idea, since the line is followed by the total identification between Tao and a concrete thing. However, in *ibid.*, 120.2890., the line is credited to Ch'eng I, while in *ibid.*, 5.97., it is credited to Ch'eng Hao.

Likewise, microcosm is also divided into the mind (entirety), nature (substance), and emotions (function). Chu Hsi implies duality, or independence of macrocosm and microcosm, by representing them as Change and the mind. Meanwhile, he hints at the unity, or continuity, of macrocosm and microcosm by identifying Change with the mind. Most importantly, this identification indicates Chu Hsi's intention of locating the essential characteristic of the mind in Change, holistic *ch'i*.

As suggested by the word "entirety," for Chu Hsi the mind is the totality of human existence both nominally and substantially. Nominally, the mind represents each human being,²⁵ and substantially, the mind "includes *wei-fa* and *i-fa*, namely, the entirety of what *I Chuan* calls 'incessant life activity (*sheng-sheng liu-hsing*),' [whose essence lies in] 'the movement-stillness alternation of yin-yang (*i-tung i-ching*).'"²⁶ What is more, this life activity constitutes the essential characteristic of human mind: the manifestation of Heavenly principle (*t'ien-li*) in man,²⁷ and cognitive capacity to grasp all the changes in the world through attraction. In other words, Chu Hsi charges the mind with "extreme ineffability" and the "mysterious capacity" (*chih-ling, shen-ming*),²⁸ which

²⁵. *Hsin tse, ch'i-jen yeh, ibid.*, 5.82.

²⁶. "Reply to Lin Che-chih," *CTTC* 43.19b.

²⁷. *Hsin-che t'ien-li tsai jen chih chüan-t'i, CTYL* 60.1433.

²⁸. *Ibid.*, 18.404.

comes from its being composed of holistic *ch'i*.²⁹ Because of these characteristics, Chu Hsi calls human mind *t'ai-chi*, the Great Ultimate, or the Ultimate reality. With this, he makes it clear that the mind, the totality of human existence, is his Ultimate reality, which includes Heavenly principle and its subtle manifestation in *wei-fa* and *i-fa*, nature and emotions, and the mysterious capacity to grasp the principle. Despite this effort to conceptualize it, the mind for Chu Hsi, as his use of the word "subtlety" in the second of the passages below implies, defies clear definition. Nevertheless, Chu Hsi wants to define the mysterious character of this inner sanctuary as clearly as the power of language permits. Chu Hsi says:

The mind is provided with the myriad principles. It can grasp all the changes through attraction (*pien-hua kan-t'ung*). Because the mind is composed of the incessant life activity (*sheng-sheng pu-ch'iung*), therefore we call its essential characteristic Change.³⁰

And:

Change is mentioned to account for both the movement-stillness alternation of yin-yang and *wei-fa* and *i-fa*. The Great Ultimate (*t'ai-chi*), which refers to the subtlety of the nature-emotions relationship (*hsing-ch'ing chih miao*), is the principle underlying the movement-stillness alternation of yin-yang and underlying *wei-fa* and *i-fa*....If with the character Change only *i-fa* is meant, this causes the mind again to be confined to *i-fa*, or after emotions are aroused.³¹

²⁹. *Ch'i-chung tzu yu-ke ling-te wu-shih*, *ibid.*, 5.87.

³⁰. "Question to Chang Ching-fu," *CTTC* 32.6a.

³¹. "Reply to Wu Hui-shu," *ibid.*, 42.13b.

What then is the nature of human mind, which is provided with the Heavenly or macrocosmic characteristic of Change? And how can this mind be differentiated into nature and emotions, *wei-fa* and *i-fa*, which stand for *li* and *ch'i*, or substance and function, respectively? In order to account for the character of the mind, Chu Hsi again reduces the mind to consciousness (*chih-chüeh*), another characteristic of Change, holistic *ch'i*. Put differently, Chu Hsi locates the fundamental characteristic of the holistic *ch'i* of the mind in consciousness. Therefore, it is not hard to see here that consciousness for Chu Hsi is composed of nature and emotions, *li* and *ch'i*, or substance and function, which have been the traditional categories in pan-*ch'i*ism ever since Kuan-tzu. This clearly indicates that Chu Hsi's idea of the mind, or consciousness, is very much indebted to the traditional interpretation of holistic *ch'i*. Let's explore Chu Hsi's idea of substance in consciousness.

Remember that Ch'eng I implied primordial consciousness with the concept of nature, or *li*, which also meant the state before subject-object separation, that is, *wei-fa*. Remember also that Ch'eng I defined nature as substance but defined the mind as function. So, as far as the idea of substance, or nature, is concerned, Chu Hsi and Ch'eng I share the same idea. By pointing out the problem in Chang Tsai's idea of the mind, Chu Hsi wants to emphasize that nature, or *li*, is identical with primordial consciousness. He says:

I am afraid that "The combination of nature and consciousness makes up mind"³² is problem-ridden. It sounds as if nature and [primordial] consciousness are two different things.³³

How then are they identical? To account for this, Chu Hsi adopts a more elaborated approach than Ch'eng I, taking advantage of the cognitive capability of the mind posited in the concept of *wei-fa*. To be more specific, Chu Hsi focuses on the basic notion that before subject-object separation occurs, subject, that is, primordial consciousness, is self-directed, or self-cognitive. In other words, in the state of primordial consciousness, which can otherwise be called primordial feeling, what feels is identical with what is felt. Chu Hsi explains:

What is felt (*so-chüeh*) is the principle (*li*) of the mind. What feels (*neng-chüeh*) is the ineffable (*ling*) of *ch'i*.³⁴

Seemingly what is felt and what feels are disparate. However, on a closer look at the passage, one can see that they are identical, because the principle of the mind is identical with the ineffable of *ch'i*, in that they all refer to the substantial aspect of holistic *ch'i*, and the mind is also identical with *ch'i* in that they all refer to holistic

³². "T'ai-ho" *CTCS* 2.3b.

³³. *CTYL* 5.92.

³⁴. *Ibid.*, 5.85.

ch'i.³⁵ Chu Hsi's idea is that in primordial consciousness, the substance of feeling (the mind) is exactly principle (nature). Put differently, he thinks that primordial consciousness is feeling which is charged with moral principle, humanity. Chu Hsi has a more detailed description about this:

That which feels (*chüeh*) is feeling [directed to]
the moral principle (*tao-li*)...which is humanity.
³⁶

This clearly shows that for Chu Hsi, as far as the substance of the mind is concerned, primordial consciousness is identical with nature. Put differently, the mode of being of nature is primordial consciousness, primordial feeling, (the mind).

This idea prompts one to conclude that nature and the mind are identical. According to Chu Hsi's logic, although

³⁵. Chu Hsi applies his advocacy of clear definitions for names to the concept of *ch'i*, namely, holistic *ch'i*. As seen throughout chapter one and two, the ideational interpretation understood that the holistic *ch'i* divides into *li* and *ch'i*, or "above form" and "below form." However, there were still concepts such as essence (*ching*) and the ineffable (*ling*), which had strong affiliations either with rational or with supernatural beliefs about holistic *ch'i*. Chu Hsi, unlike Ch'eng I, who did not offer any positive explanation of *ching* and *ling*, identifies these with *li*. As a result, for Chu Hsi the meaning of concepts such as substance, essence, the ineffable, and *li*, which share the characteristic of "above form," become identical. However, he contradicts his emphasis on the clear definition of names by using the concept of *ch'i* confusingly. Despite his definition of it as "below form," he, as his reference to Change attests, he still uses it in the sense of holistic *ch'i*. Therefore, as to the tautological nature of the line, besides *li* and *ling*, *ch'i* and the mind are tautological too, since Chu Hsi represents the mind as Change, the symbol of holistic *ch'i*. For Chu Hsi's idea about *ching* and *ling*, see chapter four, 187, footnote #34.

³⁶. CTYL 101.2562.

nature, humanity, and the mind, primordial consciousness, are identical (inseparable), they are differentiated; primordial consciousness is the subject of the feeling (what feels) and humanity is the object of the feeling (what is felt). What is more, what is felt (humanity) is not, as Ch'eng Hao asserted, originally provided with what feels (the mind). Rather, what is felt is, as Ch'eng I held, "acquired from Heaven and is endowed in the mind (what feels)."³⁷ Summing up this idea, Chu Hsi says:

For example, it can be compared to a long chain (*ch'ang-lien*). That which has activity (*lieu-hsing*) is Heavenly Tao, and that which man inherits from it (Heavenly Tao) becomes nature. Heavenly Tao refers to origination (*yüan*), flourishing (*heng*), advantages (*li*), and firmness (*chen*), which constitute the characteristics of Heaven (*ch'ien*). At birth, the Heavenly characteristics become nature, which consists of humanity (*jen*), rightness (*i*), propriety (*li*), and wisdom (*chih*).³⁸

And:

As for "What Heaven imparts to man is called human nature," you must interpret this line as meaning that no sooner does Heaven impart to man mind, than this becomes human nature.³⁹

From the discussion thus far, it can safely be said that as far as primordial consciousness is concerned, nature and the mind are inseparable (identical) but differentiated: they are duality in unity and unity in duality. Even though resort-

³⁷. *Te chih yü t'ien erh, chü yü hsin che, ibid.*, 98.2514.

³⁸. *Ibid.*, 28.725.

³⁹. *Ibid.*, 5.91.

ing to a meticulous conceptualization to account for the unique mode of being of nature, Chu Hsi concedes that language is limited in its ability to represent this inner sanctuary.⁴⁰ To resolve this apparent contradiction, Chu Hsi seems to suggest that mind and nature should be understood as being in tension with one another. Chu Hsi says:

Generally speaking, the mind and nature look as if they are unity but still duality, look as if they are duality but still unity. You must grasp this through experience (*t'i-jen*).⁴¹

When Chu Hsi says that nature is ineffable, this, as discussed above, means most of all that the character of nature is accessible through experience. However, considered theoretically, this could refer to the self-directedness of primordial consciousness. In other words, he means that primordial consciousness, principle, is self-confined, so that it is neither conscious of nor has contact with anything but itself. In this context, Chu Hsi holds that "principle has no consciousness,"⁴² and that "principle has neither sentiment (*ch'ing-i*), nor calculation (*chi-to*), nor manipulation (*chao-tso*)."⁴³

⁴⁰. "Nature is ineffable (*Hsing pu-k'o yen*)," *ibid.*, 5.89.

⁴¹. *Ta-ti hsin yü hsing, szu i erh erh, szu erh erh i, tz'u-ch'u tsui-tang t'i-jen*, *ibid.*, 5.89.

⁴². *Li wei chih-chüeh*, *ibid.*, 5.85.

⁴³. *Ibid.*, 1.3. However, this state of nature, *li*, refers not so much to unconsciousness (*pu-hsing*) as to being awake: *wei-fa pu shih mo-jan ch'üan pu-hsing, i ch'ang hsing tsai che-li*, *ibid.*, 5.86.

How then does this mind of primordial consciousness come to be conscious of other things? How is the moral value confined to nature known to the outer world? In the primary sense, this issue is concerned with cognition. In a secondary sense, it is concerned with the manifestation of primordial consciousness, or the function of the mind, namely, emotions. All these issues are represented by holistic *ch'i*, the holistic combination of *li* and *ch'i*, which also constitutes the characteristic of consciousness (*chih-chüeh*), the mind. Chu Hsi says:

Not only *ch'i*, but first there should be the *li* of consciousness (*chih-chüeh chih li*). *Li* has no consciousness. Just as the congealing of *ch'i* [which involves *li*] results in form, so only the combination of *li* and *ch'i* can constitute consciousness.⁴⁴ Take this torch, for example. The reason it can produce light is due to the fat it burns.⁴⁵

And:

If you compare the mind to a mirror, the functions of illumination and reflection (*chao-chien ch'u*) of a mirror are tantamount to emotions; and that whereby a mirror can have those functions is tantamount to nature.⁴⁶

As indicated above, consciousness for Chu Hsi is the momentum whereby cognition occurs and whereby nature becomes

⁴⁴. Chu Hsi, as implied in this line, uses the concept of *ch'i* in two ways. One is, as "the congealing of *ch'i*" indicates, holistic *ch'i* which Change stands for; the other is *ch'i* as "below form," or something describable, which is suggested in "the combination of *li* and *ch'i*."

⁴⁵. *CTYL* 5.85.

⁴⁶. *Ibid.*, 95.2423.

emotions as well. What then does a mirror represent in relation to consciousness? Before exploring this issue, a brief exposition of the Ch'engs' ideas about cognition is in order.

Ch'eng I, as seen before, ascribed the disturbance of primordial consciousness to sensory stimuli, or external sources. This disturbance, which triggered subject-object separation, was the momentum of cognition for Ch'eng I. This idea led him to define primordial consciousness, or inner reality, as nature, and to define cognition, or split reality, as the mind. And Ch'eng I thought emotions were that which ensued from the subjective response to external stimuli. As a result, for Ch'eng I the characteristic of the mind was just the function of cognition and emotions.

Ch'eng Hao believes that the primary reason for his brother's cognition-oriented concept of the mind was its distinction of inner from outer, or nature from the mind. To cope with this narrow concept of the mind, Ch'eng Hao proposed the idea of the completion of things (*ch'eng-wu*). With this, he meant that cognition did not necessarily refer to the conflict of subject with object, that is, subjective response to object upon object's stimulation. Instead, Ch'eng Hao held that cognition was accomplished by grasping the essence of things by accepting things as they are. To support this assertion, he came up with the idea of forgetting the distinction between subject and object (*liang-wang*). As to the cause of

this distinction, Ch'eng Hao attributed it to subjective conditions, represented by selfishness.

Chu Hsi incorporates Ch'eng I's idea of cognition into Ch'eng Hao's to come up with his own idea of cognition, which his concept of consciousness represents. First of all, with his definition of consciousness, Chu Hsi aims at realizing the objective of *ch'eng-wu* and *liang-wang*. As the image of the mirror implies in the above passage, for Chu Hsi cognition occurs in a receptive way, taking things in as they are. The mind, namely, the mirror-like or value-laden primordial consciousness, responds in a receptive way as things attract (*kan*) the mind. Initially, therefore, there is no need to worry about outer reality, and still less about subject-object separation. Chu Hsi says:

The human mind is like a mirror, which can reflect beauty and ugliness only if it is devoid of any previous image. If there remains an image in a mirror, how can it contain a reflection? Originally, the human mind is empty and bright (*chan-jan hsü-ming*).⁴⁷ It responds accordingly as it is attracted by a thing (*sui-kan erh ying*).⁴⁸ For this reason, it can make clear whether a thing is high, low, light or heavy as it is.⁴⁹

⁴⁷. A similar idea is seen in "Chieh-pi," *Hsün-tzu*, where it is said that due to the characteristics of emptiness, unity and stillness, human mind is called the great clear-brightness (*hsü i erh ching, wei-chih ta ch'ing-ming*). See *HPCTCC* 2.15.264.

⁴⁸. *Kuan-tzu* contains similar ideas in "Hsin-shu A": "Response is preceded by attraction (*kan erh hou ying*)...Response is conditioned by the appearance of a thing (*wu chih tse, ying*).\" See *ibid.*, 5.13.222.

⁴⁹. *CTYL* 16.347.

Let's look more closely at the term "response" (*ying*). For Chu Hsi, response, which involves cognition, is divided into three steps, which in fact occur simultaneously. When a thing or an event attracts the mind, the mind thereby grasps it as it is. And this grasping is the occasion whereby thus far self-confined primordial consciousness comes to contact or feel (cognize) the object, mobilizing its inborn moral asset, which humanity represents. Put differently, cognition is the occasion through which subject feels moral value pertinent to the involved situation, and feeling, which is another expression for response, occurs in the form of reflection.⁵⁰ Chu Hsi says:

That which feels (*chüeh*) is feeling moral principle (*tao-li*). There should not be even a slight discrepancy in feeling the principle. Otherwise, you are not fully endowed with this character of the mind (*hsin-chih te*), which is humanity.⁵¹

Chu Hsi thinks that the contact between subject and object results in the manifestation of the primordial value, namely, emotion, which has thus far been stored in primordial consciousness in the form of nature. The emotion which accompanies action⁵² thereby completes a thing, or makes it

⁵⁰. In another expression of this idea, he suggests observing a thing from the thing's perspective, not from the self's (*i-wu kuan-wu, wu i-chi kuan-wu*), *ibid.*, 11.181.

⁵¹. *Ibid.*, 101.2562.

⁵². The idea of unity of knowledge and action is incorporated in Chu Hsi's idea of moral cultivation: In *ibid.*, 115.2777., Chu Hsi asserts that in self-cultivation, the extension of moral knowledge and action occur simultaneously.

what it should be in terms of morality. This is Chu Hsi's version of cognition, which synchronizes or identifies internalization of object with externalization of subject. And Chu Hsi's version of *liang-wang* and *ch'eng-wu* culminates in this identification, which is manifested through emotions.

Let's take as an illustration Mencius's frequently-cited example of the infant who is about to fall into a pit. Applying Chu Hsi's concept of *ch'eng-wu* to this case, it would be broken down into the following three steps: "attraction" (*kan*) of the impending danger to the infant, the principle named humanity "responds" (*ying*) to the situation, which results in the "expression" (*hsing*) of loving mind.⁵³ And this idea of *ch'eng-wu* is conditioned on forgetting all the considerations which even for an instant might cause distinction between the two parties (*liang-wang*). As one can see here, all this cognitive activity and this moral consideration, which is divided into substance and function, happens on the level of consciousness. This might explain why Chu Hsi locates the essential characteristic of the mind, holistic *ch'i*, in consciousness.

In light of this exposition of Chu Hsi's theory of cognition, it can safely be argued that for him consciousness is the medium through which the inborn morality becomes reality.⁵⁴

⁵³. "Reply to Ch'en Ch'i-chih," *CTTC* 58.21b.

⁵⁴. However, Chu Hsi's concept of cognition is not the momentum whereby subject imposes morality on object. Instead, it is the occasion through which the self ascertains that the moral principle

Summing this up, Chu Hsi says:

Nature is only principle, emotions are its function (*liu-ch'u, yün-yung ch'u*), and the consciousness of the mind is that through which this principle is preserved (*chü*) and that through which these emotions are expressed (*hsing*).⁵⁵

This exposition of Chu Hsi's concept of substance and function in consciousness again might prompt one to think that nature and emotions, which represent substance and function, are identical (undifferentiable). Chu Hsi maintains that nature and emotions are basically identical, or a unity.⁵⁶ However, given that emotions are the expressions of nature, one can sense that they are differentiable, or a duality, in Chu Hsi's thought as well. In short, for him nature and emotions are, just as nature and the mind are, "duality in unity and unity in duality," since they refer to the two different aspects of holistic consciousness.⁵⁷

Chu Hsi rephrases this idea of duality in unity and unity

perceived in things is already provided in the mind (*wu-hsin su yu chih wu*). Put differently, the reason one can cognize morality is because one already has it. Therefore morality exists regardless of cognition (*pu i wei-chih erh wu, pu i chi-chih erh yu*). See CTWC (Chu Tzu wen-chi), "Hsü-chi," 10.

⁵⁵. "Reply to P'an Chien-chih," CTTC 55.1a.

⁵⁶. *Hsing-ch'ing tse i*, CTYL 5. 96.

⁵⁷. In this connection, one can sense that for Chu Hsi consciousness has two meanings. The first one is the holistic consciousness, which Change represents. The second one is the cognitive or functional consciousness, which refers to *i-fa*. In other words, the holistic consciousness is composed of primordial consciousness and consciousness. This can be understood in the context of knowledge that holistic *ch'i* is differentiated into *li* and *ch'i*.

in duality in speaking of the relationship of nature and emotions, or substance and function in terms of humanity: humanity is "the character of the mind and the principle of love (*hsin chih te, ai chih li*). " Chu Hsi's ulterior motive here is to cope with two kinds of quite popular but serious distortions of the meaning of humanity among the Ch'engs' students. The cause of the distortion was a misunderstanding about the tension between substance and function: "duality in unity and unity in duality," or "differentiated-but-inseparable."

The first distortion was that made by Yang Shih (1053-1135) in generalizing the concept of humanity, substance, as forming one body with things and the self, while refusing to regard love (function) as humanity (substance). In Chu Hsi's opinion, the problem in this conception of humanity lies in confining the definition of humanity to substance, or *wei-fa*. His argument seems to be twofold. First, the mere fact that each human being is endowed with humanity, the character of the mind, which stands for the unity of subject and object, does not mean that one has already realized the ideal in actuality. Instead, the ideal is accomplished when each human being puts love into practice in actual life, since love is the expression of humanity. Secondly, forming one body with things and the self does not mean that the self is identical with things; instead, it means obliterating any artificial distinction between the self and things which is caused by selfishness.

Chu Hsi maintains that Yang Shih's generalized conception of humanity, first of all, is dangerous because it will cause people to have a vague and confused idea of the meaning of humanity, since confining the meaning of humanity to substance will lead them to neglect the practice of morality in actual life by giving them the false sense that they have already accomplished humanity. And secondly, this generalization might mislead people into thinking that the self and things are undifferentiated (identical), and into forgetting that the self and things are inseparable but differentiated, or duality in unity and unity in duality.

The second distortion, that made by Hsieh Liang-tso (1050-c.1120), was to specifically define humanity, substance, as consciousness, function,⁵⁸ while refusing to regard love (function) as humanity (substance). This misconception about humanity originates in a superficial understanding of the Ch'engs' idea of humanity.

As discussed in the previous chapter, Ch'eng I equated [primordial] consciousness with nature, and with humanity.⁵⁹ Meanwhile, Ch'eng Hao also implicitly equated consciousness with humanity in that he referred to the active and holistic

⁵⁸. As analyzed above, in Chu Hsi the concept of consciousness has two connotations: the first one means the holistic one, which refers to the essential characteristic of human existence; and the second one refers to the cognitive one, which is *i-fa*. What Chu Hsi criticizes here is identifying humanity, substance, with the latter one, the functional aspect of consciousness, or *i-fa*.

⁵⁹. See chapter two, 95.

state of the mind with humanity. In this, he was influenced by a medical theory which explained paralysis as non-humanity (*pu-jen*).⁶⁰ However, Ch'eng I defined humanity only in terms of substance, while Ch'eng Hao's definition included substance and function. Presumably these ideas, especially Ch'eng Hao's, led Hsieh Liang-tso to define humanity as "the consciousness of pain or itching."⁶¹

In Chu Hsi's opinion, Hsieh Liang Tso's misconception is threefold. First, he confused function with substance by identifying humanity with consciousness. As discussed above, there is a consensus among Neo-Confucian thinkers that what humanity refers to is not so much a concept as consciousness, the active and holistic characteristic of human existence. Chu Hsi thinks that this holistic consciousness is differentiated into primordial consciousness and consciousness, *wei-fa* and *i-fa*, or substance and function. Therefore, it can be said that humanity can be defined as consciousness but not vice versa, because humanity refers to substance, that is, primordial consciousness. In this context, Chu Hsi points out that "originally, humanity consists in consciousness, but it is not permitted to say that consciousness is humanity."⁶²

The reason he believes consciousness is not always the defining characteristic of humanity seems to related to the

⁶⁰. See chapter two, 110.

⁶¹. *Jen shih shih t'ung-yang*, *STYL* (*Shang-ts'ai yü-lu*) B.43.

⁶². *CTYL* 6.118.

potentiality of evil, since function is the realm associated with *ch'i*. Chu Hsi seems to be conscious of the problem with Hsieh Liang-tso's remark that "humanity is the consciousness of pain and itching," which in his opinion, went too far identifying private or selfish consciousness with humanity.

The third mistake Hsieh Liang-tso made was that of self-contradiction. Humanity, as discussed above, is described as expressing itself in love, or the loving mind, consciousness. In other words, love, that which points to the presence of humanity, is held to be another form of consciousness. Chu Hsi believes that Hsieh Liang-tso, despite the fact that he confines the meaning of humanity to function, did not realize that love, consciousness, is the function of humanity. Therefore, Chu Hsi holds that, first, this kind of idea is dangerous because it means that humanity is deprived of substance, the foundation of morality, and this would again cause people to lose a sense of clarity about moral purpose in actual life. Secondly, he thinks that this idea entails the danger of identifying humanity with selfish desires and personal sensations, which are also forms of consciousness. He implies that this misconception of humanity, in the final analysis, originated in ignorance, first, that consciousness is differentiated into substance and function, and second, that in consciousness substance and function maintain a relationship, always in tension, of duality in unity and unity in duality. In his "Trea-

tise on Humanity,"⁶³ Chu Hsi argues:

Someone said: According to your explanation, is it not wrong for Master Ch'eng to say that love is emotion while humanity is nature and that love should not be regarded as humanity? *Answer:* Not so. What Master Ch'eng criticized was the application of humanity to the expression of love. What I maintain is that humanity should be applied to the principle of love. For although the spheres of man's nature and emotions are different, their mutual penetration is like the blood system in which each part has its own relationship. When have they become sharply separated and been made to have nothing to do with each other? I was just now worrying about students' reciting Master Ch'eng's words without inquiring into their meaning, and thereby coming to talk about humanity as clearly apart from love. I have therefore purposely talked about this to reveal the hidden meaning of Master Ch'eng's words, and you regard my ideas as different from his. Are you not mistaken?....Some [notably Yang Shih, 1053-1135] say that love is not humanity and regard the unity of all things and the self as humanity, while others [notably Hsieh Liang-tso, 1050-c. 1120] maintain that love is not humanity but explain humanity in terms of the possession of consciousness by the mind....From what they call the unity of all things with the self, it can be seen that humanity involves love for all, but unity is not the reality that makes humanity a substance. From the way they regard the mind as the possession of consciousness, it can be seen that humanity includes wisdom, but that is not the real reason why humanity is so called....To talk about humanity in general terms of the unity of things and the self will lead people to be vague, confused, neglectful, and make no effort to be alert. The bad effect--and there has been one--may be to consider other things as oneself. To talk about humanity in specific terms of consciousness will lead people to be nervous, irascible, and devoid of any quality of depth. The bad effect--and there has been one--may be to consider [selfish] desire as principle. In one case, [the mind] forgets [its objective]. In the other, [there is artificial effort to] help [it grow]. Both are

⁶³. CTTC 67.20a-21b.

wrong.⁶⁴

In reality, however, the smooth flow of morality from substance to function, or the unity of nature and emotions, is not always maintained. Just as in Chang Tsai's thought there was a significant gap between the ideal and reality, so is there in Chu Hsi's thought, between his accounting for substance and function, or primordial consciousness and consciousness. In other words, as the terms "previous image" (in a mirror) and "discrepancy" in feeling of morality imply, there exists the possibility of evil in Chu Hsi's philosophy.⁶⁵ In fact, in primordial consciousness, or in the realm of substance, there is absolutely no discrepancy between what is felt and what feels, since *ch'i*, the traditional factor of evil, is excluded there. But, in consciousness, which is the combination of *li* and *ch'i*, there could be discrepancies between what is felt and what feels,⁶⁶ thereby causing duality of substance and function. This possibility, or in a sense, reality, prompts Chu Hsi to revise his concept of the Ultimate

⁶⁴. Modified from Chan, *Sourcebook*, 595 and *Chu Hsi: New Studies*, 154-5.

⁶⁵. As this use of "previous image" implies, Chu Hsi, like Ch'eng Hao, attributes the cause of subject and object separation to a factor involving the self: selfishness.

⁶⁶. This might be one of the reasons why Chu Hsi holds that the combination of *li* and *ch'i* constitute consciousness. When Chang Tsai held that Void plus *ch'i* constitute human nature, he did not mean Void and *ch'i* were two separate things; he meant that they were two aspects of holistic *ch'i*, and also that the aspect of *ch'i* was the possible cause of evil in human nature. The meaning of Chu Hsi's formulation of consciousness, which is obviously a variation of Chang's idea, is illuminated in this context.

reality.

As discussed above, for Chu Hsi the Ultimate reality is the mind, holistic *ch'i*, which includes nature and emotions, *wei-fa* and *i-fa*, namely, substance and function. With this concept of the mind, Chu Hsi, as seen above, envisions a world in which the value of the Ultimate reality permeates through the unblocked transition of inborn morality from nature to emotions, something that is beyond clear description. In this sense, Chu Hsi observes that "*T'ai-chi* means the subtlety of the Ultimate reality (*pen-jan*),"⁶⁷ or "*T'ai-chi* refers to the subtlety of the nature-emotions relationship."⁶⁸ Chu Hsi's rationale behind this idea of the Ultimate reality is his belief that the mind is provided with the myriad principles, so that each human being is able to realize Tao, humanity, by enlarging (*t'ui*) the mind, the great substance (*ta-pen*).⁶⁹ In this sense, Chu Hsi observes that "for anyone who has realized humanity, principle is the mind, and the mind is principle."⁷⁰ Obviously, the concept of principle here is inclusive of substance and function, or *li* and *ch'i*, since "the mind"

⁶⁷. *T'ai-chi che pen-jan chih miao yeh*, CTTC 45.12a.

⁶⁸. *T'ai-chi che hsing-ch'ing chih miao yeh*, *ibid.*, 42.13a. From this, one can see clearly that for Chu Hsi the Ultimate reality is the mind, which encompasses the subtle relationship between nature and emotions.

⁶⁹. *Tzu ta-pen erh, t'ui chih ta tao erh*, CTYL 114.2763.

⁷⁰. *Jen-che, li chi-shih hsin, hsin chi-shih li*, *ibid.*, 37.985. In *ibid.*, 5.85., Chu Hsi has a different expression: "the mind and principle are unity (*hsin yü li i*)."

refers to the holistic state of *ch'i*. In this extended or enlarged state of the Ultimate reality, one can discern a harmonious relationship between substance and function. This is perhaps the reason why this state is in other contexts called Harmony (*ho*), which for Chu Hsi means "duality in unity and unity in duality," or that substance and function are "differentiated-but-inseparable."

However, when, due to the evil influence which Chu Hsi ascribes to a subjective cause associated with *ch'i*, duality between substance and function prevails, the mind cannot assert its holistic integrity. This imposition of a dualistic concept results in the definition of the Ultimate reality being limited to the other aspect of the mind, that is, nature, or substance. As seen above, this aspect of the mind, characterized by Equilibrium (*chung*), *wei-fa*, and primordial consciousness, is believed to be not inherent in the mind but acquired from macrocosm. Referring to this Ultimate reality, Chu Hsi states that "nature is principle (*hsing chi li*)," or "nature is the principle of the mind,"⁷¹ which he also expresses as "*t'ai-chi* is the principle of the mind."⁷² Summing up this idea, Chu Hsi maintains that "nature is the entirety of *t'ai-chi*, the Ultimate reality."⁷³ It goes without saying

⁷¹. *Hsing-che hsin chih li yeh*, *ibid.*, 5.89.

⁷². *Hsin chih li shih t'ai-chi*, *ibid.*, 5.84.

⁷³. *Hsing shih t'ai-chi hun-jan chih t'i*. See "Reply to Ch'en Ch'i-chih," *CTTC* 58.21a.

that the concept of principle here incorporates the notion of substance, or *li*, in holistic *ch'i*.

From our discussion of Chu Hsi's concept of the Ultimate reality centering on *wei-fa* and *i-fa*, one can see the legacy of the Ch'engs' concepts of nature and the mind, which represent the conflict between deduction and holism, *li* and Change, or continuity and independence. Accommodating this conflict into his idea of substance and function in the mind, Chu Hsi seems to envision an inevitable tension in the understanding of the Ultimate reality: duality in unity and unity in duality, or differentiated-but-inseparability.

This tension is also felt in Chu Hsi's idea of moral cultivation, which is predicated on the Ch'engs' idea. Finding the origin of evil to be in sensory stimuli, namely, in *i-fa*, Ch'eng I, in theory, confined self-cultivation to *wei-fa*, with a view toward fending off those stimuli. But in actuality he proposed the investigation of principle in things as a concrete guide to self-cultivation. Meanwhile, ascribing the origin of evil to the self, Ch'eng Hao emphasized self examination, to the effect of reminding the forgetful mind of its innate morality and capacity, as a proper approach to moral cultivation. However, both of them directed moral cultivation toward the realization of humanity, which was conditioned on no-self, no-selfishness, and based the realization of humanity on the exercise of seriousness (*ching*).

As explained above, for Chu Hsi, in principle, there is

no need to worry about sensory stimuli in cognition, because for him cognition does not occur through sensory stimuli. Instead he has in mind Ch'eng Hao's ideal of *ch'eng-wu* and *liang-wang*. Cognition for Chu Hsi is the occasion through which the inborn morality is transmitted to the outer world in the form of emotions. Therefore, it can be said that a successful transmission of morality in Chu Hsi is very much dependent upon the purity of the "transmitter." In this context, one can understand why Chu Hsi attributes the cause of evil to subjective factors, to which he assigns symbols such as "previous image" and "dust and dirt"⁷⁴ in a mirror.

Ch'eng Hao's concept of seriousness lives on in Chu Hsi's idea of moral cultivation. Therefore, put differently, before it collects "dust and dirt," the only thing the "transmitter" is required to do is to preserve its original state. Chu Hsi calls this effort of the self "seriousness," saying that "[the entirety of] the mind and nature can be always preserved, only if one exercises seriousness."⁷⁵ And, this self effort, or "seriousness is none other than to awaken (*huan-hsing*) this mind."⁷⁶ In other words, exercising seriousness, according to Chu Hsi, consists in "checking" (*tien-chien*) the storage place

⁷⁴. *Ch'en-kou chih pi*. See "Reply to Wang Tzu-ho," *CTTC* 49.9b.

⁷⁵. *Jen chih hsin-hsing, ching tse ch'ang-ts'un, pu ching tse pu ts'un*, *CTYL* 12.210.

⁷⁶. *Ching fei pieh shih i-shih, Ch'ang huan-hsing tz'u-hsin pien shih*, *ibid.*, 6.114.

of the inborn moral endowment,⁷⁷ which humanity represents, to make sure it is intact. Therefore, in Chu Hsi's opinion, exercising seriousness of itself involves the fulfillment of humanity.⁷⁸

The exercise of seriousness bears a seeming similarity to *Ch'an*, or Zen meditation, which is otherwise called Quiet-Sitting. Chu Hsi argues that seriousness does not refer to sitting rigidly without motion (*k'uai-jan wu-tso*), cutting off all sensory stimuli.⁷⁹ Certainly, he continues to argue, while sharing an introspective method (*hsiang-li ju-shen*) with Quiet-Sitting, on a deeper level seriousness is quite different from *Ch'an* meditation,⁸⁰ because exercising seriousness is an effort to go deep into the matrix of morality, incessant life activity. In order to account for the difference between seriousness and Quiet-Sitting, Chu Hsi turns to Ch'eng I, who insisted on establishing concrete guidelines, or a program for

⁷⁷. *Ibid.*, 9.153.

⁷⁸. *Ching tse, jen tsai ch'i chung i, ibid.*, 6.122.
The concept of seriousness leads Chu Hsi to speak in terms of what might be described as the core of Neo-Confucian spirituality: no-selfishness, no-self. In *ibid.*, 6.117., Chu Hsi explains humanity, arguing "humanity is preceded by (*ch'ien-shih*) no-selfishness, and followed by (*hou-shih*) forming one body with the things and the self." And, in *ibid.*, 29.754., 29. 750., 35.922., and in *CTTC* 47.4b., Chu Hsi describes the character of the sage, Confucius, as no-selfishness and no-self (*sheng-jen wu-szu [ta-kung] wu-wo*). From this, one can clearly see that Chu Hsi, inheriting the ideas of Chang Tsai and the Ch'engs, assigns the ultimate value in moral cultivation to "no-self," or "enlarged self."

⁷⁹. *CTYL* 12.211.

⁸⁰. *Ibid.*, 18.415.

exercising seriousness, to avoid unnecessary confusion with Buddhism. Chu Hsi says:

Question: Could you explain the meaning of "Self-cultivation requires seriousness; the pursuit of learning depends on the extension of knowledge?"
Answer: Self-cultivation and the extension of knowledge are inseparable (*p'ien-fei pu-te*); the extension of knowledge must be predicated on self-cultivation; self-cultivation should depend on the extension of knowledge.⁸¹

And:

Self-cultivation (*han-yang*) is concerned with *wei-fa*, while investigation of principles and things (*ch'iung-ko*) is concerned with *i-fa*.⁸²

As the above passages indicate, Chu Hsi's basic framework of substance and function, or *wei-fa* and *i-fa*, shapes his idea of moral cultivation as well. He believes that self-cultivation, or exercising seriousness, should be predicated on an objective program which would include the extension of knowledge (*chih-chih*), the investigation of things (*ko-wu*),⁸³ and the investigation of principle (*ch'iung-li*). To be more specific, according to Chu Hsi, self-cultivation means self-effort in stillness (*ching kung-fu*), which aims at Equilibrium

⁸¹. *Ibid.*, 18.403.

⁸². *Ibid.*

⁸³. As to his definition of the "investigation of things," Chu Hsi observes that it is concerned with probing into the Four Beginnings (*ssu-tuan*), the manifestation of principle, to arrive at principle itself (*ibid.*, 53.1287.). And he thinks the investigation of things is dependent on the extension of knowledge, since the former centers on principle, while the latter centers on the mind. In other words, for him the extension of knowledge means to extend knowledge acquired in the investigation of things to the utmost, to arrive at principle. See *ibid.*, 15.292.

(chung), while examination and investigation (hsing-ch'a) refer to the self-effort in movement or activity (tung kung-fu), which culminates in Harmony (ho).⁸⁴ Chu Hsi thinks that they--exercising seriousness (chü-ching) and investigation of principle (ch'iung-li)--are inseparable in moral cultivation.

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The rationale behind Chu Hsi's idea of mutual dependence between self-cultivation and an objective program is based on two levels of reasoning. First of all, he argues that in theory there is no distinction between the self and things, since the myriad things are the manifestation of principle. The only difference is that principle in the self is called nature, while principle in things is called principle; in other words, nature is principle.⁸⁶

This reasoning provides him with the basis for his second argument. On this account, he says, there is no need for the self to be introverted to find out principle, risking confusion with Buddhism. Principle is manifest in every mode of being; and human mind, an embodiment of principle, is endowed with the capacity to grasp principle in things.⁸⁷ In this

⁸⁴. *Ibid.*, 62.1517.

⁸⁵. *Liang-hsiang tou pu hsiang-li*, *ibid.*, 9.149.

⁸⁶. *Hsing chi li yeh*, *tsai-jen huan-tso hsing*, *tsai-shih huan-tso li*, *ibid.*, 5.82.

⁸⁷. Chu Hsi does not confine the object of the investigation of principle to principle in things (*tsai wai chih li*); he thinks to pursue the best moral value in a given situation (*ch'iu ch'u chih-tang*) is the investigation of principle. See *ibid.*, 30.776.

case, principle in things is substance, while human mind is its function, since principle in things is known through human mind:

Principle is universally inherent in the myriad things. But it is human mind that takes charge of it. Being in charge, the mind therefore makes uses of it. Considering this, it can be said that the substance of principle resides in things but its function depends on the mind....In speaking this way, I was taking the self as the [knowing] subject (*chu*) and taking things as objects (*k'o*). Simply put, my idea is that principle in things is identical with principle in the self.⁸⁸

From this discussion of Chu Hsi's idea of moral cultivation, which centers on the concept of seriousness, one can again observe a tension arising from the conflict between the holism of *wei-fa* plus *i-fa* and *wei-fa*. In other words, with seriousness, Chu Hsi on the one hand has in mind Ch'eng Hao's idea of holism, and on the other hand advocates Ch'eng I's *wei-fa*, which is dependent on an objective guideline, *i-fa*. Chu Hsi, as we have already seen, wants to preserve the tension between *wei-fa* and *i-fa*, associated respectively with self-cultivation and an objective program, by emphasizing the mutuality of their relationship.⁸⁹ However, his propensity to intellectualize thwarts this intention:

Question: Which has priority between the extension

⁸⁸. *Ibid.*, 18.416.

⁸⁹. In *ibid.*, 115.2777., Chu Hsi, in the manner of Ch'eng Hao, argues that they are "simultaneous (*i-shih ping liao*).\" In *ibid.*, 119.2879., Chu Hsi also observes that "inner and outer should be mutually nurtured (*hsü shih nei-wai chiao-hsiang yang*).\"

of knowledge and self-cultivation? Answer: I think the extension of knowledge should have priority over self-cultivation.⁹⁰

The dissolving of tension is also seen in Chu hsi's idea of the Ultimate reality. As discussed above, Chu Hsi's concept of *t'ai-chi*, the Ultimate reality, refers, on the one hand, to nature, *wei-fa*, and, on the other hand, to the mind, *i-fa*. With this idea, Chu Hsi implied a tension in the Ultimate reality which is embodied in "duality in unity and unity in duality" between nature and the mind. However, Chu Hsi's intellectual propensity causes this tension to dissipate.

Remember that Chu Hsi asserted that nature is ineffable, and the best way to understand the nature-mind relationship is through experience. What really prompts this observation is his belief that the existence of nature can only be hypothesized. He maintains that "It is wrong to imagine nature to be a concrete thing existing inside. Nature only stands for a standard principle (*li so tang-jan*) in a given situation. In other words, the way each human being is originally required to perform refers to nature."⁹¹ Because nature can only be spoken of hypothetically, Chu Hsi thinks each human being can put morality into practice in a given situation, or morality

⁹⁰. *Ibid.*, 9.152. This propensity to intellectualize is also obvious in the question of the order to be assigned among "the investigation of principle (*ch'iung-li*)," "the realization of nature (*chin-hsing*)," and "the fulfillment of the Mandate (*chih-yü ming*)."⁹¹ Chu Hsi agrees with Ch'eng I: basically, order cannot be applied to them (*pu-k'o i tz'u-hsü yen*), but still the order is inevitable (*ch'üeh yu tz'u-ti*). See *ibid.*, 77.1969.

⁹¹. *Ibid.*, 60.1426.

in reality can be explained. In other words, for Chu Hsi, nature is logically postulated from the presence of the mind of *i-fa*, emotions. For this reason, the mind is described as the beginning (*tuan*) or as a clue (*hsü*).⁹² Chu Hsi's idea is that the mind is the beginning of a string called morality, from which one can arrive at the other end, the origin or substance of morality and being. And this substance, he thinks, is beyond explanation.⁹³

Despite this basic belief in the ineffability of nature, Chu Hsi contradicts himself by relying on the power of language to account for its existence, and he uses a number of similes and metaphors to define it.⁹⁴ He clearly knows that language is not an ideal method to use. But without making use of it, he argues, there is no way to clarify one's understanding. He was once asked:

You once said that nature is principle. However, originally there is no such thing (*pen wu shih-wu*). Now you talk as if nature is a thing by comparing it to a jewel. Answer: That comparison is no good.
⁹⁵

And:

⁹². *Tuan*, *hsü yeh*, *ibid.*, 53.1285.

⁹³. *Pu jung shuo ch'u, chi shih hsing chih pen-t'i*, *CTTC* 46.12b.

⁹⁴. Chu Hsi uses metaphors such as sunshine (*yüeh-kuang*, *ibid.*, 4.58.), fire (*i-t'uan huo*, *ibid.*, 4.76.), water (*shui*, *ibid.*, 18.411.), jewel (*pao-chu*, *ibid.*, 74.1898.), and seed (*ku-chung*, *ibid.*, 95.2837).

⁹⁵. *Ibid.*, 74.1898.

You once said that nature cannot be compared to a thing. What do you think about the comparison of nature to water by Ming-tao? Answer: If you compare nature this way and that way, there might be a problem after all. But without comparison, you cannot understand it clearly.⁹⁶

The reason Chu Hsi is so intent on defining nature in this way is to provide human beings with the "stuff" of morality by making nature, what he believes to be the source of morality, substantial. Therefore, seen from the point of view of nature, the mind becomes rather insubstantial (*hsü*), because it has to depend on nature for its substance, just as a dumpling depends on stuffing for substance.⁹⁷

By relying repeatedly on the use of metaphor to advance his argument concerning the definition of nature, Chu Hsi made an enormous sacrifice: the tension between nature and the mind --"duality in unity and unity in duality"--was lost, and duality alone came to be asserted. And thereby nature became something substantial and great, as Ch'eng I once called it, while the mind came to be viewed as insubstantial and secondary to nature. The loss of this tension resulted in two misconceptions about Chu Hsi's philosophy in the history of Confucianism.

The first one is the characterization of Chu Hsi's philosophy, together with that of Ch'eng I', as the study of

⁹⁶. *Ibid.*, 95.2429.

⁹⁷. *Hsin shih hsü-te wu, hsing shih li-mien sui-tu hsien-ts'ao, ibid.*, 60.1426.

nature-principle (*hsing-li hsüeh*).⁹⁸ As discussed throughout this chapter, the essence of Chu Hsi's moral philosophy lies in the tension between nature and the mind, representing *li* and the holistic *ch'i* respectively. Therefore, should one characterize Chu Hsi's philosophy, it would be closer to Chu Hsi's intention to call it the study of mind-nature (*hsin-hsing hsüeh*) or the study of mind-principle (*hsin-li hsüeh*), a distinction not apparent because of this misunderstanding of the dynamic relationship he posited between nature and the mind. The reason Chu Hsi was placed in the same category as Ch'eng I seems to be that in the wake of this loss of tension, Chu Hsi's idea of nature appeared to be very similar to what Ch'eng I believed, that nature is bigger than the mind.⁹⁹ Looking from a different perspective, this misconception can be said to represent the intellectual or deductive aspect of Chu Hsi's philosophy, which Ch'eng I also shared.

It was Wang Yang-ming (1472-1529) who recognized the

⁹⁸. As implied throughout this chapter, it is an obvious mistake to categorize Chu Hsi's philosophy with Ch'eng I's. Rigorously speaking, Ch'eng I's philosophy is, just as Chang Tsai's is, a failure, in that he theoretically evaporated the self by relegating the mind, the anchor of the self, to function.

⁹⁹. But, unlike Ch'eng I, for Chu Hsi this misconception is caused by the loss of recognition of the tension between ineffability and effability with respect to nature. As this tension was lost and primacy given to effability, in the same way recognition of the tension between nature and the mind was lost, and thereby nature has become an abstract concept, which Chu Hsi never intended. Because, as the concept of primordial consciousness implies, nature for Chu Hsi is not so much an abstract concept as something intimate. Chu Hsi maintains that nature and principle should be understood as something "active" (*huo p'o p'o ti*, CTTC 48.5b.) or something "alive" (*tang huo k'an*, CTYL 5.84.).

importance of the study of mind-principle in Chu Hsi, which led him to write "Master Chu's Final Conclusions," to justify his own idea of the mind.¹⁰⁰ But Wang Yang-ming did not realize that Chu Hsi's concept of principle refers not to holism but to substance. In other words, he only understood the other half of Chu Hsi's philosophy, that is, the experiential and holistic aspect which the mind represents.

In sum, Chu Hsi, while acknowledging himself that there are limits to the capacity language has to account for the relationship between nature and the mind (that comprises the core of his philosophy), relied too much upon it, with the result that far greater emphasis and attention came to be given to that which could be captured in language, and recognition of his belief in the importance of being mindful that genuine philosophic inquiry involved a dynamic between that which could be spoken of, and that which could not, was lost, and the tension he posted between nature and the mind, or intellect and experience, came to be disregarded. It seems that his elaborate reasoning and masterly command of language were so imprinted on the minds of readers of Confucian philosophy that Chu Hsi, contrary to his intention, has ended up being categorized as an intellectualist.

Despite his elaborate and meticulous logic, which, as far

¹⁰⁰. For detailed information, see Chan, *Chu Hsi: New Studies*, 462-469.

as the major issues in Neo-Confucian moral philosophy are concerned, did not leave anything unaccounted for, Chu Hsi's thought reveals two notable logical inconsistencies. One is his concept of *t'ai-chi*;¹⁰¹ the other is his idea concerning the active characteristic of nature. Chu Hsi holds, on the one hand, that nature has activity (*tung*),¹⁰² and on the other hand, that nature does not have activity (*pu-tung*).¹⁰³ This particular inconsistency, if anything, seems to involve of another manifestation of tension which should be recognized as inevitable in Chu Hsi's philosophy.

As mentioned above, Chu Hsi was particularly careful not to relegate nature to an abstract concept. The impetus behind his positing of tension between nature and the mind might have been to ensure that nature, *li*, so prone to conceptualization, did not recede into abstraction, by virtue of being linked to the mind, holistic and active *ch'i*. Through the concept of "silent realization" of what is bestowed to the mind, one can

¹⁰¹. As seen above with *t'ai-chi*, the Ultimate reality, Chu Hsi referred to both *wei-fa* and *i-fa*, or nature and the mind. But he contradicts himself by holding that "originally, *wei-fa* cannot be called *t'ai-chi*." See CTYL 94.2369.

¹⁰². Upon being asked which one has activity, between the mind and nature, Chu Hsi says that "the location of activity (*tung-ch'u*) is the mind, while that which has activity (*tung-te*) is nature." See *ibid.*, 5.88. And also in CTC 56.34a., Chu Hsi argues that "humanity refers to activity (*jen pien shih tung*)."

¹⁰³. "Nature and emotions are unity. But nature does not have activity, while emotions are the location of activity (*hsing-ch'ing tse i*, *hsing shih pu-tung*, *ch'ing shih tung-ch'u*)." See CTYL 5.96. And also in *ibid.*, 5.93., Chu Hsi says that "Nature does not have activity, while emotions have activity (*hsing shih wei-tung*, *ch'ing shih i-tung*)."

account for the intimacy of nature, since even in the pulse and heartbeat one can feel of nature's presence. However, when it comes to defining nature, that is, deducing it from macrocosm, it is difficult not to describe nature in term of a concept, which is neither intimate nor does it have activity.

With this analysis in mind, let us see how Chu Hsi's pursuit of the Ultimate reality is extended into the realm of macrocosm, thereby achieving Chu Hsi's ideal of "duality in unity and unity in duality," even between macrocosm and microcosm, where Chu Hsi has already implied symmetry exists.

Chapter Four: Holistic *Ch'i*, *Wu-chi*, and its principle,
T'ai-chi.

Originally, defining the relationship of yin-yang and *t'ai-chi* of itself involves difficulty.¹

And:

If only you can manage to speak it out with language (*yü-yen*), you can understand it. Just observing a lot of things is no better than not even paying attention to them....But don't be ambiguous; you have to be mindful of the clear definition of a name (*ming-i cho-lo*).

Chu Hsi's pursuit of the Ultimate reality which begins with an exploration of mental processes, turns later to an exploration of the universal principles of macrocosm, or "the big man," as he refers to it.² He aims at defining the "duality in unity and unity in duality," that is, the essential characteristic of micro holistic *ch'i* in relation to macro

¹. *Yin-yang t'ai-chi chih chien, pen tzu nan hsia-yü*. See "Reply to Wu Hui-shu," CTTC 42.12b. According to Chu Hsi's recollection, his interest in probing the principle governing the world began in his childhood: "From the age of five or six, I had been vexed by Tao: What is there beyond the world (*t'ien-ti ssu-pien*)? Upon hearing that the world was limitless, I thought that there might be a limit (*chin-ch'u*). Just like this wall, beyond which is something. Vexed so much by this problem, I almost fell ill at that time." See CTYL 94.2377.

². He referred to Heaven as "big man," while man was "small Heaven." see P.133, footnote #20. Chu Hsi's ideas about the outer world, which his study of *I Ching* represents, were developed later than those about the inner world (the mind and nature), which began to take final form when he was about 40 years old. According to Chu Po-k'un, Chu Hsi's two major writings about *I Ching*: *Chou-i pen-i*, *The original meaning of the Chou-i* and *I-hsüeh ch'i-meng*, *A primer on the Change* were finished when he was 47 and 56 years old, respectively. See *I-hsüeh*, 2.426.

holistic *ch'i*. In other words, he tries to attribute the cause of that tension in human existence to the tension that characterizes the macrocosm. Chu Hsi's conception of this "big man" was largely motivated by a need to resolve the problems in Ch'eng I's dualistic definition of holistic *ch'i*. When Chu Hsi resolved Ch'eng I's problematic definition of the mind by theorizing that it is composed of holistic *ch'i*, the characteristics of which are determined by the tension between duality and unity in it, at the same time he found a way to explain the workings of holistic *ch'i* as a universal principle in the macrocosm. However, just as Chu Hsi's idea that it was the tension between "duality in unity and unity in duality" which characterized holistic *ch'i* was not given sufficient emphasis with respect to his definition of the mind, it was also not given sufficient emphasis with respect to his idea of the macrocosm. In both instances, the fundamental problem of how to account in language for the unaccountable, ineffable aspects of reality is responsible. Chu Hsi's thought differs from Ch'eng I's in the following ways.

The major difference between Chu Hsi and Ch'eng I's idea is their differing concepts of the Ultimate reality. Ch'eng I represented the substance of holistic *ch'i*, that is, *li*, as the Ultimate reality, while Chu Hsi assumes that the Ultimate reality consists in the tension between holistic *ch'i* and its substance. The second difference between Chu Hsi and Ch'eng I is their differing terms for the Ultimate reality. Ch'eng I

represented the Ultimate reality as *li*, while Chu Hsi represents it as *t'ai-chi*.

Chu Hsi believed Ch'eng I's fundamental problem, which was responsible for the above conception of the Ultimate reality, to be his ideational approach to holistic *ch'i*, which divides holistic *ch'i* into *li* and *ch'i*, thereby positing a deductive order of *li-ch'i*, which stands for "above form," or substance, over "below form," or function. However, Chu Hsi realizes that, although it robs *li* and *ch'i* of their holistic context, the ideational approach, or deduction, is useful in that it can account for phenomena, "below form," by deriving them from "above form," substance. Chu Hsi represents the Ultimate reality, the deductive point which is secured by the ideational approach, as the *t'ai-chi* of effability.

Chu Hsi realizes that the only way to correct the defect involved in deduction is to restore *li* and *ch'i* to their original holistic matrix, namely, pan-*ch'i*ism, whose essential characteristic lies in the unceasing activity of *ch'i* and the ensuing *ch'i-li* order.³ However, this activity-oriented approach to holistic *ch'i*, Chu Hsi thinks, is also defective in that it cannot account for the genesis of the myriad things theoretically. Chu Hsi represents this holistic Ultimate reality as the *t'ai-chi* of ineffability, or *wu-chi*.

In short, Chu Hsi thinks that with *t'ai-chi* alone,

³. The *ch'i-li* order, as will be seen, means that the activity of *ch'i* has *li*, orderliness, as its property.

although phenomena can be accounted for, the idea of the holistic and active characteristic of the Ultimate reality can not be. But, with *wu-chi* alone, although the holistic and active characteristic of the Ultimate reality can be preserved, it is impossible to explain the genesis of phenomena. This is the nature of the tension involved in "ineffable but still effable (*wu-chi erh t'ai-chi*)" with regard to the Ultimate reality as discussed in this chapter.

Ch'eng I resorted to a dialectic--one that ultimately proved unsatisfactory--in order to emphasize the holistic-but-distinctive relationship between substance and function, *li* and *ch'i*. Chu Hsi, in addition to "duality in unity and unity in duality," and "differentiated-but-inseparability" also described it as: "When there is *li*, there is *ch'i*; when there is *ch'i*, there is *li* (*yu li tse yu ch'i, yu ch'i tse yu li*)."
It is "extended from the bottom up, extended from the top down (*tzu-hsia t'ui erh shang ch'ü, tzu-shang t'ui erh hsia lai*)."

This chapter, in which I examine the nature and inevitability of the concept of holistic *ch'i*, which is the basis of Chu Hsi's notion of Ultimate reality, is divided into two parts. In the first half, I will discuss Chu Hsi's idea of the Ultimate reality as ineffable, or *wu-chi*. In the second half, I will discuss his idea of the Ultimate reality as effable, or *t'ai-chi*. Then I will show how recognition of the tension he posited between *wu-chi* and *t'ai-chi* was lost as a result of the difficulty inherent in accounting through language for

this relationship.

As discussed in the previous chapter, Chu Hsi shares with Ch'eng I an ideational interpretation of holistic *ch'i*, the fundamental feature of which is the deductive order posited from *li* to *ch'i*, which was justified by the definition of them as "above form" and "below form," respectively. This idea underlies Ch'eng I's well-known phrase: "Unity of principle and its various manifestations." Ch'eng I's idea is that "below form," *ch'i*, is the manifestation of "above form," *li*.

However, one conspicuous change in Chu Hsi's conception of this idea of transcendental immanence is that he wants to give consideration not only to the *li-ch'i* order but also to the reversed order of *ch'i-li*. Chu Hsi says:

Yin-yang is *ch'i*. If there is this *li*, there is this *ch'i*; if there is this *ch'i*, there is this *li*. [Among] the myriad things and the myriad transformations on Heaven and Earth, is there anything which does not derive from this *li*? is there anything which does not derive from yin-yang?⁴

What then is Chu Hsi's idea behind this juxtaposition? Before exploring this issue, let us recapitulate what went wrong with Ch'eng I's interpretation of holistic *ch'i*.

As discussed above, Ch'eng I's thinking was marred by parochialism, in that he regarded only nature as the embodiment of macrocosm, which meant that ultimately the anchor of the self, the mind, was lost as it was relegated to cognitive

⁴. CTYL 65.1607.

function alone. It is not hard to see that this parochialism, in the final analysis, originated in his ideational approach to holistic *ch'i*, pan-*ch'iism*, which differentiated "below form" from "above form," and thereby regarded only the latter as the Ultimate reality. As a result, a hierarchy was created between them, namely, that of *li* and *ch'i*. Sensing a potential problem of bifurcation in this view of pan-*ch'iism*, Ch'eng I used a dialectical explanation of "independence," "dependence," and "priority" to bridge the gap between *li* and *ch'i*, to no avail.

Though sharing with Ch'eng I a propensity to intellectualize, Chu Hsi appears to have seen the limitations and danger involved, namely that Ch'eng I's ideational interpretation might lead to a loss of recognition of *ch'i*'s holistic character. It appears that Chu Hsi blames Ch'eng I's dualistic definition for his mispresentation of the meaning "above form" and "below form," the two distinctive-but-inseparable features in pan-*ch'iism*. As Chu Hsi explains them:

[As to] "above form" and "below form" [in pan-*ch'iism*], they are just the distinctions (*fen-pieh*) made between the separation and union (*li-ho*) [of the holistic *ch'i*] from the standpoint of form (*hsing-ch'u*); They exactly refer to the demarcation (*chieh-chih*). If just said to be above (*tsai-shang*) and below (*tsai-hsia*), then they become two separate pieces (*liang-chieh*).⁵

In this passage, Chu Hsi effectively expresses the essential point of pan-*ch'iism*. First of all, he believes that it

⁵. CTYL 94.2369.

accounts for continuity of being between "above form" and "below form," and he implies that the concept of holistic *ch'i* underlies the distinction. Chu Hsi appears to think that the distinction of "above" and "below" refers to a certain point, both temporal and spatial, at which the activity of holistic *ch'i* results in form, and at which form dissolves into holistic *ch'i*. With this, he posits that "above form" and "below form" are not to be separated, since they are two aspects of holistic and continuous *ch'i*.

Considered in this context, Ch'eng I's problem again boils down to his failure to realize that the matrix of his concept of *li*, the Ultimate reality, was grounded in the transformational capacity of *ch'i*, pan-*ch'i*ism. In other words, he forgot that in replacing Chang Tsai's concept of the Great Void with *li*, he still referred to the whole field of *ch'i* activity as *ch'i-hua*, not *li-hua*. At this juncture, Chu Hsi appears to come to an understanding that in fact the ideational approach and the representational approach are two integral ways of understanding holistic *ch'i*. Put differently, Chu Hsi appears to think that the ideational approach to the holistic *ch'i* should be complemented by Chang Tsai's representational one, as Chu Hsi's ideas about cosmogony and the first man and woman would suggest. Chu Hsi explains:

In the beginning of heaven and earth, there was only yin-yang *ch'i*. This *ch'i* moved and circulated, turning this way and that. As this movement gained speed, a mass of sediment was compressed (pushed together), and since there was no outlet for this, it consolidated to form the earth in the center of

the universe. Clear *ch'i* formed the sky, the sun and moon, and the stars and zodiacal spaces. It is only on the outside that the encircling movement perpetually goes on. The earth exists motionless in the center of the system, not at the bottom.⁶

And:

In the beginning of heaven and earth, how was the human species produced? The steaming of *ch'i* (*ch'i-cheng*)⁷ of itself produced man. After bringing a man and woman into being, it came to produce the myriad things....That couple came into being of itself through changes and transformations of *ch'i* exactly in the way the lice on human body comes into being these days.⁸

The above passages contradict our notion of Chu Hsi as the advocate of *li*. Without even introducing the concept of *li*, Chu Hsi explains the geneses of the universe and man with *ch'i* alone. In order to have a clear understanding of this holistic *ch'i*, let's take a close look at its "changes and transformations." He attributes the nature of these "changes and transformations" to alternating movements inherent in holistic *ch'i*. Chu Hsi explains:

Though composed of two words, yin-yang is nothing but the appearing and vanishing of the homogeneous *ch'i*;⁹ once extending and once withdrawing, once decreasing and once increasing. Extending is yang,

⁶. Modified from Chan, *Source book*, 641-2.

⁷. On other occasions, Chu Hsi replaces this expression with "the transformation of *ch'i*" (*ch'i-hua*). See, *CTYL* 1.7., and 94.2380.

⁸. *Ibid.*, 94.2380.

⁹. As to the nature of yin-yang, Chu Hsi thinks that yin-yang can be regarded both as duality and as unity (*yin-yang, tso i-ke shuo i te, tso liang-ke shuo i te*). See *Ibid.*, 74.1880. From this, it can safely be said that Chu Hsi's theme of "duality in unity and unity in duality" is also applied to the yin-yang relationship.

while withdrawing is yin; increasing is yang, while decreasing is yin. [Yin-yang], just the appearing and vanishing of the homogeneous *ch'i*, has been producing innumerable events in Heaven and Earth.¹⁰

This passage shows clearly that Chu Hsi locates the origin of the universe and life, the Ultimate reality, in yin-yang holistic *ch'i*. Therefore, it is not surprising to see that Chu Hsi appropriates the phrase Ch'eng I used to praise *li*, his Ultimate reality ("How beautiful the Mandate of Heaven is")¹¹ to extol holistic *ch'i*. In Chu Hsi's words:

Only the alternation of yin-yang is Tao. Cold is succeeded by heat, and heat is succeeded by cold. This principle (*tao-li*) only rotates unceasingly. "The Mandate of Heaven, how beautiful and unceasing!" It has been this way from time immemorial.¹²

As this passage indicates, Chu Hsi's concept of Tao refers not so much to Ch'eng I's concept of *li* as to Chang Tsai's concept of holistic *ch'i*. This idea is well expressed in the statement "Only the alternation of yin-yang is Tao." And, as he implies with Tao, Chu Hsi thinks this yin-yang holistic *ch'i* is none other than the Ultimate reality.¹³

Let us look into this holistic *ch'i*, *t'ai-chi*, whose essential characteristic is activity. As seen above, the nature of this activity originates in the alternation of

¹⁰. *Ibid.*, 74.1879.

¹¹. For Ch'eng I's idea of the Mandate of Heaven, see chapter one, 88.

¹². *Ibid.*, 77.1970.

¹³. This idea is also reflected in another line, "*T'ai-chi* just refers to holistic *ch'i*" (*T'ai-chi chih shih i-ke ch'i*), *ibid.*, 3.41.

movement and stillment of yin-yang *ch'i*. Fundamentally, it is impossible to posit an end or a beginning for this ever-going process, still less to assign priority between movement and stillness. However, Chu Hsi, with his propensity to intellectualize, and aided by the authority of Chou Tun-i (1017-1073), extracts a static picture out of this on-going process, and thereby assigns priority to yin-stillness over yang-movement.

Chu Hsi argues:

[The alternation of] movement and stillness doesn't have an end, and [that of] yin and yang doesn't have a beginning. Originally, priority is not applicable to them. However, if the alternation is cut off in the middle, then priority could be found between them. Given what Chou-tzu said "*T'ai-chi* through movement generates yang," it is certain that prior to movement is always stillness.... Movement should be preceded by stillness.¹⁴

So far Chu Hsi's idea sounds similar to Ch'eng Hao's, in that he states that *t'ai-chi*, or Tao, is exactly *ch'i*, and vice versa. But Chu Hsi, unlike Ch'eng Hao, insists on differentiating "above form" from "below form."¹⁵ And the way in which they are differentiated from each other involves the motion of *t'ai-chi*, the Ultimate reality.

As seen above, Chu Hsi locates *t'ai-chi* in yin-yang holistic *ch'i*, whose essential characteristic is activity. By identifying *t'ai-chi* with yin-yang *ch'i*, Chu Hsi seems to

¹⁴. "Reply to Wang Tzu-ho," *CTTC* 6.49.7a.

¹⁵. For example Chu Hsi observes that: "A concrete thing is Tao, and Tao is a concrete thing; [however] they are differentiated but inseparable (*ch'i i tao, tao i ch'i; yu fen-pieh erh pu hsiang-li yeh*)."

invest *t'ai-chi* with the property of activity. However, a dilemma for Chu Hsi is that even though the Ultimate reality consists in yin-yang *ch'i*, whose activity is describable and so is "below form," one cannot say that *t'ai-chi*, the Ultimate reality, is exactly movement and stillness, because "If one says that *t'ai-chi* is exactly movement and stillness, then it will make 'above form' and 'below form' confused."¹⁶ Then, how can *t'ai-chi*, "above form," be differentiated from "below form," the activity of *ch'i* which is accessible through language? Or, how can holistic *ch'i* be differentiated as "above form" and "below form"?

In order to solve this problem, Chu Hsi focuses on the orderliness, *li*, in the activity of holistic *ch'i*, whose archetype was seen in Kuan-tzu. In other words, in the orderly alternation between movement and stillness or between the dispersion and gathering of *ch'i*, Chu Hsi finds the momentum whereby holistic *ch'i* is distinguished into "above form," orderliness, and "below form," activity, which are differentiated but inseparable from each other.¹⁷ Chu Hsi explains:

The orderly intermingling of yin-yang and the Five Phases is *li*. If [yin-yang] *ch'i* does not congeal together, then *li* is deprived of something to rest

¹⁶. "Reply to Yang Tzu-chih," *CTTC* 45.12a.

¹⁷. If the *ch'i-li* relationship is incomprehensible here, imagine Kuan-tzu's idea of *li*: "if the mind becomes calm, the *ch'i* becomes orderly." Though being the property of the *ch'i* activity, the orderliness is still distinguishable from the activity of *ch'i* itself.

upon.¹⁸

This idea of *li* provides Chu Hsi with a stepping stone to account for the active nature of the Ultimate reality in terms of both "above form" and "below form." Chu Hsi argues that it is not *t'ai-chi* but yin-yang *ch'i* which moves and becomes still in actuality. But the reason yin-yang *ch'i*, "below form," can move and be still consists in *li*, "above form," which moves and becomes still. In other words, Chu Hsi thinks that "*Li* moves and becomes still; therefore, *ch'i* moves and becomes still. If *li* does not move and become still, then, where does movement-stillness, the property of *ch'i*, come from? Chu Hsi argues:

[As to] yang-movement and yin-stillness, this does not mean that *t'ai-chi* moves and becomes still. Instead, this just means that *li* moves and becomes still (*li yu tung-ching*). *Li*, which is invisible, comes to be known through yin-yang [movement and stillness].¹⁹

And:

Movement-stillness is the momentum (*chi*) whereby [*li*] rides on [*ch'i*]; when *ch'i* becomes still, then, this *li* is stored (*ts'un*); when *ch'i* moves, then, this *li* becomes active (*hsing*).²⁰

Therefore, according to Chu Hsi's idea, "When there is this *li* of movement, then movement ensues, and thereby yang is generated; when there is this *li* of stillness, then stillness

¹⁸. CTYL 1.3. The same kind of idea about the *ch'i-li* order is also seen in *ibid.*, 4.68.: "*Li* is only attached to *ch'i* (*li chih fu ch'i*)"; and in *ibid.*, 4.71.: "*Li* dwells on *ch'i* (*li yü yü ch'i*)."

¹⁹. *Ibid.*, 94.2374.

²⁰. *Ibid.*, 94.2371.

ensues, and thereby yin is generated. After movement occurs, *li* resides in movement; and after stillness occurs, *li* resides in stillness."²¹ But *li*, principle, belongs to "above form," while movement-stillness itself, which is accessible through language, belongs to "below form."

With this differentiation of "above form" and "below form" within holistic *ch'i*, Chu Hsi identifies *li*, "above form," with *t'ai-chi*.²² Chu Hsi's motive in this identification is to clarify the character of *t'ai-chi* with respect to its activity. In other words, he wants to substantiate his basic idea that "above form" cannot be confused with "below form," which underlies his statement that "*t'ai-chi* neither moves nor becomes still." He argues that from the perspective of the Ultimate reality (*pen-t'i*), *t'ai-chi*, which neither moves nor becomes still, contains (*han*) [the principle] of movement-stillness, because, although movement-stillness belongs to the characteristic of "below form," that which makes it to move and be still is *t'ai-chi*.²³ But Chu Hsi thinks that from the perspective of the activity of *ch'i* (*liu-*

²¹. *Ibid.*, 94.2373-4.

²². "As to movement-stillness, there must be a principle underlying movement-stillness. The principle (*shih-tse*) is so-called *t'ai-chi*." See "Reply to Yang Tzu-chih," *CTTC* 45.11b.

²³. *Tung-ching yin-yang, chieh chih-shih hsing-erh-hsia che, jan tung i t'ai-chi chih tung, ching i t'ai-chi chih ching*, *CTYL* 94.2369. Chu Hsi has a different expression for this characteristic of *t'ai-chi*: "*T'ai-chi* is something hidden. In case of movement, it manifests itself in yang; in case of stillness, it manifests itself in yin (*t'ai-chi shih-ke ts'ang-t'ou te, tung-shih shu yang, wei-tung shih yu shu yin le*)," *ibid.*, 94.2372.

hsing), that is, yin-yang *ch'i*, the matrix of *t'ai-chi*, *t'ai-chi* can be said to have (yu) the characteristic of movement-stillness, not because *t'ai-chi* itself moves and becomes still, but because that which is "above form" is carried by or resides in "below form."²⁴ Chu Hsi says:

In terms of the Ultimate reality [*pen-t'i*], it can be said that *t'ai-chi* contains (*han*) movement-stillness in itself. In terms of activity [*liu-hsing*], it can be said that *t'ai-chi* has (yu) the characteristic of movement-stillness.²⁵

What then is Chu Hsi's picture of the Ultimate reality, which consists of *li*, "above form" and yin-yang *ch'i*, "below form"? When it comes to the general nature of the Ultimate reality, Chu Hsi observes that "Tao should be considered as the combination of *li* and *ch'i*."²⁶ However, when it comes to a more detailed description of the relationship between "above form" and "below form," Chu Hsi says:

Previously, I thought that *t'ai-chi* was substance, and movement and stillness (*tung-ching*) were function. Surely this idea is problematic. Later, I changed this to "*tai-chi* is the subtlety of the Ultimate reality (*pen-jan chih miao*), and movement-stillness is the momentum whereby [*t'ai-chi*] rides on [*yin-yang ch'i*]." This makes the idea almost close to what it should be.²⁷

To sum up this discussion about the characteristics of

²⁴. Chu Hsi says "Since *ch'i* moves and becomes still, how is it that *li*, which is carried by *ch'i*, cannot be said to move and be still? (*ch'i chi yu tung-ching tse, so-tsai chih li, i an-te wei-chih wu tung-ching*).\" See *ibid.*, 5.84.

²⁵. "Reply to Yang Tzu-chih," *CTTC* 45.12a.

²⁶. *Tao hsü-shih ho li yü ch'i k'an*, *CTYL* 75.1896.

²⁷. "Reply to Yang Tzu-chih," *CTTC* 45.11b-12a.

holistic *ch'i*, Chu Hsi states that "extended from the bottom upward, the Five Phases are but two *ch'i*'s, and the Two *ch'i*s are but one *li*."²⁸ But, the fundamental problem within this definition of holistic *ch'i* is that although conceived of as being the Ultimate reality, it cannot account for the genesis of the myriad beings, since this Ultimate reality is accessible only through silent realization but not through language.

Chu Hsi observes:

Once moving and once being still (once moving and then becomes still) refers to opening and closing, the activity of holistic (*i-ke*) *ch'i*. If extended further from the last (*ta-che*) opening and closing, this alternation is limitless (*wu ch'iuung chi*) [and so ineffable]; Therefore, the ontological origin (*pen-shih*) cannot be found here.²⁹

In sum, Chu Hsi observes that, "In terms of the endowed phenomena (*ping-fu*), there is first this *ch'i*, and thereafter *li* comes into being. Consequently, if there is this *ch'i*, then there is this *li*; if there is not this *ch'i*, then there is not this *li* either."³⁰

Realizing the difficulty inherent in speaking in concrete language about this "first" state, what might be called an "upward" approach to holistic *ch'i*, Chu Hsi resorts

²⁸. *Tzu hsia t'ui erh shang ch'ü, wu-hsing chih shih erh-ch'i, erh-ch'i yu chih shih i-li*, CTYL 94.2374.

²⁹. *Tzu ch'i p'i-ho chih ta-che t'ui erh shang chih, keng wu ch'iuung chi, pu-k'o i pen-shih yen*, *ibid.*, 94.2366.

³⁰. "Reply to Chao Chih-tao," CTTC 59.42a.

to a "downward" approach, namely, deduction,³¹ to account for the genesis of the myriad things. In this ideationally oriented explanation, predicated on the substance-function distinction in holistic *ch'i*, Chu Hsi follows most of the features of Ch'eng I's idea of individuation, which advocates "unity of principle and its various manifestations."³²

The first step for Chu Hsi is to posit a deductive order for holistic *ch'i*. For this, he approaches holistic *ch'i* from a different angle, which inevitably forces him to contradict himself. As discussed in the previous section, Chu Hsi rendered *li* secondary to *ch'i*. In other words, he thought that the presence of *li* was dependent on holistic *ch'i*, which he believed to be ineffable (*wu-chi*). However, when he follows a deductive order, Chu Hsi asserts that *li* is the ineffable (*ling*) and that which presides over the activity of *ch'i*. Chu Hsi argues:

Question: There must be something which presides over the activity of *ch'i*. [What do you think about it?] Answer: *Ch'i* contains of itself something ineffable (*ling*) in it.³³

This perception of holistic *ch'i* is based on an ideation-

³¹. *Tzu-shang t'ui erh hsia-lai*, CTYL 94.2374.

³². Chu Hsi's explanation of the moon and its reflections on the river can be said to be a good illustration of *li-i fen-shu*. See *ibid.*, 94.2409. Chu Hsi follows his own teaching about the need for clearly defining terms with respect to *li-i fen-shu*, too. He refers to the moon as "the universal *li*" (*kung-kung chih li*), while he refers to reflections as "the particular *li*" (*i-wu so-chü chih li*), *ibid.*, 94.2372.

³³. *Ch'i chung tzu yu-ke ling-te wu-shih*, *ibid.*, 5.87.

al construct which differentiates the world, the field of *ch'i* transformation, into *li* and *ch'i*, which are defined as substance and function, or "above form" and "below form." Chu Hsi is well aware that an ideational approach to holistic *ch'i* is dangerous in that it invites a dualistic interpretation of holistic *ch'i*. However, for the sake of convenience, he simplifies the task of ascribing continuity by using the formula which originated with Chang Tsai:

In Heaven and Earth, there are *li* and *ch'i*. *Li*, which is above form, is the essence (*pen*)³⁴ in the production of things. *Ch'i*, which is below form, is the material (*chü*)³⁵ in the production of things. Therefore, in the production of man and things, [the endowment of] nature should be based on this *li*, and form should be endowed from this *ch'i*.³⁶

Basically, Chu Hsi, as Ch'eng I did, advocates that no priority is applicable to the differentiated-but-inseparable

³⁴. My translation of the character *pen*, which in this passage refers to *li*, as "essence" might seem problematic, because the rarefication of *ch'i*, that is, *ching* has also been rendered as "essence." Are *li* and *ching* identical in Chu Hsi? Yes. This is the case when he holds that "the combination of *ching* and *ch'i* produces man and things." See *ibid* 63.1551.

Moreover, Chu Hsi identifies *shen* (the ineffable) with *ching* and *li*: "The essential (*ching-ying*) *ch'i* is *shen*. Metal, wood, water, fire, and earth are not *shen*, that through which they become metal, wood, water, fire, and earth is *shen*. In man, [*shen*] is *li*, which becomes humanity, righteousness, propriety, wisdom, and faithfulness. (*Ibid.*, 1.9). This could be said to be a good illustration of Chu Hsi's clear definition of terms (*ming-i cho-lo*).

³⁵. The original character for "material" means tool (*chü*). However, in *ibid.*, 94.2367-8., Chu Hsi says that "the rotation and combination of the seven elements, namely, the five Phases and yin-yang, are the materials (*ts'ai-liao*) in the production of the things." My rendering of *chü* as "material" is based on this.

³⁶. "Reply to Huang Tao-fu," *CTTC* 58.4b.

relationship between *li* and *ch'i*.³⁷ Although Chu Hsi, in the manner of Ch'eng I, tries to describe the distinction between them as order (*chieh-tz'u*),³⁸ he always ends up speaking in terms of priority (*hsien-hou*). Chu Hsi says:

From the perspective of *li*, substance is prior to function; because if substance is focused on, the *li* of function (*yung chih li*) is already in it; this is the reason "substance and function share the same origin." From the perspective of a thing (*shih*), manifestation is prior to obscurity; because on the very thing, the substance of *li* (*li chih t'i*) is manifest; this is the reason "manifestation and obscurity are inseparable." Though they share the same origin, how can we not make any distinction of refinement, coarseness, and priority between them? Moreover, since it has already been said that the working of function (*yung-hsing*) is preceded by the establishment of substance (*t'i-li*), it would be safe to say that substance is prior to function.³⁹

As "the essence of the things" indicates, for Chu Hsi, *li*, the substance of holistic *ch'i*, is the Ultimate reality, which he often represents as Tao.⁴⁰ However, Chu Hsi realizes

³⁷. The expression "differentiated but inseparable" (*pu-hsiang tsa, pu-hsiang li*) has been used to explain the relationship between substance and function beginning with the discussion of Kuan-tzu's concept of *ch'i* in this thesis. However, it was not until Chu Hsi that the traditional idea of the *li-ch'i* relationship found its form. For *pu-[k'o] hsiang tsa*, see "Reply to Ch'eng K'o-chiu," *ibid.*, 37.33a., and for *pu-(wei-ch'ang) hsiang li*, see *CTYL* 94.2368., and similar expressions, *passim*.

³⁸. *Tao hsien-hou pu-k'o, jan i hsü-yu chieh-tz'u*, *ibid.*, 94.2368.

³⁹. *CTCS* (*Chou-tzu ch'üan-shu*) 2.34.

⁴⁰. In the *Chou-i pen-i*, "Hsi-ts'u A" (*ICCC* 28.384), Chu Hsi holds that "the alternation of yin-yang is *ch'i*; as to its principle, it is so called Tao." And in *CTYL* 77.1970., he says that "Tao is also just the principle of concrete things (*tao i chih shih ch'i chih li*)." This concept of Tao, which refers to the substance of holistic *ch'i*, contrasts with the holistic sense of Tao as in

that the concept of *li*, the legacy of Ch'eng I's dualism, is not suitable for representing the Ultimate reality. The major reason, he argues, is that the concept of *li* represents a subdivision, a species, if you will, and therefore cannot represent the Ultimate reality, genus. Let's listen to Chu Hsi's argument:

Question: How do you differentiate Tao from *li*?
Answer: Tao refers to the way, while *li* means natural designs (*wen-li*). Question: You mean grains (*mu-li*)? Answer: Correct. Question: It sounds like they are identical. Answer: The concept of Tao is inclusive, while *li* is the subdivision (*li-mo*) of Tao. Again: The concept of Tao is extremely broad (*hung-ta*), while that of *li* is detailed (*ching-mi*).⁴¹

In arguing that *li* should be defined as "subdivision," Chu Hsi advances two major reasons. First, he considers exceptional cases in the transformation of *ch'i*, to which the myriad things owe their being. In as much as the abnormal cases are the result of the transformation of *ch'i*, they should be regarded as manifestations of *li*. However, here *li* is regarded as different from *li* as it governs normal phenomena. Chu Hsi observes:

As to normal *li* (*cheng-li*), we can take as an example the sudden bursting forth of the flower and the leaf on a tree. This is the vestige of *ch'i* transformations (*tsao-hua*). And abrupt lightning,

"Tao should be considered as the combination of *li* and *ch'i*." From this, it is quite clear that Chu Hsi uses the term Tao both in substantial sense and the holistic sense. As will be seen, this will be the case with the term *t'ai-chi*. All these usages comport with Chu Hsi's idea of seeking the Ultimate reality both in substance and holism.

⁴¹. CTYL 6.99.

thunder, wind, and rain can be added to these examples. However, becoming accustomed to these things, man does not take them to be strange. When faced with a ghostly crying or a ghostly fire, man finds them strange. I am not quite sure if they are a vestige of *ch'i* transformations, but definitely, they are the [manifestations of] abnormal *li* (*pu-cheng li*). So, they look strange....An abnormal mixing of *ch'i* is responsible for them; it can't be said that *li* is not involved here; it can't be said that there is no such case. In cases like cold winter or hot summer, *li* is normal. Sometimes, however, all of sudden, we have a cold summer or a hot winter. How can we say that there is no such *li*? But, since they are not the right *li*, we call them strange.⁴²

Chu Hsi's second argument for an understanding of *li* as subdivision involves its general meaning of reason or principle. Familiarity with Chu Hsi's writings leads to an awareness that his concept of *li* refers not only to a technical term but also to a general term, which does not necessarily refer to the substance of holistic *ch'i*. The following passages concerning an explanations of the statement "*Jen sheng ch'i ping, li yu shan-o*" will give us some sense of the contrast between the general and technical usages of the term *li*. Chu Hsi says:

Upon birth, man is endowed with *ch'i*. *Li*, substance, or essence, has the chance of becoming either good or bad. The character of this *li* does not refer to the substantial *li* (*shih-li*, or the technical term); rather, it means reason as in "the reason should be like this (*li tang yu tz'u*)."⁴³

And:

[The character] *li* is to be interpreted as immedi-

⁴². *Ibid.*, 3.37.

⁴³. *Ibid.*, 95.2426.

ately (*ho*, or *ho-hsia*).⁴⁴

The two examples above clearly illustrate Chu Hsi's usage of *li* in both a technical and general sense. It seems that this broader connotation of *li* provides Chu Hsi with the rationale to use it in creating unifying terms in defining the elements of the Ultimate reality. Chu Hsi's use of terms such as "the substantial *li*" (*shih-li*), "the One *li*" (*i-li*), and "this [particular] *li*" (*tz'u-li*)⁴⁵ seems to reflect his initial effort to differentiate the technical meaning of *li* from its broader one.

As an encompassing term for the Ultimate reality, Chu Hsi uses *t'ai-chi*, the Great Ultimate, with which he refers to the substance of holistic *ch'i*.⁴⁶ And for him, the characteristic of substance, in addition to being "above form," consists in

⁴⁴. *Ibid.* A paraphrase of this passage would read: "Upon the birth of man, *ch'i* is endowed; [due to the *ch'i*, for man] there is an immediate chance of becoming either good or bad." On another occasion, Chu Hsi justifies this attitude, saying "you should read characters seriously; they should be understood phrase by phrase, paragraph by paragraph. Proceeding to the next paragraph without completely understanding this one, you are confused; [in this way], how can you understand them thoroughly!....The habit of negligence is a common problem among the students these days." See *ibid.*, 94.2404.

⁴⁵. For *shih-li*, in addition to the above passage, see *ibid.*, 75.1929., for *i-li*, see "Reply to Yü Shih-peng," *CTTC* 45.1a., and for *tz'u-li*, *passim* in *CTYL*.

⁴⁶. Despite his meticulous differentiation between *li* and *t'ai-chi*, Chu Hsi, as will be seen below, still uses them interchangeably on many occasions.

being the principle which causes yin-yang *ch'i* to move.⁴⁷ In the same vein, he holds that "so-called *t'ai-chi* is nothing but the principle of the Two *ch'is* and the Five Phases."⁴⁸ It seems to be also in this context that Chu Hsi attributes the origin of phenomena to substance.⁴⁹ Chu Hsi conceives of *t'ai-chi* as "the One which has no parallel (*i erh wu tui che*),"⁵⁰ because it is the sum total of the myriad *lis* in Heaven and Earth.⁵¹ In other words, "*T'ai-chi* is just an all-embracing principle (*tao-li*), which covers yin-yang, hardness-softness, odd-even numbers; there is nothing *t'ai-chi* leaves behind."⁵² This idea is well summarized in the following passage. Chu Hsi observes:

⁴⁷. For example, Chu Hsi holds that "Yin-yang is *ch'i*. That through which once yin and once yang (once yin and then yang) is Tao. If one just says that yin-yang is called Tao, then yin-yang becomes Tao. [The reason] 'once yin and once yang' is mentioned here is [to indicate] that through which yin-yang alternates is Tao." And "That which has been rotating this way from time immemorial is yin-yang. Who makes it rotate? That is Tao." See CTYL 74.1896.

⁴⁸. *Ibid.*, 94.2365.

⁴⁹. How are we to interpret Chu Hsi's line that *ch'i* was born out of *li*? (*Ch'i shui shih li chih so-sheng, ibid.*, 4.71.) It seems that this line is not to be taken literally. Instead it is to be read as an intuitive description of the *ch'i* transformation which attributes *ch'i*, "below form," or function to *li*, "above form," or substance.

⁵⁰. *Ibid.*, 100.2549. Chu Hsi also refers to *t'ai-chi* as "the Utmost *li* (*li chih chi-chih*).\" See "Reply to Ch'eng K'o-chiu,\" CTTC 37.31b.

⁵¹. CTYL 94.2375.

⁵². *Ibid.*, 75.1929.

The Change contains *t'ai-chi*; thereunder come the Two Modes, the Four Forms, and the Eight Trigrams. The Three Hundred Eighty Four Diagrams are reduced to Sixty Four; the Sixty Four are reduced to the Eight Trigrams; the Eight Trigrams are reduced to the Four Forms; the Four Forms are reduced to the Two Modes; the Two Modes are reduced to *t'ai-chi*. In terms of a thing, the *t'ai-chi* in the Change can be compared to the root of a tree, or to the head of Buddha. The root of a tree and the head of Buddha are the Utmost with form (*yu-hsing chih chi*). But *t'ai-chi*, which is neither a tangible thing nor has a spatial presentation, is the Utmost without form (*wu-hsing chih chi*).⁵³

Considered in this context, it is not surprising to find that Chu Hsi's concept of *li*, *t'ai-chi*, has the characteristic of the unmoved mover: *li*, *t'ai-chi*, does not move; Instead, it causes things to move.⁵⁴ In this context, Chu Hsi observes that "*t'ai-chi* is only *li*; *li* is not to be subject to movement and stillness."⁵⁵ In this way, Chu Hsi's concept of *t'ai-chi*, *li*, is invested with transcendence,⁵⁶ giving the impression that *t'ai-chi* is something absolute.

Until now we have discussed Chu Hsi's idea of *t'ai-chi*, the Ultimate reality, from the perspectives of *wu-chi* and

⁵³. *Ibid.*, 75.1930. Chu Hsi also calls *t'ai-chi* "*li* without form (*wu-hsing erh yu-li*).\" See *ibid.*, 94.2366.

⁵⁴. Chu Hsi explains this idea in terms of the change of day-night and the ineffable (*shen*), or *li*: "The ineffable can change day-night; however, day-night can't change the ineffable." See, *ibid.*, 94.2403.

⁵⁵. *T'ai-chi chih shih li, li pu-k'o i tung-ching yen*. See *ibid.*, 94.2370.

⁵⁶. *Ch'ao-jan yü hsing-ch'i chih piao*. See *ibid.*, 94.2403-4. In a letter to Lu Tzu-ching, Chu Hsi has a different expression for transcendence: "[*t'ai-chi*] existing 'prior to' the Three: Two Modes, Four Forms, and Eight Trigrams (*chü yü san-che chih hsien*).\" See *CTTC* 36.8b.

t'ai-chi, which represent, respectively, ineffability and effability, and stand as well for holistic activity and a concept, substance. Chu Hsi's idea is that in understanding the Ultimate reality, *wu-chi* and *t'ai-chi* should form "duality in unity and unity in duality" or be "differentiated-but-inseparable." In other words, for Chu Hsi the Ultimate reality can only be apprehended through an understanding of the tension between these two aspects, duality and unity. This is what Chu Hsi intends by "ineffable but still effable (*wu-chi erh t'ai-chi*). " Because if one focuses on its holistic activity, which is accessible to the mind only by silent realization, then the genesis of the myriad things cannot be explained. Meanwhile, as discussed above, if deductive reasoning is used to account for phenomena, the Ultimate reality can be understood only as something concrete. This idea is well expressed in the following letter to Lu Hsiang-shan. Chu Hsi argues:

If *wu-chi* is not mentioned, then *t'ai-chi*, [thereby] being relegated to a concrete thing (*i-wu*), is not qualified to be the origin of the myriad transformations. If *t'ai-chi* is not mentioned, then *wu-chi*, [thereby] being lost into an unsubstantiality (*k'ung-chi*), is not qualified to be the origin of the myriad transformations.⁵⁷

⁵⁷. "Reply to Lu Tzu-ching," *CTTC* 36.9a-10b. Although this letter is written for Lu Hsiang-shan (1139-93), the criticism it contains applies to the Ch'engs as well. From Chu Hsi's point of view, Ch'eng I's notion of the Ultimate reality, or *li*, is so one-sided in favor of effability that it ended up with becoming a concrete thing; while Ch'eng Hao's notion of the Ultimate reality, or the mind is so one-sided in favor of ineffability that it results in an unsubstantiality.

Remember that Chu Hsi said nature was ineffable, because originally nature did not exist; it was postulated to secure the source of moral principle.⁵⁸ This idea applies to *t'ai-chi*, the Ultimate reality as effability, as well. Chu Hsi thought originally that *t'ai-chi* was ineffable, since it does not exist in reality.⁵⁹ It is just the expression of the power (*piao-te*) of ontological origin,⁶⁰ postulated as a point from which the existence of the myriad beings can be deduced.⁶¹ But postulated in this way *t'ai-chi*, as discussed above, is rather prone to being conceived of as a solid thing, and thereby overshadows its *wu-chi* matrix, to which the mind has access only by silent realization. To keep these polarities of silent realization and language in tension, Chu Hsi, contrary to his understanding that language is considered secondary in the School of the sage, and that language is a big source of

⁵⁸. See chapter three, 164-5.

⁵⁹. ...*Pen-lai tou wu wu-shih...tan t'ai-chi shuo pu-ch'ü*, CTYL 94.2370.

⁶⁰. *T'ai-chi pen wu tz'u-ming, chih shih-ke piao-te*, *ibid.*, 94.2375.

⁶¹. For example, the following passage illustrates the postulated nature of *li*, *t'ai-chi*: "Before Heaven and Earth existed, there was after all only *li*. As there is this *li*, therefore there are Heaven and Earth. If there were no *li*, there would also be no Heaven and Earth, no man, no things, and in fact, no containing or sustaining [of things by Heaven and Earth] to speak of. As there is *li*, there is therefore *ch'i* to operate everywhere and nourish and develop all things." Modified from Chan, *Source book*, 635.

trouble,⁶² does not exercise sufficient caution in relying upon its powers. His strategy appears to be to balance his description of the absolute and transcendent characteristic of *t'ai-chi* by stressing the unceasing nature of holistic *ch'i*, from which *t'ai-chi* derives. However, this effort is unillified when describing their relationship. Chu Hsi explains:

Before *t'ai-chi* existed, there must have existed the world (yin-yang *ch'i*).⁶³

And:

The presence of *li* amid *ch'i* can be compared to a shining jewel in the water.⁶⁴

Admonishing his disciples on one occasion, Chu Hsi said that "the more verbose, the more disjointed."⁶⁵ This is exactly the case with Chu Hsi himself. In the first passage, Chu Hsi tries to restore tension in the polarity of *t'ai-chi* and *wu-chi* by indicating that *t'ai-chi* is preceded by *wu-chi*.⁶⁶

⁶². *Sheng-men i yen-yü tz'u-yü te-hsing, yen-yü i ta-nan, ibid.*, 52.1242.

⁶³. *T'ai-chi chih ch'ien, hsü yu shih-chieh lai, ibid.*, 94.2368.

⁶⁴. *Li tsai ch'i chung, ju i-ke ming-chu tsai shui-li, ibid.*, 4.73.

⁶⁵. *Yü-yen tuo tse, yü chih-li, ibid.*, 115.2777.

⁶⁶. The history of the term *ch'i* also attests to this fact. As discussed in the first chapter, *ch'i*, whose original meaning was physio-psychological energy in the *Tso Commentary*, began to be associated with a pan-*ch'i*istic meaning in the Warring States period. It was not until *Kuan-tzu* that the pan-*ch'i*istic function of *ch'i* was explained in terms of substance and function, namely, *Tao* and its power. It was also in *Kuan-tzu* that *ching* and *li*, which had to wait for Chu Hsi to formally identify them with each other, were sought in *ch'i* itself. In other words, they were derived from *ch'i* in *Kuan-tzu*. However, from the *Lü-shih ch'un-ch'iu* on, *ch'i*,

But Chu Hsi's reliance on metaphor, as illustrated in the second passage, helps create the impression that *t'ai-chi* is either "an invisible thing standing aloof from yin-yang,"⁶⁷ or "a shining and flashing thing existing up there."⁶⁸ Therefore it is not surprising to find that Chu Hsi's repeated emphasis on an understanding of the tension between unity and duality that characterizes his conception of the Ultimate reality, which the phrase *wu-chi erh t'ai-chi* represents,⁶⁹ fell on deaf ears, and that duality alone came to be emphasized:

Question: Are *t'ai-chi* and *wu-chi* one thing? Answer: Originally, they are one thing. Put that way, your question sounds as though they are two different things.⁷⁰

And in the same way, recognition of the tension in Chu Hsi's thought, between the ineffable and effable aspects of

still in the pan-ch'iistic context, was explained to derive from substance, *t'ai-i*, Tao, *hsüan*, and so forth. The idea was to explain the functional reality from the perspective of the essential substance in pan-ch'iism. Therefore, if the *Kuan-tzu* and *LCCC* models are conceptualized in the *ch'i-li* and *i-ch'ia* order respectively, it can be safely said that the *li-ch'i* order was derived from the *ch'i-li* order, which pan-ch'iism originally stood for. Put differently, as far as pan-ch'iism is concerned, it seems the *ch'i-li* order and the *li-ch'i* order are interdependent, but the former in terms of origin came before the latter. For details, see chapter one, 26-7.

⁶⁷. *Yin-yang shang pieh yu i-ke wu-hsing wu-ying te wu-shih*, *ibid.*, 95.2437.

⁶⁸. *Yu-ke kuang-ming shan-shuo te wu-shih tsai na-li*, *ibid.*, 116.2794.

⁶⁹. For example, *wu-chi erh t'ai-chi, tz'u erh-tzu ch'ing, wu tz'u-hsü ku yeh*, *ibid.*, 94.2367.; And, *wu-chi erh t'ai-chi, chih-shih i-chü*, *ibid.*, 94.2365.

⁷⁰. *Ibid.*, 99.2533.

the Ultimate reality was lost, as effability, *t'ai-chi*, came to be emphasized. Just as in the case of microcosm, the impact of this loss of tension with respect to a definition of macrocosm is felt in two ways.

The primary impact is felt in the categorization of Chu Hsi's philosophy, together with that of Ch'eng I, as the Study of Principle (*li-hsüeh*). As discussed above, Chu Hsi's philosophy is as much *ch'i-hsüeh* as *li-hsüeh*. In other words, though Chu Hsi puts *ch'i* and *li*, representing *wu-chi* and *t'ai-chi*, in polarity, the character of Chu Hsi's philosophy, if anything, is *ch'i-hsüeh*, since *t'ai-chi* is a postulation from *wu-chi*, holistic *ch'i*. Put differently, as implied by "before *t'ai-chi* existed, there must have existed the world, namely, yin-yang *ch'i*," for Chu Hsi, holistic *ch'i* is prior to *li*, *t'ai-chi*. This misunderstanding can be said to reflect a failure to keep in mind Chu Hsi's conception that the ineffable and effable aspects of the Ultimate reality were to be understood as being in tension with one another, a failure which resulted in emphasis being given to its effable aspect, represented by *t'ai-chi*, effability.

The second impact was felt in the reactions to Chu Hsi from so-called the circle of the Study of *Ch'i*, *ch'i-hsüeh*. The consensus among this circle about *li*, which was an oblique criticism directed toward Chu Hsi's idea of *li*, centered on

the idea that *li* is secondary to *ch'i* (*ch'i chih li*),⁷¹ which is, as seen above, in fact Chu Hsi's idea. In other words, the emphasis on effability discouraged them from seeing Chu Hsi's idea of *t'ai-chi* as representing ineffability, that is, *wu-chi*. This development serves as a good illustration of the effect of the loss of recognition of the tension Chu Hsi postulated between the ineffable and the effable, and also an indication of how powerful the appeal of the concept of *t'ai-chi*, or effability, was.

⁷¹. Lo Ch'in-shun (1465-1547): "The gathering of *ch'i* manifests that there is the *li* of gathering; the dispersion of *ch'i* indicates that there is the *li* of dispersion. Only the gathering and dispersion of *ch'i* is so-called *li*" (*ch'i chih chü pien-shih chü chih li, ch'i chih san pien-shih san chih li, wei ch'i yu-chü yu-san, shih nai so-wei li yeh*)," *K'un chih chi*, 2.7b. Wang T'ing-hsiang (1474-1544): "The myriad principles derive from *ch'i*; there is no independent *li*, suspended in the mid-air (*wan-li chieh ch'u-yü ch'i, wu hsüan-k'ung tu-li chih li*)," "*T'ai-chi pien*," 170. Wang Fu-chih (1619-1692): "*Li* is in *ch'i*; *ch'i* is none other than *li* (*li tsai ch'i chung, ch'i wu-fei li*)," "Commentary on the *Cheng-meng*," CSISCC 17.9286. Finally, all these oblique criticisms of Chu Hsi's concept of *li* were brought together with Tai Chen (1723-1777), who replaced the vertically-aligned "above form" and "below form" with the horizontally-aligned "before form" and "after form." Tai Chen's conception can be described as a graphic illustration of how dominating and suffocating the idea of *t'ai-chi* (*li*) as effable, or the *li-ch'i* order, had become in his time. See "*Meng-tzu tzu-i shu-cheng*" B, TCC, 288.

Conclusion

This thesis has traced the process by which the notion first expressed in *Kuan-tzu* of polarity between ineffability and effability in pan-ch'iism came to shape the character of Neo-Confucian thought in the Sung Dynasty, which reached its culmination in Chu Hsi's moral philosophy. In the course of discussion, we have seen that *Kuan-tzu*'s notion of the Ultimate reality triggered a dispute about the nature of the Ultimate reality--whether it should be defined as *ch'i*, *li*, or the mind--and another dispute about how the Ultimate reality can be known, whether through intellect or experience. We have also seen that Chu Hsi resolved these disputes by incorporating the involved issues into the tensional aspects of holistic *ch'i*. That is, as to the nature of the Ultimate reality, he understood it to lie in the tension between Change and the mind, or macrocosm and microcosm, which represent the differentiated-but-inseparable aspect of *ch'i* in pan-ch'iism. Chu Hsi also posited tension in the macrocosm and microcosm; *li-ch'i* in macrocosm and nature and emotions in microcosm. And he believed that our understanding of those tensions itself involved a set of polarities, that is, the need to balance intellectual investigation with knowledge acquired through experience. As I have explained, while it was Chu Hsi's idea that maintaining the tension between these polarities was basic to that understanding, due to the metaphorical power he

relied on, other Neo-Confucian thinkers did not understand his idea, with the result that holistic *ch'i* came to be divided into *ch'i*, *li*, and the mind, causing the impression that they are pitted against one another. In this apparent misunderstanding caused by language, we can clearly see the nature and inevitability of *ch'i*.

As to the fundamental characteristic of Chu Hsi' moral philosophy, it has been generally agreed among students of Chu Hsi that he should be viewed as a great synthesizer of Neo-Confucian ideas, my thesis certainly supports that view. However, given that Chu Hsi's thought was linked with *Kuan-tzu* in understanding the fundamental characteristics of pan-*ch'i*-ism, and considering the generally accepted fact that what Confucius and Mencius advocated was the Study of the Mind (*hsin-hsüeh*), which Chu Hsi represented as the fundamental aspect of microcosm, it would not be far-fetched to honor him in a more general sense as a great interpreter of Confucian thought. And this description of an evolution of Confucian ideas from the Study of the Mind into Chu Hsi's Study of *Ch'i* suggests how progressive and adaptable Neo-Confucianism was. I hope that this account of Chu Hsi's philosophy will serve as one answer to the perennial question, "What is new in Chu Hsi?"¹

¹. For details, see Chan, *Chu Hsi: Life and Thought*, 39-70.

Glossary

ai 爱

ch'a-shih tuan-erh 察识端倪

Chan-kuo ts'e 战国策

Chang Chüeh-jen 张觉人

Chang Tai-nien 张岱年

"Chang Tsai che-hsüeh ssu-hsiang chi ch'i tsai tao-hsüeh chung te ti-wei 张载哲学思想及其在道学中的地位

Chang Tsai chi 张载集

Ch'ang-an 长安

ch'ang-ts'un tz'u-hsin 长存此心

Chao Chih-tao 赵致道

ch'ao-jan yü hsing-ch'i chih piao

Ch'en Ch'i-chih 超然于形器之表 陈器之

Ch'en Lai 陈来

cheng-li 正理

Cheng Tzu-shang 郑子上

ch'eng (completion) 成

Ch'eng Hao (Ming-tao) 程颢(明道)

Ch'eng K'o-chiu 程可久

chi 机

"Chi-ch'un chi" 季春纪

"Chi-i" 祭仪

ch'i chi yü tung-ching tse, so-tsai chih li, i an te wei-chih 气既有动静则所载之理,亦安得谓之无动静

chan-jan hsü-ming 湛然虚明

Chang Ching-fu (Shih) 张敬夫(栻)

Chang Jung-ming 张荣明

Chang Tsai (Heng-ch'ü) 张载(横渠)

ch'ang 常

ch'ang-lien 长连

chao-chien ch'u 照见处

Chao-kung 昭公

chen (firmness)

ch'en-kou chih pi 贞 尘垢之蔽

Cheng Hsüan 郑玄

"Cheng-shuo" 正说

Cheng Wan-keng 郑万耕

ch'eng (sincerity) 诚

Ch'eng I (I-ch'uan) 程颐(伊川)

Ch'eng-shih I-chuan 程氏易传

chi-ch'ou 己丑

Chi-hsia 稷下

chi-to 计度

ch'i chih chü pien-shih chü chih li, ch'i chih san pien-shih san chih li, wei ch'i yu chü-san, shih nai so-wei li yeh 气已聚便是聚之理, 气之散便是散之理, 惟其有聚有散是乃所谓理也。	
ch'i chih li 气之理	ch'i chung tzu yu-ke ling te wu-shih 气中自有个灵的事物
ch'i-hsüeh 气学	ch'i hsi wu-nei, ch'i ta wu- wai 其细无内, 其大无外
ch'i-hua 气化	ch'i-i fen-shu 气一分殊
ch'i i tao tao i ch'i, yu fen-pieh erh pu-hsiang li yeh 器亦道道亦器, 有分别而不相离也	
ch'i-jo 气弱	ch'i-kung 气功
ch'i-li 气力	Ch'i-lu hsüeh-k'an 齐鲁学刊
ch'i-se 气色	
ch'i shui shih li chih so-sheng 气虽是理之所生	
ch'i tsai k'ou wei yen 气在口为言	
ch'i yu shan pu-shan 气有善不善	
ch'i yeh che shen chih sheng yeh 气也者神之盛也	
ch'i-yüan 气源	ch'i-yung 器用
chiang ch'eng t'ien-ti chih mao yeh 将成天地之貌也	
chiao 教	chiao-kan 交感
"Chiao-t'e sheng" 郊特性	Chieh 桀
"Chieh-pi" 解蔽	chieh-chih 界至
chieh-tz'u 节次	chien 兼
chien-chao 兼照	chien-t'i 兼体
"Ch'ien-ch'eng" 乾称	
Ch'ien-fu lun 潜夫论	ch'ien-k'un 乾坤
ch'ien-shih 前事	Ch'ien-tso tu 乾遂度
chih (pronoun) 之	chih (quality) 质

chih (wisdom) 智	chih-ch'i 治气
chih-ch'i (will-ch'i) 志气	chih-ch'i yang-hsin 治气养心
chih-ch'i yang-sheng 治气养生	chih-chih 致知
chih-ching 至精	chih-ch'u 至处
chih ch'iung-li, pien shih chih yü ming 只窮理便是至于命	chih-jen 知人
chih-chüeh 知觉	chih-ling shen-ming 至灵神明
chih-li 至理	chih-pen 知本
"Chih-pei yu" 知北遊	chih-shan 至善
chih-pien 至变	chih shih jen wei t'ien-ti hsin, shih-hsin chih tung tse, fen le, t'ien wei shang, ti wei hsia 只是人为天地心, 是心动则分了, 天为上, 地为下
"Chih-tang" 至圣	chih yüan chih cheng 知远之证
chih-t'ien 知天	ching (rarification) 精
chin-ch'u 尽处	ching-ch'i chih chi 精气之极
ching (seriousness) 敬	ching chung t'i-jen ta-pen wei-fa Ching Fang 京房
ching fei pieh shih i-shih, ch'ang huan-hsing tz'u-hsin pien shih 敬中体认大本未发	
ching kung-fu 静功夫	ching-mi 精密
"Ching-shen hsün" 精神训	
ching tse jen tsai ch'i chung i 敬则仁在其中矣	
ching-ying 精英	
ch'ing 情	ch'ing-cho 清濁
ch'ing hsü i ta 清虚一大	ch'ing-i 情意
Ch'ing-t'ung shih-tai 青铜时代	ch'iu ch'u chih tang 求处至圣
ch'iung-ko 窮格	ch'iung-li 窮理
ch'iung-li chih yao 窮理之要	Chou Hsing-chi 周行己

"Chou-i ch'eng-shih chuan hsü" 周易程氏传序
 Chou-i pen-i 周易本义
 Chou-i t'an-yüan 周易探源
 "Chou-yü" 周语
 Chu Hsi 朱熹
 Chu Hsi che-hsüeh yen-chiu 朱熹哲学研究
 Chu Jui-k'ai 祝瑞开
 chü 具
 chü i ch'i 居移气
 chü yü san-che chih hsien 具于三者之先
 ch'uan-ch'ü yin-yuan 穿渠引源
 "Ch'üan-hsüeh" 劝学
 ch'üan-t'i 全体
 "Ch'üan-yen" 佺言
 chuang 状
 Chuang-kung 庄公
 chün-tzu 君子
 chung (equilibrium) 中
 "Chung-ho chiu-shuo hsü" 中和旧说序
 "Chung-hsia chi" 仲夏纪
 Chung-kuo che-hsüeh 中国哲学
 Chung-kuo lien-tan shu yü tan-yao 中国炼丹术与丹药
 chung-shu 忠恕
 Chung-yung 中庸

erh-pen 二本

fa-hsiang 法象
 fan wu chih ching tz'u tse wei sheng 万物之精比则为生
 Fei chih 费直
 fen 氛
 fen-pieh 分别
 "Fu" 赋
 Fung Yu-lan 冯友兰

Hang K'ang-po 韩康伯

"Hao-ling" 号令

ho (harmony) 和

hou-shih 后事

hsiang 象

hsiang-shu 象数

hsiao-ch'u 小处

Hsieh Shang-ts'ai 谢上蔡

hsien (scarcity) 鲜

hsien ch'a-shih, hou han-yang 先察识后涵养

hsien-hou 先后

hsin (trust) 信

hsin-che t'ien-ti tsai jen chih ch'üan-t'i 心者天地在人之全体

hsin chi li 心即理

hsin chih li shih t'ai-chi 心之理是太极

hsin chih te, ai chih li 心之德爱之理

hsin ching ch'i li 心静气理

hsin-hsing hsüeh 心性学

hsin-t'i liu-hsing 心体流行

hsin tse ch'i jen yeh 心则其人也

hsin shih hsü-te wu, hsing shih li-mien sui-tu hsien-ts'ao

心是虚的物, 性是里面稟赋的性

"Hsin-shu" 心术

hsing 性

hsing-che hsien chih li yeh 性者心之理也

hsing chi li yeh, tsai jen huan-tso hsing, tsai shih huan-tso

li

性即理也, 在人叫做性, 在事叫做理

hao-jan chih ch'i 浩然之气

heng 亨

ho, ho-hsia 合, 合下

Hsi-kung 僊公

hsiang-li ju-shen 向里入深

hsiao-chiang ch'i 小将气

hsiao-jen 小人

hsien (manifest) 见

hsin (mind) 心

hsin 歆

hsin 歆

hsin-li hsüeh 心理学

Hsin-t'i yü hsing-t'i 心体与性体

hsin t'ung hsing-ch'ing 心通性情

hsin t'ung hsing-ch'ing 心通性情

hsin t'ung hsing-ch'ing 心通性情

hsin t'ung hsing-ch'ing 心通性情

hsin t'ung hsing-ch'ing 心通性情

hsin t'ung hsing-ch'ing 心通性情

hsin t'ung hsing-ch'ing 心通性情

hsin t'ung hsing-ch'ing 心通性情

hsin t'ung hsing-ch'ing 心通性情

hsin t'ung hsing-ch'ing 心通性情

hsin t'ung hsing-ch'ing 心通性情

hsin t'ung hsing-ch'ing 心通性情

hsin t'ung hsing-ch'ing 心通性情

hsing-ch'i 行气 hsing-ch'ing chih miao 性情之妙
 hsing-ch'ing tse i 性情则一
 hsing-ch'ing tse i, hsing shih pu-tung, ch'ing shih tung-ch'u
 性情则一, 性是不动, 情是动处
 hsing-ch'u 形处 hsing-li hsüeh 性理学
 "Hsing-li shih-i" 性理拾遗 hsing-p'o 形魄
 hsing pu-k'o yen 性不可言
 hsing shih t'ai-chi hun-jan chih t'i 性是太极浑然之体
 hsing shih wei-tung, ch'ing shih i-tung 性是未动, 情是已动
 hsing-ta hsin-hsiao 性大心小 hsiu-ch'i 香气
 hsü 绪 Hsü Chih-jui 徐志锐
 hsü-hsing 虚形
 hsü-hsing wan-wu so-tao chih wei tao yeh 虚形万物所道之谓道也
 hsü i erh ching, wei chih ta ch'ing-ming 虚一而静谓之太清明
 hsü shih nei-wai chiao-hsiang yang 须是内外交相养
 hsü-wang 虚妄 hsü-wu 虚无
 hsüan 玄 hsüan-hsüeh 玄学
 "Hsüan-kao" 玄告 "Hsüan-li" 玄攤
 hsüan-li 玄理 "Hsüan-ying" 玄瑩
 hsüeh-ch'i 血气 hsüeh-ch'i chih ching 血气之精
 hsüeh-ch'i chin-li tse yu-shuai hsüeh-ch'i ho-p'ing
 血气筋力则有衰 血气和平
 Hsün Shuang 荀爽 Hsün-tzu 荀子
 hu 乎 Hu Fu-ch'en 胡孚琛
 Hu Heng-shan 胡衡山 Hu-hsiang 湖湘
 Huai-nan-tzu 淮南子 Huang-lao 黄老
 Huang Tao-fu 黄道夫 Huang-ti nei-ching 黄帝内经

hun-ch'i 魂气

hun-lun 浑沦

huo-p'o p'o ti 活泼泼地

i (Change) 易

i (meaning) 意

i (principle) 义

i (rightness) 义

I-ching 易经

I-chuan 易传

i-che hsiang yeh 易者象也

i erh erh, erh erh i 一而二, 二而一

i erh wu-tui che 一而无对者

i-fa 已发

"I-hsü" 易序

I-hsüeh che-hsüeh shih 易学哲学史

I-hsüeh ch'i-meng 易学启蒙

i-ke 一个

i-li 易理

i-li 义理

i-li 一理

i-shih 一事

i-shih 一时

"I-shu" 遗书

"I-shuo" 易说

i-t'uan huo 一团火

i-tung i-ching 一动一静

i wu kuan-wu, wu i chi kuan-wu 以物观物, 可以己观物

i-wu so-chü chih li 一物所具之理 i yü hsin 一于心

Jang-kung 襄公

"Jen-shuo" 仁说

jen-che li chi shih hsin, hsin chi shih li 仁者理即是心 心即是理

jen-ch'i 人气

jen chih hsin-hsing, ching tse ch'ang-ts'un, pu-ching tse pu-ts'un 人之心性, 敬则常存, 不敬则不存

jen duo-shuo hsin, fang shuo hsin, k'an-lai tang hsien shuo hsin 人多说性, 方说心, 看来当先说心

jen pien shih tung 仁便是动

jen sheng ch'i ping, li yü shan-o 人生气稟 理有善恶

jen shih shih t'ung-yang 仁是识痛痒 jou 柔

kan erh hou ying 感而后应

kan-t'ung 感通

Ko Chao-kuang 葛兆光

k'o 客

k'o-kan 客感

ku-li 孤理

kua-pien 卦变

Kuan-tzu 管子

kuei-shen 鬼神

kung (power) 功

kung chih shih jen chih li...ai tse jen chih yung yeh

公只是仁之理，爱则仁之用也

kung-kung chih li 公莫之理

k'ung-hsü 空虚

Kuo Mo-jo 郭沫若

kang-jou 刚柔

Ki no shi sô 氣の思想

ko-wu 格物

k'o-hsing 客形

ku-chung 穀种

kua-ch'i shuo 卦气说

k'uai-jan wu-tso 塊然兀生

Kuan-tzu yen-chiu 管子研究

K'un-chih chi 困知记

kung (unity) 公

k'ung-chi 空寂

K'ung Ying-ta 孔颖达

Kuo-yü 国语

lai-ch'i 来气

Lao-tzu chung-shuo chiu-miou

老子众说纠缠

li (principle) 理

li (brightness) 离

Li-chi 礼记

li chih fu ch'i 理只附气

Li Chü-yang 李居洋

li-hsüeh 理学

Lao-tzu 老子

Lao-tzu wei-chih li-lüeh

li (propriety) 礼

li (advantage) 利

li chih chi-chih 理之极致

Li Ching-ch'ih 李镜池

li-ho 离合

li-hui 理会

- li-i fen-shu 理一分殊 li-ming 离明
- li-mo 理脉 li so tang-jan 理所当然
- li tang yu tz'u 理当有此
- li tsai ch'i chung, ch'i wu fei li 理在气中, 气无非理
- li tsai ch'i chung, ju i-ke ming-chu tsai shui li
理在气中如一个明珠在水里
- Li Tse-hou 李泽厚 li-ts'o 离挫
- Li T'ung (Yen-p'ing) 李侗(延平) li wei chih-chüeh 理未知觉
- li yu tung-ching 理有动静 li yü yü ch'i 理寓于气
- "Li-yün" 礼运 liang-chieh 两截
- Liang-han ssu-hsiang shih 西汉思想史
- liang-hsiang tou pu-hsiang li 两项都不相离
- liang-i 两仪 liang-t'i 两体
- liang-wang 两忘 liao-chi 燎祭
- Lieh-tzu 列子 lien-tan shu 炼丹术
- Lin Tse-chih 林择之 ling 灵
- ling-ch'i 灵气 liu-ch'u yün-yung ch'u 流出运用处
- Liu Shu-hsien 刘述先 Liu Ch'ang-lin 刘长林
- Lo Ch'in-shun 罗钦顺 Lu Hsiang-shan 陆象山
- Lu Tzu-ching 陆子静 Lü-shih ch'un-ch'iu 吕氏春秋
- Lü Tzu-yüeh 吕子约 luan-ch'i 乱气
- "Lüeh-li" 略例 Lun-heng 论衡
- "Lun-szu" 论死
- "Lun Huang-ti nei-ching chung te ch'i" 论黄帝内经中的气
- "Lun Chou-i ta-chuan ti tzu-jan kuan" 论周易大传的自然观
- "Lun Lü-shih ch'un-ch'iu ti ju chia ssu-hsiang ch'ing-hsiang"
论吕氏春秋的儒家思想倾向

Meng Hsi 孟喜 "Meng-tzu tzu-i shu-cheng" 孟子字义疏证
 miao-yu 妙有 ming (phenomenon) 明
 ming-i chih yü chi nan hsia...tz'u-teng ch'ieh yao mo-chih
 hsi-t'ung 名义之语极难下...此等且要默识心通
 ming-i cho-lo 名义著落 "Ming-hsiang" 明象
 miou-hsin 谬心 Mo-tzu 墨子
 Mou Tzung-san 牟宗三 mu-li 木理
 "Nei-yeh" 内业 neng 能
 neng-chüeh 能觉 ni-ch'i 逆气

○ 惡

"Pa cheng shen-ming lun" 八正神明论 pai-ch'i 败气
 pao-chu 宝珠 Pao-p'u-tzu 抱朴子
 pen-jan 本然
 pen-lai tou wu wu-shih...tan t'ai-chi shuo pu ch'u
 本来都无物事,但太极说不出
 "Pien-hsü" 变虚 pien-hua 变化
 p'ien-fei pu-te 偏废不得
 ping-ch'i yü ch'ing-cho, ku ch'i ts'ai-chih yü hou-po
 稟气有清濁,故其才质有厚薄
 pu-hsiang li 不相亲 pu-hsiang tsa 不相杂
 pu i wei-chih erh wu, pu i chi-chih erh yü 不以未知而无,不以既知而有
 pu-jung shuo ch'u, chi shih hsing chih ta-pen 不容说处即是性之大本
 pu-k'o i tz'u-hsü yen...ch'üeh yü tz'u-ti 不可以次序言,...却有次第
 pu-k'o ch'iuung 不可窮 pu-k'o shuo 不可说
 pu-k'o wei hsiang 不可为象 pu-lei 不累

pu-ts'e 不测

"San-pien" 三辨

sha-ch'i 杀气

shan-fan pu-shan fan 善反不德反

"Shao-i" 少仪

shen (spirit) 神

"Shen-hua" 神化

sheng 生

sheng chih ch'i 生之气

sheng-ch'i (voice-ch'i) 声气

sheng-men i yen-yü tz'u yü te-hsing, yen-yü i ta-nan

sheng-sheng liu-hsing 圣门以言语次于德行, 言语亦大难 生生流行

sheng wei sheng ch'i 声味生气

shih (reality) 实

shih-ch'i 食气

shih-li 实理

shih wei wei, wei wei ch'i 食为味, 味为气

shih-yu 实有

shu 数

Shuo-wen 说文

shuo te ch'u, yu ming te ch'u, fang shih chien te fen-ming

shuo tse wu-k'o shuo 说得, 又名得出, 乃是见得分明 说则无可说 所觉

ssu 思

ssu-lü 思虑

sang-ch'i 丧气

shan 善

shang-t'ien chih tsai 上天之载

shen (ineffable) 神

shen chih k'uei 神之魁

shen shih ch'i 神食气

sheng-ch'eng 生成

sheng-ch'i (life-ch'i) 生气

sheng-jen wu-szu wu-wo 圣人无私无我

sheng-sheng pu-ch'iuang 生生不穷

shih 施

shih (thing) 事

shih-hsin hu tzu-jan chih t'u 事心乎自然之塗

shih-tse 是则

shih-wu 事物

shou-ch'i 守气

shun-ch'i 顺气

"Shuo-kua chuan" 说卦传

Ssu-k'u ch'üan-shu 四库全书

"Ssu-tai" 四代

ssu-tuan 四端

sui kan erh ying 随感而应
"Szu-shun lun" 似顺论

Sun-tzu 孙子

szu-ch'i 食气

ta-chiang ch'i 大将气

ta-hsin 大心

ta-pen 大本

ta-ch'u 大处

ta-pao, hsiao-pao 大胞, 小胞

Ta-tai li-chi 大戴礼记

ta-ti hsin yü hsing szu i erh erh, szu erh erh i, tz'u-ch'u
tsui tang t'i-jen 大抵心与性似一而二, 似二而一, 此处最当体认。

Tai Chen 戴震

Tai Sheng 戴圣

t'ai-chi 太极

t'ai-chi che hsing-ch'ing chih miao 太极者性情之妙

t'ai-chi che pen-jan chih miao 太极者本然之妙

t'ai-chi chih ch'ien hsü yu shih-chieh lai 太极之前须有世界来

t'ai-chi chih shih i-ke ch'i 太极只是一个气

t'ai-chi chih shih li, li pu-k'o i tung-ching yen

太极只是理, 理不可以动静言

t'ai-chi pen wu tz'u-ming, chih shih-ke piao-te

太极本无此名, 只是个表德

"T'ai-chi pien" 太极辨

t'ai-chi shih-ke ts'ang-t'ou te, tung shih shu yang, wei-tung
shih shu yin 太极是个截头的, 动时属阳, 未动时属阴

t'ai-ch'u 太初

t'ai-ho 太和

t'ai-hsü 太虚

t'ai-hsü tzu-jan 太虚自然

T'ai-hsüan ching 太玄经

"T'ai-hsüan yü tzu-jan k'o-hsüeh" 太玄与自然科学

T'ai-p'ing yü-lan 太平御览

t'ai-su 太素

t'ai-shih 太始

"T'an-kung" 檀弓

tang huo k'an 生活看

T'ang Chia-hung 唐嘉弘

"T'ang-wen" 湯問

Tao-chiao yü chung-kuo wen-hua 道教与中国文化

tao hsien-hou pu-k'o, jan i hsü yu chieh-tz'u

道先后不可, 然亦须有节次

"Tao-hsü"

道虚

tao hsü shih ho li yü ch'i k'an 道须是合理与气看

tao-i 道义

tao i chih shih ch'i chih li 道亦只是器之理

Tao-nan 道南

tao-te hsing-ming 道德性命

te 德

te chih yü t'ien erh, chü yü hsin che 德之于天而具于心者

ti-li 地理

t'i 体

t'i-chih 体质

t'i-hui 体会

t'i-jen 体认

t'i-li 体立

t'i-yung 体用

t'iao-li 条理

tien-chien 点检

t'ien chih ch'i 天之气

t'ien chih pu-ts'e wei shen, shen erh yu ch'ang wei t'ien

天之不测为神, 神而有常为天。

t'ien hsia chih tung, shen ku chih yeh 天下之动, 神鼓之也

t'ien hsia wu i-wu fei-wo 天下无一物非我

"T'ien-jui" 天瑞

t'ien-tao 天道

t'ien-te 天德

t'ien-ti chih ch'i pu shih ch'i hsü 天地之气不失其序

t'ien-ti ssu-pien 天地四边

t'ien-wen 天文

"T'ien-wen hsün" 天文训

ting-hsing 定性

"Ting-kuei" 订鬼

to-ch'i 夺气

tsai-shang, tsai-hsia 在上在下

Ts'ai Chi-t'ung 蔡季通

ts'ai-chih 才质

ts'ai-liao 材料

Ts'ai Te-kuei 蔡德贵

Ts'an-t'ung-ch'i 参同契

tsao-tso 造作

tso-ch'i 作气

ts'u 辞

Tseng Chi-fu 曾吉父

Tso Chuan 左传

ts'u-ch'i 辞气

"Ts'ung I Ching tao I Chuan" 从易经到易传 Tu wei-ming 杜维明

"Tui k'ao-cheng Kuan-tzu ti i-tien k'an-fa" 对考证管子的一点看法

t'ui 推

Tung Chung-shu 董仲舒

tung-ching 动静

tung-ching yin-yang, chieh chih shih hsing-erh-hsia che, jan
tung i t'ai-chi chih tung, ching i t'ai-chi chih ching

动静阴阳皆只是形而下者,然动亦太极之动,静亦太极之静
t'ung 通 t'ung-ping 统兵

tzu ch'i p'i-ho chih ta-che t'ui erh shang ch'ü, keng wu-
ch'üung chi, pu-k'o i pen-shih yen

自其闢闢之大者推而上去,更无穷极,不可以本始言
tzu-ch'eng 自成

tzu hsia t'ui erh shang ch'ü, tzu shang t'ui erh hsia lai

自下推而上去,自上推而下来
tzu hsia t'ui erh shang ch'ü, wu-hsing chih shih erh-ch'i,
erh-ch'i yu chih shih i-li

自下推而上去,五行只是二气,二气又只是一理
tzu-jan 自然 tzu ming ch'eng 自明诚

tzu pi erh lai 自彼而来

tzu ta-pen erh t'ui chih ta tao erh 自大本而推之达道耳

tzu-tsai 自在

tz'u hsing-tzu shih-ke hsin-tzu i 此性字是个心字意

tz'u-li 此理

wan-li chieh ch'u yü ch'i, wu hsüan-k'ung tu-li chih li

万理皆出于气,无悬空独立之理

wang 忘

wang-ch'i 望气

"Wang-chih" 王制

Wang Ch'ung 王充

"Wang Ch'ung te che-hsüeh ssu-hsiang yü han-tai te ch'i-hsiang
hsüeh 王充的哲学思想与汉代的气象学

Wang Fu 王符 Wang Fu-chih 王夫之

Wang Pi 王弼 Wang Su 王肃

Wang T'ing-hsiang 王廷相 Wang Tzu-ho 王子合

Wang Yang-ming 王阳明 Wei-chin shen-hsien tao-chiao 魏晋神仙道教

wei-fa 未发

wei-fa pu shih mo-jan ch'üan pu-hsing, i ch'ang hsing tsai
che-li 未发不是漠然全不省,亦常醒在这里

Wei Po-yang 魏伯阳 "Wen-chi" 文集

wen-li 文理 wu 无

wu-chi erh t'ai-chi 无极而太极

wu-chi erh t'ai-chi, chih shih i-chü 无极而太极,只是一句

wu-chi erh t'ai-chi, tz'u erh-tzu ch'ing, wu tz'u-hsü ku yeh

无极而太极,此而字轻,无次序故也

wu chih tse ying 物至则应 wu-chuang 无状

wu-fang 无方 wu-hsin su yu chih wu 吾心素有无物

wu-hsing 无形 wu-hsing erh yu-li 无形而有理

wu i hai ch'i t'ien 无以害其天 wu-kan 无感

wu pu chih yeh 无不之也

wu pu-shih erh chih hsiung-chi 毋不筮而知凶吉

wu-szu 无私 "Wu-tu" 五蠹

wu-wei 无为 wu-wo 无我

wu-wo erh hou ta 无我而后大

wu-wo i-li, ts'ai ming pi, chi hsiao tz'u, ho nei-wai chih tao
yeh 物我一理,才明彼既晓此,合内外之道也

wu-yu 无有

ya-yin 涯垠

Yang Hsiung 扬雄

Yang Tzu-chih 杨子直

yao-hsiang 爻象

yen 言

yin-yang ch'i 阴阳气

ying 应

yin-yang t'ai-chi chih chien, pen tzu nan hsia yü

阴阳太极之间,本自难下语

yin-yang tso i-ke shuo i te, tso liang-ke shuo i te

阴阳做一个说亦得,做两个说亦得

yin-yang shang pieh yü i-ke wu-hsing wu-ying te wu-shih

阴阳上别有一个无形无影底物事

"Ying-ti ts'u" 迎敌祠

yu (being) 有

yu (hidden, noumenon) 幽

yu (through) 由

yu-hsing chih chi 有形之极

yu hsüeh-ch'i che 有血气者

yu hsüeh-ch'i chih shu 有血气之属

yu i hu wu-ch'iuung chih tz'u 游意乎无穷之次

yu ke kuang-ming shan-shuo te wu-shih tsai na-li

有个光明闪烁底物事在那里

yu li tse yü ch'i, yü ch'i tse yü li 有理则有气,有气则有理

yu-wu 有物

"Yü-ch'ao" 玉藻

Yü Fan 虞翻

Yü Tun-k'ang 余敦康

Yü Shih-p'eng 虞士朋

yü-yen 语言

yü-yen duo tse, yü chih-li 语言多则愈支离

yüan 元

yüan-ch'i 元气

"Yüan-tao hsün 原道训

"Yüeh-chi" 乐记

yüeh-kuang 月光

"Yüeh-lun" 乐论

yün-ch'í 雲氣
yung-hsing 用行

yung-ch'í 勇氣

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